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The ability to recognize sameness among objects and events is a prerequisite for 
abstraction and forming concepts about what one has learned; thus, identity and 
nonidentity learning can be considered the backbone of higher-order human cognitive 
abilities. This is one reason why it is critical to understand how nonhuman primates learn 
about identity relations. Furthermore, given the adaptive significance of using concepts, it 
is important to investigate if and how nonhuman primates form identity concepts for 
which they categorize or classify the stimuli around them. 
Identity concepts involve discriminating among and between objects, physical 
properties, states, and events in the natural world based on the shared relation of equality 
(Lock & Colombo, 1996; Spinozzi, 1996; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 
1997). One can subdivide the relation of identity into whole- and part-identity (Evans & 
Smith, 1988; Smith, 1989), with the former characterized by discovering identity 
relations holistically (e.g., a penny is identical to another penny) and the latter by 
discovering identity relations between the constituent properties or parts of objects (e.g., 
a red square is identical in color to a red circle). Color and shape are the two common 
properties for which objects may be identical in one regard, but not in the other; 
additionally, number (cardinality) may be considered a constituent property of a 
collection of objects. Discovering identity relations between the constituent properties of 
objects is an important ability that often characterizes the comparisons that humans make 
so it is important to devote attention to understanding how nonhuman primates process 
and conceptualize part-identity. Because the ability to generalize the results of learning is 
to what concepts ultimately reduce, the series of experiments herein first investigated 
 
xvii 
responding to part-identity and -nonidentity and whole-identity and -nonidentity and then 
explored the generality of such learning to the formation of concepts about color, shape, 
and cardinal number. 
The objectives and aims of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were threefold: First, establish 
and evaluate concurrent whole-identity and -nonidentity responding to stimuli that 
differed only in one regard, their color, using for the first time a novel conditional 
discrimination procedure that was akin to the S/D discrimination task. Second, evaluate 
performance differences between concurrent color and shape part-identity responding 
with a larger set of colors and shapes and then do the same for concurrent color and shape 
part- and whole-identity responding. Finally, after the conditional discrimination was 
established, evaluate color and shape part- and whole-identity concept formation by 
introducing novel problems that featured a small set of novel colors and novel shapes. 
The data from Experiments 1, 2, and 3 indicated that the two orangutans learned 
to respond concurrently to color whole-identity and -nonidentity and they responded 
faster to color whole-identity. Additionally, both subjects learned to respond concurrently 
to color and shape part- and whole-identity and for the most part, it was easier for them to 
do so with color part- and whole-identity problems than shape part- and whole-identity 
problems. Further, their learned responses to color and shape part- and whole-identity 
fully transferred to novel color part-identity problems for both subjects and fully 
transferred to novel color and shape whole-identity problems for one orangutan. 
The objectives and aims of Experiments 4, 5, and 6 were also threefold: First, 
establish concurrent identity and nonidentity responding to a small set of numerosity 
stimuli that had cue-ambiguous irrelevant dimensions for the first time in orangutans. 
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Second, establish identity responding to a small set of numerosity stimuli that had cue-
ambiguous irrelevant dimensions before establishing the same when one or more 
irrelevant dimensions were cue-constant. Finally, after the conditional discrimination was 
established, investigate the extent to which numerical identity concepts about cardinal 
number formed by introducing novel and familiar numerosities that were instantiated 
with novel and familiar cue-constant and cue-ambiguous element colors and shapes. 
The data from Experiments 4, 5, and 6 showed that one subject learned to judge 
numerical identity when both irrelevant dimensions were cue-constant, but the subject did 
not do the same when one or more irrelevant dimensions were cue-ambiguous. Further, 
the subject‘s accuracy was affected by the numerical distance and the numerical total of 
comparisons during acquisition of the conditional discrimination. The subject 
subsequently formed a domain-specific concept about numerical identity as evinced by 
the transfer of learning to novel numerosities instantiated with novel, cue-constant 
element colors and shapes and novel numerosities instantiated with cue-constant, familiar 
element colors and shapes. 
This dissertation provided evidence about the extent to which orangutans learned 
to respond to color, shape, and number identity and nonidentity and subsequent concept 
formation from such learning. The findings from this study will help in understanding the 
convergence and divergence in the expression abstraction in the primate phylogeny, thus, 






Beginning in early childhood, humans discriminate patterns among objects, 
events, and ideas across the domains of time, space, and the sensory modalities 
(Bornstein, 1984; Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov, 2001; Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 
1988; Tomasello, 1999). Discriminating patterns is not the same thing as forming 
concepts about those patterns, but the two processes share a common activity—assigning 
entities to categories (Neisser, 1987). In particular, discrimination is a prerequisite for 
abstraction and forming concepts (Holyoak, Gentner, & Kokinov, 2001) as behavior can 
only be labeled conceptually-mediated if one learns to discriminate between and among 
classes and that behavior generalizes to novel instances (Thompson, 1995). Concepts 
give the world stability and are functionally adaptive and cognitively economic for those 
who use them. They capture the idea that many things are similar in some respect. Once 
an entity is assigned to an existing class, then some of its attributes can be inferred and it 
can be thought about and responded to in ways already mastered. Moreover, by virtue of 
membership in a familiar class, behavioral adjustment to novel entities with which one 
has no prior experience or reinforcement history is possible, which reduces the amount of 
information that needs attention and remembering (Smith, 1981; Thompson, 1995; 
Thompson & Oden, 1995, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Zentall, Wasserman, Lazareva, 
Thompson, & Rattermann, 2008). 
William James (1890/1981) noted more than a century ago that ―sense of 
sameness is the very keel and background of our thinking‖ (p. 434). Today, concepts of 
identity and nonidentity, which involve discriminating among and between entities based 
 
2 
on the shared relation of equality (Lock & Colombo, 1996; Spinozzi, 1996; Thompson & 
Oden, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997), are the most commonly studied type of relational 
concepts. Given its pervasiveness as a research topic in humans, it is not surprising that 
identity-nonidentity relational learning and concept formation are considered 
fundamental to understanding nonhuman primate cognition (Lock & Colombo, 1996; 
Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1988; Spinozzi, 1996; Thompson & Oden, 2000; 
Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
What of number? Number—an abstraction that represents how many discrete 
things are perceived and the only property of a set that remains invariant when other 
characteristics of the set change (Piaget, 1941/1965)—not only fills our world, but also 
fills the world of primates. Research in human numerical cognition focuses on how, if, 
and when humans use number as a salient dimension, with the findings indicating that the 
ability to perceive numerical information begins in infancy (Cooper, 1984; Gelman & 
Gallistel, 1986; Strauss & Curtis, 1984). Likewise, more than a century‘s worth of 
research has determined that primates process and use numerical information in a variety 
of ways (for reviews, see Boysen, 1997; Boysen & Capaldi, 1993; Boysen & Hallberg, 
2000; Davis & Memmott, 1982; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; and Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
Studying higher-order cognitive abilities like relational learning, concept 
formation, and numerical cognition in nonhuman primates is an attempt, for one, to relate 
their abilities to the abilities of humans (Himes, 1999). If one conceptualizes cognition as 
covert behavior, then according to the basic rules of evolution, cognitive abilities are 
subject to natural selection like any biological characteristic, and patterns in the 
expression of behavior and cognitive abilities should exist across species with respect to 
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an organism‘s phylogeny. Because the taxonomic relationships among humans and 
nonhuman primates are known (e.g., humans and chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and 
orangutans are closely related sister species that share a common ancestor that dates back 
5 to 10 million years ago), there is an evolutionary basis for applying comparative 
methods to evaluate patterns of divergence and convergence in cognitive abilities (Haun, 
Jordan, Vallortigara, & Clayton, 2010; Parker, 1999).  
Discovering the areas of cognitive generality and specificity between humans and 
primates is complicated because each species has its own specific limitations (Wright, 
1992), different methodological tools employed across species may lead to task-specific 
differences (Hauser, 1997), and schooling and language learning may mask or distort 
shared mechanisms (Fabre-Thorpe, 2001; Geary & Lin, 1998). Further, human-like 
language abilities are precluded in all but a few animal species (e.g., language-trained 
apes) so language cannot yet be assigned a significant role in the behavior of nonhuman 
animals in natural settings (Lattal & Perone, 1998). In light of the aforementioned, the 
most important comparisons may be between nonhuman primates and nonverbal human 
infants (Hauser, 1997). 
Given the adaptive significance of using concepts, it is important to investigate if 
and how primates form concepts for which they categorize or classify the stimuli around 
them (Thompson, 1995; Thompson & Oden, 1995, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997). One 
problem in investigating concept formation is that psychologists often talk about 
concepts, but then only study categorization. Further, most researchers assume that 
concept formation is pure and simple, but there are enough differences in the nature of 
the input (c.f., random dot patterns vs. geometric shapes, multi-item arrays vs. two-item 
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arrays, two vs. three dimensional stimuli, etc.) to warrant close differentiated 
examinations (Mandler, 2000). 
Investigations about the extent to which apes, monkeys, and human infants form 
conceptual understandings of identity and nonidentity about color, shape, and cardinal 
number from identity and nonidentity judgments about color, shape, and cardinal number 
are limited. The aforementioned trend in the literature is in comparison to investigations 
about relational learning and concept formation that involves objects and continuous 
quantity (e.g., the combined influence of number and length, volume, area, etc.). A 
comparative examination among apes, monkeys, and human infants may contribute to 
our understanding about when higher-order cognitive abilities emerged in the 
phylogenetic scale, how they have increased in complexity since their emergence, and the 
extent to which they depend upon language (Fabre-Thorpe, 2001; Hauser, 1997; Pearce, 
1988). 
Proper application of the comparative method, however, requires knowledge 
about the abilities of all sister ape species, especially those that are nonverbal given that 
researchers theorize that language promotes a kind of flexible thinking that leads to the 
development of higher levels of conceptualization (Fabre-Thorpe, 2001; Hauser & Carey, 
1998; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; Parker, Mitchell, & Miles, 1999; Pearce, 1988; 
Premack, 1988; Thompson & Oden, 1995; Tomasello, 1999). The majority of literature 
concerning concept formation about color, shape, and number in apes, though, is 
explored in language-trained chimpanzees. This dissertation, thus, attempts to balance the 
scale by providing evidence about the extent that nonlanguage-trained orangutans learn to 
judge color, shape, and cardinal number identity-nonidentity and form concepts of 
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identity-nonidentity from such judgments. As such, this line of investigation informs our 






In the human cognition literature, a concept is regarded as a mental representation 
of a category, which need not have a real world counterpart, or as knowledge that 
facilitates categorization and a category is defined a class of objects or events that belong 
together. Cognitive psychology focuses on the structure and organization of concepts and 
primarily describes terminal performance (Medin, 1989; Smith, 1981). One way to think 
about the relation between concepts and categories is to describe concepts as a basis or 
rule for categorization, which is a differential response to a set of stimuli (Herrnstein, 
1990; Medin, 1989; Smith, 2005). Thus, concept formation and categorization are 
intimately connected to the extent that theories about conceptual structure are not 
separated from those proposed for categorization. 
Recasting terminology and taxonomy in terms of the conditions necessary and 
sufficient for conceptual behavior, the behavior analytic perspective takes a functional 
approach by examining what types of behavior are conceptual and how conceptual 
behavior emerges (Astley & Wasserman, 1996; Palmer, 2002; Wasserman & DeVolder, 
1993; Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). In this regard, Keller and Schoenfeld‘s 
(1950) outline serves as the standard, ―when a group of objects gets the same response, 
when they form a class the members of which are reacted to similarly, we speak of a 
concept‖ (p. 154) and ―generalization within classes and discrimination between 
classes—this is the essence of concepts‖ (p. 155). Further, it is common to speak of a 
class of stimuli (i.e., a stimulus class) that occasion a common response in a given 
context as a category or concept. 
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In nonhuman animals, the study of concept learning is rooted in the field of 
comparative psychology, with recent work integrating behavior analysis and learning 
theory (e.g., discrimination, generalization, and laws of learning), cognitive psychology 
(e.g., memory, attention, and representation), and evolution and ecology (e.g., adaptation 
and ecological relevance). Animal cognition, the area of inquiry that lies at the 
intersection of human cognition and animal learning, draws on all of the aforementioned 
research traditions in its approach to the study of concept formation (Terrace, 1984; 
Thompson, 1995; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Zentall & Smeets, 
1996). Animal cognition researchers investigate conceptually-mediated behavior, that is, 
whether nonverbal organisms are capable of discriminating between and within common 
classes of objects, states, and events and across multiple domains in ways that do not 
follow the simple associative processes often attributed to animals (Lock & Colombo, 
1996; Thompson & Oden, 2000). 
It should be clear by now that the terms concept, category, stimulus class, and 
their derivatives are used interchangeably and loosely across and within research 
domains. One must also add the term abstraction to the ambiguous terminology and 
taxonomy list. An abstraction is a discrimination based on a single property of stimuli, 
independent of other properties, thus, it involves generalization among all stimuli with 
that property (e.g., all red stimuli as opposed to specific red objects). The term concept is 
sometime used to refer to abstraction involving more than a single property, thus, it 
involves generalization among stimuli along multiple dimensions (e.g., humans as 
opposed to orangutans). More often the terms abstraction and concept are used 
interchangeably (Catania, 1998). In any case, the taxonomy and terminology that fall 
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under the rubric of concept formation are not the important issue; instead, it is important 
to investigate whether animals learn or form concepts or stimulus classes for which they 
categorize or classify the stimuli around them (Thompson, 1995; Thompson & Oden, 
1995, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
2.1 Inferring Concept Formation 
Before I am prepared to say that a pigeon has a concept of ―person‖, I want to 
know whether what I teach it about …―person,‖ say a tall man wearing a white 
coat, it will generalize to another instance of the same concept, say a short woman 
wearing a maroon sweater—and that it will generalize in this particular way rather 
than to all white objects (e.g. refrigerators or laboratory doors), or all objects 179 
cm tall (Lea, 1984, p. 271). 
To investigate whether animals learn or form concepts or classes for which they 
categorize or classify the stimuli around them, as Lea (1984) indicated, it is not sufficient 
merely to demonstrate discriminative responding in the face of stimulus variability and 
then conclude that an organism‘s behavior was conceptually-mediated. Concept 
formation is inferred when the same response is spontaneously occasioned by many 
stimuli in a set (or by the relations among the stimuli in a set) and that response must 
occur at a much lower probability (or at a much lower rate) in the presence of stimuli that 
are not members of the class, in other words, generalization within and discrimination 
between classes (Fields & Reeve, 2000; Herrnstein, 1990; Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950; 
Lea, 1984). 
2.1.1 Operant Conditioning Procedures 
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Discrimination learning is a prerequisite for forming concepts (Holyoak, Gentner, 
& Kokinov, 2001). Inferences of concept formation usually involve assessing differences 
in responding in the presence of different stimuli, which is a stimulus control issue 
(Saunders & Williams, 1998). Stimulus control refers to any difference in responding in 
the presence of different stimuli. Simple and conditional discrimination procedures are 
instrumental in studying higher-order processes like concept formation because the study 
of concept formation requires a training history in which the same response is reinforced 
in the presence of a number of stimuli that contain the element or elements to which 
control is being established.  
In the prototypical simple discrimination task, a reinforcer is delivered after 
responses to positive discriminative stimuli (S+), but not after responses to negative 
discriminative stimuli (S-). For example, in the oddity task, subjects are simultaneously 
presented with sets of three or more stimuli (e.g., AAB or ABA, with the letters of the 
alphabet signifying different stimuli) and selection of the odd stimulus is rewarded 
regardless of its spatial position (Saunders & Williams, 1998; Zentall, Hogan, & 
Edwards, 1984). 
In conditional discrimination, the function of a discriminative stimulus, whether 
S+ or S-, changes based on the presence of another stimulus, the conditional stimulus; in 
other words, the simple discrimination that is reinforced depends on which conditional 
stimulus is presented (Saunders & Williams, 1998). The same/different (S/D) task is an 
example of the conditional position discrimination procedure. In this task, for example, 
subjects learn to associate one configuration of stimuli (identical stimuli: AA, BB, and 
CC) with pressing the left button because this response is followed by reinforcement and 
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another configuration of stimuli (nonidentical stimuli: AB, BC, and CD) with pressing 
the right button because this response is followed by reinforcement (Nakagawa, 2003; 
Saunders & Williams, 1998; Zentall, Hogan, & Edwards, 1984). Matching-to-sample 
procedures are another prototypical conditional discrimination procedure. In the two-
choice matching-to sample (MTS) task, a subject is presented with a single sample 
stimulus and two comparison stimuli, and the subject receives differential reinforcement 
for choosing the comparison stimulus that matches the sample stimulus (Saunders & 
Williams, 1998; Zentall, Hogan, & Edwards, 1984). 
What about the simple and conditional discrimination procedures employed with 
human infants? The conjugate reinforcement paradigm requires that infants activate 
reinforcement (auditory, visual, nonnutritive, or social) with their arm or leg movements, 
with the intensity, rate, or salience of reinforcement contingent on the infant‘s behavior. 
For example, with conjugate mobile reinforcement, infants lie supine in cribs with a cord 
attached from their leg to a mobile that hangs overhead such that their movements (the 
operant) activate the mobile. If infants who have learned to associate their kicks with 
activating the mobile during a training phase continue to kick at a high rate when tested 
with the same mobile under nonreinforcement and their rate of kicking does not exceed 
baseline rates when tested with a novel mobile, then it can be said that they discriminate 
the details of the novel mobile from the details of the training mobile (Colombo, 1993; 
Piek, 2006; Rovee-Collier, 1996; Weisberg & Rovee-Collier, 1998). 
Finally, the visual anticipation paradigm is a method that has both operant and 
classical conditioning features. With this procedure, infants learn spatial, spatiotemporal, 
or other kinds of patterns among stimuli (a predictable stimulus order or movement) such 
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that they start to anticipate the pattern. For example, infants are seated in front of video 
displays while a target stimulus appears in the center of the screen, then disappears, and 
then is followed by visual reinforcement that appears on the right side of the screen if a 
red target stimulus was presented or on the left side of the screen if a blue target stimulus 
was presented. An infant‘s typical response is to make a head turn or visually fixate on 
stimuli that appear on the screen in the different locations, but the question is whether 
infants are capable of predicting or anticipating patterns, especially when novel members 
of the learned class are introduced during transfer testing. 
Of final note, the stimuli employed in simple and conditional tasks may vary in 
the number of dimensions they share with each other. Relevant dimensions distinguish 
odd from nonodd stimuli or matching from nonmatching stimuli and irrelevant 
dimensions are those that do not. When operant procedures are used, the relevant 
dimension is the property that is correlated with differential reinforcement. Irrelevant 
dimensions may be of two types: those that are cue-constant are shared by all stimuli and 
those that are cue-ambiguous differ among all stimuli in an uninformative way. Thus, 
irrelevant dimension cue constancy and ambiguity are measures of between-stimulus 
heterogeneity or variability. In a three-choice oddity task, for example, a blue circle, red 
circle, and red circle would respectively serve as the odd and nonodd stimuli if color was 
the relevant and shape the irrelevant cue-constant dimension. In a three-choice S/D task, 
a blue triangle and red triangle versus a green square and yellow circle would 
respectively serve as the identical and nonidentical pair if shape was the relevant 
dimension and color the irrelevant cue-ambiguous dimension. When problems are 
constructed such that nonodd (or matching) stimuli are identical, like in the first example, 
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the task is called a simple or conventional task. When problems are constructed such that 
the matching (or nonodd) stimuli are not identical, but share more properties with each 
other than they share with the odd stimulus, like in the latter example, the task is called a 
dimension-abstracted task (Bernstein, 1961; Noble & Thomas, 1985; Steirn & Thomas, 
1990; Strong, Drash, & Hedges, 1968; Thomas & Frost, 1983). 
2.1.2 Transfer Tests 
Mastery of operant tasks does not presume the formation of concepts. Assessing 
transfer is the standard method used to determine if behavior goes beyond simple 
associative and perceptual processes after operant procedures have established 
discriminative responding. Transfer of learning tests measure the degree to which 
organisms recognize class memberships when comparing stimuli by demonstrating that 
the effects of contingencies applied to some stimuli of a given class (i.e., baseline 
performance to training stimuli) generalize or shift to other members of the same class 
(Saunders & Williams, 1998; Spinozzi, 1996; Thompson, 1995; Thompson & Oden, 
1995, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). In addition 
to transfer of learning tests, the transfer may in the form of generalization of function or 
in the emergence of untrained relations from relations that are explicitly trained (see 
Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). 
To demonstrate conceptual behavior, transfer of learning tests must use novel 
exemplars to ensure that there are no features other than the concept facilitating transfer. 
If novel stimuli are not used then transfer performance could be controlled by extraneous 
factors, the features of training stimuli, reinforcement history, or background cues that 
parallel the concept (Herrnstein, 1990; Jitsumori, Siemann, Lehr, & Delius, 2002; 
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Spinozzi, 1996; Thompson, 1995; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Wright & Katz, 2006; 
Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). Novel exemplars may be novel in the sense that 
the stimuli have never been seen before by subjects or task-novel in that they were not 
used during acquisition or transfer testing for the task-at-hand or for a similar previous 
task. There are also semi-novel exemplars, sets that contain at least one stimulus that was 
used in training or transfer testing before being employed in the task-at-hand. For 
example, a familiar-novel pair of stimuli contains one stimulus that was used in training 
and one novel stimulus. In many cases, transfer tests with semi-novel exemplars cannot 
show concept learning, but sometimes they can and do. 
Further, with simple and conditional discrimination procedures, it is critical that 
transfer tests not involve differential reinforcement of correct responses to novel 
exemplars because it is then possible that performance reflects acquisition of a learning 
set in which an initially narrowly construed association was applied to an increasingly 
broader class of objects. If one chooses to reinforce responses differentially during 
transfer testing then one-trial (also called trial-unique) presentations of novel problems is 
preferable to prevent subjects from rapidly learning how to respond accurately. If the 
same novel exemplars within different problems or the same problem is repeatedly 
presented under differential reinforcement, then one should evaluate transfer of learning 
using first- or early-trial performance for each problem or for the transfer test session. 
Although transfer of learning assessments remains the critical test for concept 
formation, there is no consensus about what constitutes successful transfer of learning. 
Some psychologists argue that learning must be relatively faster during transfer when 
presented with novel exemplars than it was during baseline to infer conceptual behavior. 
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If learning is at the same basic rate during training and transfer then the inference is that a 
concept has not been learned (Tomasello & Call, 1997).  
Some psychologists propose that the formation of a concept is confirmed by the 
maintenance of a high level of accuracy during the transfer test phase when trained 
animals are presented with novel exemplars. This may mean that performance with novel 
stimuli during transfer testing is equivalent to baseline performance, is better than what 
chance would predict, or is better than chance but below baseline performance (Spinozzi, 
1996; Vonk & MacDonald, 2002; Wright & Katz, 2006; Zentall, 1996; Zentall, Hogan, & 
Edwards, 1984). Wright and Katz (2006) termed partial transfer as when transfer 
performance is better than what chance would predict, but below baseline performance 
and full transfer as when transfer performance is equivalent to baseline performance and 
above what chance would predict. Partial transfer is not as encouraging as is full transfer 
because it is possible that multiple cues other than the concept are controlling behavior. 
In any case, the immediate successful transfer of discriminative performance to novel 
exemplars (i.e., early-trial learning) instead of successful transfer of discriminative 
performance to novel exemplars across repeated presentations, is the most compelling 
evidence for concluding conceptual behavior because it suggests that learning did not 
function in a simple associative manner during acquisition (Thompson & Oden, 2000). 
2.2 Types of Concepts 
Three broad attributes—perceptual, associative, and relational—seem to unite 
events within a category or stimuli class (Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). Although 
this dissertation will use the aforementioned system to type concepts, other researchers 
use different systems. For example, concepts may also be grouped as similarity- and 
 
15 
nonsimilarity-based, in other words, stimulus classes for which the defining characteristic 
is similarity versus the converse, nonsimilarity (Wasserman & DeVolder, 1993; Zentall, 
1996). Because perceptual and associative concepts are only tangential to this 
dissertation, I present only a brief discussion of these topics to establish a framework for 
thinking about relational concepts. 
2.2.1 Perceptual Concepts 
Perceptual concept learning is related to the most familiar form of categorization 
in humans. Perceptual concepts involve sorting stimuli into appropriate categories based 
on perceptual identity and similarity, in other words, grouping stimuli that share one or 
more physical properties into classes. Humans would describe members of a perceptual 
class in terms of a category label like ‗red‘ things. The stimuli that compose perceptual 
classes cannot be defined by a few simple features, but instead possess many features that 
control categorization so it is often difficult to specify the particular common elements 
that might be used to classify category members from nonmembers.  
Investigations of perceptual concept formation tend to focus on natural concepts. 
Natural concepts are those that form in relation to stimuli that occur in the natural 
environment (e.g., people, trees, and animals). The stimuli within natural categories are 
physically more similar to each other than they are to stimuli from different categories 
(Herrnstein, 1984; Jitsumori & Delius, 2001; Smith, 1981; Thompson, 1995). Because 
perceptual similarity often guides responding, this type of concept learning is considered 
a basic-level conceptual behavior largely under the control of the behavioral principles of 
stimulus discrimination and generalization (Katz, Wright, & Bodily, 2007; Zentall, 
Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002; Zentall et al., 2008). 
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2.2.2 Associative Concepts 
Associative concepts involve forming categories that are made up of arbitrary 
stimuli deemed to be equivalent because they are associated with a common event, 
response, or outcome as the stimuli within classes bearing no obvious physical similarity 
to each other (Katz, Wright, & Bodily, 2007; Zentall et al., 2008). Thus, the formation of 
associative concepts attests to the ability to produce novel and appropriate responses in 
the presence of physically dissimilar objects and events. 
Equivalence classes are a specific type of associative concept. Sidman (1990, 
1997) defined stimulus equivalence as an asset of stimuli that all bare the same relation to 
one another if all of the tests for the properties of equivalence—reflexivity, symmetry, 
and transitivity—are satisfied. One way to think about these three relations is to say that 
two ideas that were never associated directly with each other, but were each associated 
with a third idea, could potentially come to be associated such that the three ideas become 
interchangeable (Catania, 1998; Green & Saunders, 1998; Zentall, 1996).
1
 
Functional (equivalence) classes are also a specific type of associative concept. A 
functional class is composed of a group of discriminative stimuli that all control the same 
behavior. One can conclude that stimuli are functionally equivalent when a variable 
applied to one, like a change in contingencies, is sufficient to similarly change behavior 
in the others (Clayton & Hayes, 1999; Sidman, 1990; Sidman, Wynne, Maguire, & 
Barnes, 1989; Urcuioli & Zentall, 1993; Zentall, 1996; Zentall, Clement, & Weaver, 
2003; Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002; Zentall et al., 2008). 
                                               
1
 There is also the relational frame account of stimulus equivalence (for review, see 
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). 
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2.2.3 Relational Concepts 
Relational (also called abstract) concepts are illustrated when membership in a 
common class is based on the relations among stimuli, which transcends the individual 
features of stimuli. To form a relational concept, an organism must be able to isolate 
relevant relational invariants from the physical properties of the entities engaged in the 
relation and transfer that understanding to novel arguments. In other words, relational 
concept learning involves judging the nonphysical or abstract relationship (e.g., temporal, 
perceptual, and spatial) between stimuli based on a rule that transcends any particular set 
of exemplars. Example types of relational classes are ‗larger than‘ (i.e., larger-smaller), 
‗more than‘ (i.e., more-less), and ‗identical to‘ (i.e., identity-nonidentity). Thus, a single 
stimulus can belong to one class (e.g., better than) if the stimulus to which it is compared 
is worse than it and another class (e.g., worse than) if the stimulus to which it is 
compared is better than it (Katz, Wright, & Bodily, 2007; Thompson, 1995; Thompson & 
Oden, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Wright, 1992; Zentall, Galizio, & Critchfield, 
2002; Zentall et al., 2008). 
Relational concepts are said to be a prerequisite for, or the basis of, higher-order 
cognitive skills like understanding mathematical equivalence operations, analogy, and 
Piagetian conservation (Czerny & Thomas, 1975; Thomas & Peay, 1976). Understanding 
social relationships, and possibly foraging, seems the likely impetus for the evolution of 
relational concepts because these skills depend on comparing conspecifics and food 
sources (Hauser, 1997; Tomasello & Call, 1997). Identity and nonidentity are the most 
commonly studied relational concepts. Identity concepts involve discriminating among 
and between objects, physical properties, states, and events in the natural world based on 
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the shared relation of equality (Lock & Colombo, 1996; Spinozzi, 1996; Thompson & 
Oden, 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997). The identity relation may be subdivided into 
whole- and part-identity. Whole-identity is characterized by discovering identity relations 
holistically across all dimensions and part-identity by discovering identity relations 
between the constituent properties or parts of objects (Evans & Smith, 1988; Smith, 
1989). Discovering identity relations among the constituent parts of objects is an ability 
that often characterizes the comparisons that humans make, however, less research 
attention is devoted to investigating processing and conceptualization of part-identity 
than whole-identity. 
Color part- and whole-identity MTS tasks require that color, the mix of light 
wavelengths leaving the surface of objects, be the relevant dimension that distinguishes 
whether stimuli are identical or nonidentical. Likewise, shape part- and whole-identity 
MTS tasks require that shape, the region bounded by continuous contour, be the relevant 
dimension. Furthermore, for part-identity MTS tasks, at least one irrelevant dimension 
must be cue-ambiguous (i.e., its instances differ among all stimuli being compared in 
some uninformative way); for example, a green square is identical to a red square, not a 
yellow rectangle in terms of shape part-identity. For whole-identity MTS tasks, all 
irrelevant dimensions are cue-constant (i.e., its instances are shared by all stimuli being 
compared); for example, a green square is identical to a green square, not a yellow square 
in terms of color whole-identity. 
The next sections detail the empirical literature about color and shape identity and 
nonidentity responding and concept formation in apes, monkeys, and nonverbal human 
infants. Nonverbal human infants were defined as infants 12 months of age or younger 
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because infants typically produce their first word around one year of age (Benedict, 1979; 
Berger, 2008; Lamb, Bornstein, & Teti, 2002; Menyuk, Liebergott, & Schultz, 1995). 
Second, because of the scope of the dissertation research, only empirical studies using 
operant or associative learning methods in which identity-nonidentity responding as well 
as subsequent concept formation could be assessed are discussed. Finally, it was useful to 
exclude studies that involved two or more relevant dimensions, cross-modal and 
extradimensional concept formation, and symbolic language systems (i.e., lexicons and 
lexigrams). 
I limited my evaluations of concept formation to early-trial transfer performance, 
which I set at 25 or fewer trials of a single problem when differential reinforcement was 
employed.
2
 Further, statistical analyses to determine whether baseline and transfer test 
performance differed significantly from each other or differed from chance were not 
performed in many studies described herein. For these studies, I considered baseline and 
transfer test performance equivalent when their accuracy differed by 5% to 6% or less 
and I considered transfer test performance at what chance would predict if accuracy 
differed from chance by 15% to 16% or less.
3
 Finally, Douglass (1925) recognized that 
there is no limit to a concept‘s extension or perfection; instead, there are varying degrees 
in the attainment of a perfect concept. Based on this idea, it was useful in this dissertation 
to distinguish the level at which concepts formed according to which dimension‘s 
                                               
2
 Data that showed that a concept did not form across more than 25 differentially 
reinforced trials of a single problem were considered for inclusion 
3
 When statistical evaluations were absent, chance probabilities for correct responses 
were estimated to be .50 for two-choice simple and conditional discriminations, .33 for 
three-choice simple and conditional discriminations, and so forth unless otherwise 
indicated in the text. 
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instances were made novel for the transfer test stimuli (Roberts, Robbins, & Everitt, 
1988). The levels of concept formation that are proposed herein may be analogous to the 
levels of relational knowledge proposed by Smith (1984) and this possibility is presented 
in the Discussion section at the end of Chapter 2. 
The lowest level of concept formation was assessed by introducing novel 
instances of the irrelevant dimension; for example, training responding in which shape is 
the relevant dimension and transfer testing with the familiar training shapes instantiated 
in novel colors. If an organism maintains discriminative responding to novel instances of 
the irrelevant dimension then it has demonstrated a conceptual understanding that the 
identity relation applies to specific trained members within the dimension regardless of 
the distinct manner in which they are instantiated. An intermediate level was assessed by 
introducing novel instances of the relevant dimension; for example, training identity 
responding in which color is the relevant dimension and transfer testing with novel colors 
instantiated in the familiar training shapes. If an organism maintains discriminative 
responding when the instances of the relevant dimension are made novel, then the 
organism has demonstrated a conceptual understanding that the identity relation applies 
to all members of the dimension when they are instantiated in the same way. Finally, the 
highest level corresponded to introducing novel instances of the relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions in conjunction, with maintenance of discriminative responding indicating a 
conceptual understanding of identity for members within the dimension regardless of 
how they are distinctly instantiated.  
2.2.3.1 Identity-Nonidentity about Color and Shape in Apes 
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There is only a single study addressing whole-nonidentity responding and concept 
formation in apes. The study showed that a language-trained chimpanzee formed a 
concept about shape at the intermediate level, but only after additional training with a 
larger set of exemplars (Tomonaga, 1995). First, a chimpanzee called Ai was trained to 
select the odd shaped white target stimulus from a set of identically shaped, white 
distracter stimuli to a criterion level of accuracy with 12 target-distracter oddity 
problems. Then, interspersed within baseline trials of the training problems were 
nonreinforced probe trials in which the shape of the target and distracter stimuli was 
novel, but the subject‘s accuracy was statistically no different from chance for the novel 
problems. Full transfer of learning occurred only when nonreinforced and reinforced 
probe trials for which the shape of the target and distracter stimuli was novel were 
interspersed within baseline trials of the old novel and old semi-novel transfer test 
problems. 
With respect to investigations of part-identity and -nonidentity responding and 
concept formation, there is also only a single study in apes. The study showed that a 
group of chimpanzees formed a concept about color (or shape) as a constituent property 
of objects at the highest level; notably, the same could not be said of a group of 
orangutans (King, 1973).
4
 Specifically, using a paired S/D object discrimination task, half 
of the subjects (the shape-same-color-different group) were trained to select the stimulus 
pair that had identical shapes and different colors with the incorrect pair having different 
shapes and identical colors. The other half of subjects (the color-same-shape-different 
                                               
4
 By indexing concept learning with all 102 differentially reinforced transfer trials, the 
author concluded that the orangutans demonstrated concept formation, which is opposite 
to my interpretation. 
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group) were trained to select the stimulus pair that had identical colors and different 
shapes with the S- pair having different colors and identical shapes. For example, it was 
correct for the shape-same-color-different group to select the pair of triangles that were 
colored differently and the color-same-shape-different group to select the pair of red 
stimuli that were shaped differently when presented with a red triangle and green triangle 
as one pair and a red C-shape and red square as the other pair. 
To test for transfer of learning, subjects were given problems constructed from 
three novel shapes and three novel colors. The accuracy of the orangutans was 
statistically at chance and improved to above chance levels with additional trials, which 
suggests associative learning. On the other hand, the accuracy of the chimpanzees was 
statistically above chance and did not improve with additional trials, which suggests 
partial concept formation. Furthermore, additional test trials for which the correct 
stimulus pair was identical in both color and shape and the incorrect stimulus pair 
different in color (e.g., red triangle and red triangle vs. red square and white C-shape), 
shape (e.g., red triangle and red triangle vs. white triangle and white C-shape) or both 
color and shape (e.g., red triangle and red triangle vs. red triangle and white C-shape) 
showed that the color-same-shape-different group chose primarily according to color 
identity, not shape nonidentity and that the shape-same-color-different group chose 
primarily according to color nonidentity, not shape identity. 
2.2.3.2 Identity-Nonidentity about Color and Shape in Monkeys 
Monkeys more often than not form whole-identity and -nonidentity concepts 
about shape. A concept of whole-nonidentity about shape formed at the intermediate 
level after a group of eight monkeys learned to concurrently judge color and shape 
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whole-nonidentity (Meyer & Harlow, 1949). Specifically, subjects were trained to select 
the odd shaped white stimulus from two other identically shaped white stimuli (e.g., 
white trapezoid:white triangle:white triangle) trained to a criterion level of accuracy; 
thus, the odd stimulus was odd for no dimension other than shape.
5
 As a group, accuracy 
was statistically above chance for the first 24 differentially reinforced trials of three sets 
that contained novel white shapes. Additionally, a concept about shape whole-identity 
formed at the intermediate level in two capuchin monkeys after concurrent color and 
shape whole-identity matching (Barros, Galvão, & McIlvane, 2002) and in three tufted 
capuchin monkeys after shape whole-identity matching (Truppa et al., 2010).  
On the other hand, shape whole-identity responding did not lead to the formation 
of a concept of shape whole-identity at the intermediate level in three tufted capuchin 
monkeys (Truppa et al., 2010) and two Japanese monkeys (Kojima, 1979, 1982). For the 
aforementioned two instances that concepts failed to form, however, additional training 
with a larger set of exemplars resulted in concept formation. Specifically, additional 
shape whole-identity matching with a larger set of exemplars resulted in the formation of 
a concept of shape whole-identity at the highest level in six capuchin monkeys even 
though in the earlier experiment three subjects failed to form a shape whole-identity 
concept (Truppa et al., 2010). Also, a concept of whole-identity about shape did not form 
at the intermediate level until two Japanese monkeys received additional shape whole-
identity training with a larger set of exemplars (Kojima, 1979, 1982). 
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With respect to color whole-identity and -nonidentity concept formation, it is 
clear that monkeys sometimes succeed in this regard, but they fail equally as often. At the 
intermediate level, a group of eight monkeys formed a whole-nonidentity concept after 
they learned to concurrently respond to color and shape whole-nonidentity (Meyer & 
Harlow, 1949) and two capuchin monkeys formed a whole-identity concept after they 
learned to concurrently respond to color and shape whole-identity (Barros, Galvão, & 
McIlvane, 2002). At the lowest level, four rhesus monkeys (Jackson & Pegram, 1970) 
and one Japanese monkey (Fujita, 1983b) formed a whole-identity concept and four 
Japanese monkeys formed a whole-identity and -nonidentity concept even though one 
subject required additional training with a larger set of stimuli before concept learning 
occurred (Fujita, 1983b). On the other hand, at the lowest level, six Japanese monkeys 
failed to show behavior indicative of a concept of whole-identity about color (Fujita, 
1982, 1983a, 1983b) and four Japanese monkeys failed to show behavior indicative of 
color whole-identity and -nonidentity concept formation (Fujita, 1983a, 1983b). 
Investigations about identity-nonidentity concept formation about color and shape 
as constituent properties of objects are represented in a limited capacity within the 
literature as more emphasis is placed on concept formation across objects globally. 
Although the empirical evidence is limited, monkeys form part-identity concepts about 
color and shape. First, concurrent responding to color and shape part-nonidentity during 
oddity tasks led to the formation of a concept about shape and color part-nonidentity at 
the lowest level in two rhesus monkeys and a concept about color part-nonidentity at the 
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intermediate level in one of the two rhesus monkeys (Young & Harlow, 1943).
6
 
Specifically, both subjects continued to select (a) the odd shaped stimulus statistically 
more often than chance for two sets of novel colored, familiar shaped stimuli and (b) the 
odd colored stimulus statistically more often than chance for two sets of novel shaped, 
familiar colored stimuli. Further, one subject continued to select the odd colored stimulus 
statistically more often than chance for two sets of novel colored, familiar shaped stimuli, 
which illustrates concept formation at the intermediate level. Second, a part-identity 
concept about color formed at the lowest level after color part-identity responding in two 
rhesus monkeys even though one monkey required additional color part-identity 
matching with a larger set of exemplars before concept formation occurred (Weinstein, 
1945). 
2.2.3.3 Identity-Nonidentity about Color and Shape in Infants 
Only a few empirical reports investigate concept formation using operant and 
associative learning methods in infants. The findings indicate that nonverbal infants form 
whole-identity concepts about shape and part-identity and -nonidentity concepts about 
shape and color. The major methodological limitation of these experiments is that they do 
not examine the data for individual differences in performance so it is possible that many 
individuals within the group failed to form concepts. Identifying individual differences in 
performance could enhance the generalizability of results and show that identity 
judgments can establish a range of stimulus control topographies, which permit 
                                               
6
 My conclusion differs from the authors‘ who based their conclusion of successful 
generalization of color and shape oddity judgments on transfer tests that involved 
previously used, differentially reinforced transfer stimuli, transfer stimuli that may not 
have been discriminably different from the training stimuli, and nonsimilarity (instead of 
nonidentity) based judgments. 
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individual acquisition and promote or retard generalization (Brannon, Cantlon, & 
Terrace, 2006; Galvão et al., 2005; Judge, Evans, & Vyas, 2005). 
Using the visual anticipation paradigm, the responses of nine 5- to 7-month-olds 
indicated the formation of a whole-identity concept about shape (McMurray & Aslin, 
2004). During the training phase, participants were shown shapes in one color that 
appeared in the center of the screen before disappearing from the screen (e.g., a yellow 
cross and yellow square). Visual reinforcement then appeared on the left side of the 
screen if the previous stimulus was the square and on the right side of the screen if the 
previous stimulus was the cross. Each participant learned the relation between shape and 
the spatial location of reinforcement because they looked at the correct side of the screen 
for a longer period than the incorrect side of the screen statistically more often than what 
chance would predict. During the transfer testing phase, nonreinforced test trials of the 
familiar shapes in novel colors we shown (e.g., red square and orange cross). Correct 
anticipatory eye movements did not differ statistically between nonreinforced trials of the 
training stimuli and the novel colored, familiar shaped test stimuli; thus, infants 
recognized that shape was invariant in the face of changes to its color and their 
anticipatory eye movements followed the pattern learned during training. 
Second, using the conjugate reinforcement paradigm, a part-identity concept 
about shape formed at the highest level in a group of 2.5 to 4 month old infants (Hayne, 
Rovee-Collier, & Perris, 1987). Training mobiles consisted of wooden blocks with the 
same colored shape on each block (e.g., blocks with red As). The shape on the blocks 
remained unchanged during training, while the color varied (e.g., red As, blue As, and 
green As). During transfer testing, participants were shown mobile blocks with the 
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familiar or a novel shape in one novel color (e.g., black As or black 2s). If participants 
learned the relation between the shape on the mobile blocks and activation of the mobile, 
then they should continue kicking when the familiar shape was shown in a novel color 
and discontinue kicking otherwise. During the transfer test, the rate of kicking was 
statistically higher than the baseline rate of kicking for the familiar shape in the novel 
color, which shows that infants generalized their responses to members of the class (e.g., 
the shape on blocks), and was statistically no different from baseline for the novel shape 
in the novel color, which shows that they did not generalize their responses to 
nonmembers of the class. The results showed that the infants formed a part-identity 
concept about shape as a constituent property of the mobiles. Finally, an additional 
experiment showed conceptualization of identity about both color and shape as the 
constituent properties of objects at the lowest level in two groups of six-month-olds, but 
not in a group of three-month-olds using the conjugate reinforcement paradigm (Bhatt, 
Wilk, Hill, & Rovee-Collier, 2004).  
2.2.3.4 Discussion 
The levels of concept formation proposed in this dissertation may be analogous to 
the levels of relational knowledge that were proposed by Smith (1984) to underlie the 
development of dimensional comparisons. The first level of understanding relations 
involves knowledge that a particular attribute (e.g., red) can be instantiated in a variety of 
distinct objects. The second level involves knowledge that there are qualitatively distinct 
kinds of attributes (e.g., red and blue are attributes of the same kind) that are different 
from other kinds, in other words, knowledge that a particular dimension exists (e.g., the 
color dimension). Young children are able to learn relations at the first level, whereas, 
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only older children are generally able to learn relations at the second level. With that said, 
the lowest level of concept formation proposed in this dissertation may be akin to the first 
level of relational knowledge, the intermediate level akin to the second level of relational 
knowledge, and the highest level an integration of the first and second levels of relational 
knowledge. If this is the case, then it should be easier to form concepts at the lowest level 
and hardest to form concepts at the highest level. The just reviewed literature does not 
disentangle these relationships so it remains a matter for future research. 
The differentiation hypothesis about conceptual development proposes that there 
is a shift during infancy from the discovery of identity relations based on the global or 
holistic aspect of objects (i.e., across all dimensions at once) to those that are articulated 
along the different dimensions of objects. What this means is that infants first form broad, 
global concepts and categories (i.e., whole-identity) for which the members are related to 
one another based on overall similarity, but as infants age and gain experience with the 
world, they progress towards forming concepts for which the members are related to each 
other by the possession of a common property (i.e., part-identity). Thus, concept 
development is assumed to begin at a concrete level (e.g., these things all look alike) and 
become more abstract (e.g., these things are all the same kind of thing) as children learn 
to generalize across more and more varied instances (Burns, 1992; Kemler, 1983; Smith, 
1984; Smith, 1993; Smith & Heise, 1992). Researchers posit that hearing different words 
consistently applied to two objects stimulates nonverbal infants to pay attention to the 




So what does the empirical evidence detailed in this dissertation reveal in this 
regard? Although circumstantial in nature, it is possible that concepts about part-identity 
do not form in young infants as the empirical evidence indicated that conceptualization of 
identity about color and shape as the constituent properties of objects occurred in 2.5- to 
4-month-olds (Hayne, Rovee-Collier, & Perris, 1987) and 6-month-olds (Bhatt et al., 
2004), but not 3-month-olds (Bhatt et al., 2004). In apes and monkeys, the differentiation 
hypothesis may translate into a difference in the ease of forming part- and whole-identity 
concepts; clearly, more research is necessary to assess the differentiation hypothesis. 
Another unanswered question that arises from the empirical literature concerns 
whether it is easiest to form concepts about color or concepts about shape. There is 
evidence in apes indicating that it is harder to learn how to match according to shape part-
identity than color part-identity, but there is also evidence indicating that shape and color 
part-identity matching is equally difficult. Specifically, five chimpanzees were more 
accurate for color than shape part-identity problems (average 11% difference) when 
blocks of color and shape part-identity trials were presented using a two-choice 
conditional MTS procedure (e.g., green triangle → green square, not red triangle when 
presented on a wooden platform, but vice versa when presented on a metal platform) 
(Nissen, Blum, & Blum, 1949). Additionally, when color and shape part-identity trials 
were intermixed to require concurrent matching for three of the aforementioned 
chimpanzees, they were still more accurate for color than shape part-identity problems 
(average 14% difference). On the other hand, shape and color part-identity matching 
accuracy was not statistically different for four orangutans and one gorilla (average 5% 
difference) when irrelevant dimensions were cue-ambiguous (e.g., green circle → green 
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cross, not red square; green triangle → yellow triangle, not blue square) (Vonk, 2003). 





EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF COLOR AND SHAPE IDENTITY-
NONIDENTITY RESPONDING AND CONCEPT FORMATION 
The objective of Experiment 1 was to establish concurrent whole-identity 
responding with a set of stimuli that differed in only one regard, their color, using a novel 
conditional discrimination procedure. The hypothesis was that subjects would learn to 
respond to color whole-identity and -nonidentity; further, I hypothesized that there would 
be accuracy and response time differences between color whole-identity and -nonidentity 
judgments.  
The objective of Experiment 2 was to establish concurrent color and shape part-
identity responding with a small set of colors and shapes. The hypothesis was that 
subjects would learn to respond concurrently to both color and shape part-identity; 
further, I hypothesized that there would be accuracy and response time differences 
between color and shape part-identity judgments.  
Finally, the objective of Experiment 3 was to establish concurrent color and shape 
part- and whole-identity responding with a small set of familiar colors and shapes and 
then test for concept formation at the highest level by introducing problems in which both 
the color and shape of stimuli was novel. It was predicted that it would be more difficult 
to form part-identity concepts about color and shape than whole-identity concepts about 
color and shape. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Subjects and Housing 
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The subjects were two Sumatran orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii), Madu and 
Junior (also called Bernas), that were housed at Zoo Atlanta. Madu was a captive-born, 
hand-reared adult female aged 26.5 years at the start of the study. Junior was a captive-
born, foster-reared (by Madu), developing adolescent male aged 6.7 years at the start of 
the study. Madu had an extensive experimental history of participating in cognition and 
learning tasks that began with her involvement in a joystick-controlled computerized 
route and detour task when she was around six years old (Menzel & Menzel, 2007). 
Junior was experimentally naïve having never participated in any form of cognition and 
learning task. An additional three orangutans, two adult males and one adult female 
(Allen, Jantan, and Biji), were excluded from further participation in the study because 
they ceased to respond during the first or third phase of shaping or they exhibited a 
positional response bias during Experiment 1A. 
Subjects were not food- or water-deprived during the study. The two subjects 
were socially housed together with a dominant adult male and an infant orangutan in 
large indoor and outdoor enclosures. The caging of the indoor enclosures was made of a 
plain weave wire mesh (about 9.5 mm wire diameter with 25 mm wire openings).  
3.1.2 Apparatus and Materials 
A touchscreen frame (70.9 x 39.9 cm active area) held LEDs that created a grid of 
infrared lights such that x- and y-coordinates were identified when a touch obstructed one 
or more beam.
7
 A flatscreen LCD television (69.7 x 39.2 cm viewing area) sat behind the 
touchscreen to display the visual stimuli and sound the auditory stimuli. The television‘s 
resolution was set to 1366 x 768 pixels; thus, each pixel (dot pitch) measured 0.51 mm x 
                                               
7
 All measurements are length by height by width. 
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0.51 mm and there were 49.75 pixels per inch (PPI). Behind the touchscreen frame and in 
front of the television sat a clear acrylic shield (72 x 42 cm) that prevented subjects from 
contacting the television, but allowed subjects to view stimuli displayed on the television. 
The touchscreen frame, acrylic shield, and television are collectively called the 
touchscreen. The touchscreen was connected to the experimenter‘s (U.A.) laptop 
computer that ran the stimulus presentation software (SuperLab 4.0, Cedrus Corporation, 
San Pedro, CA) that delivered trials of the visual and auditory stimuli and recorded 
subject responses and response times. The visual stimuli presented by the stimulus 
program were generated by a custom computer program. 
Food was dispensed manually via a PVC pipe that was angled downward such 
that food traveled from the upper to the lower opening and exited inside the enclosure of 
participants. Yogurt served as the food reinforcer during the shaping phase and frozen 
grapes of approximately the same size (pieces cut into 1/2 to 1/8) served as the food 
reinforcers during the part and phases of the experiment s. 
The touchscreen was secured on the lower shelf of a moveable cart about 15 cm 
off the ground and faced towards subjects. The experimenter‘s laptop rested on the upper 
shelf of the cart (i.e., the laptop station) about 55 cm off the ground and faced away from 
subjects. An acrylic sheet (1.2 x 1.2 m) with a cutout (70 x 39 cm) to allow touches to the 
touchscreen was attached to the face of the cart. The acrylic sheet limited physical 
contact to just the touchscreen and obscured the face and body of the experimenter from 
subjects. 
3.1.3 Visual and Auditory Stimuli 
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Visual stimuli consisted of seven shapes: square, rectangle, pentagon, circle, 
rhombus (diamond), trapezoid, and hexagon. The shapes were shown in seven colors: red 
(RGB: 255, 000,000), yellow (RGB: 255, 255, 000), brown (RGB: 153, 102, 000), pink 
(RGB: 255, 000, 135), purple (RGB: 085, 000, 085), orange (RGB: 055, 102, 000), and 
grey (RGB: 128, 128, 128). Additionally, the square and rectangle shapes were shown in 
a black and white pattern. 
The sample-touched tone was one 300-ms sound (suction.wav) from Microsoft 
Office 2003. The correct-response tone was one 500-ms high (1,000 Hz) tone and the 
incorrect-response tone was one 1,000-ms low (100 Hz) tone, both of which were created 
using a freeware sound generator program. 
3.1.4 General Procedure 
Subjects were isolated from the rest of their social group or just isolated from 
dominate members of their social group when participating in the study. Specifically, 
Junior was always isolated from Madu and the dominant adult male and for the majority 
of time isolated from the infant orangutan. Madu was always isolated from the dominant 
adult male, sometimes isolated from Junior, and almost never isolated from the infant 
orangutan. Subjects had visual and auditory contact with the other members of their 
social group while they participated in the study. 
Sessions started with the experimenter positioning the apparatus flush against the 
cage mesh of the indoor enclosures so that subjects were able to reach through the mesh 
and touch the touchscreen. Then, the experimenter sat behind the apparatus at the laptop 
station to start trials, deliver food reinforcers, and monitor the presentation of stimuli. For 
the majority of trials within a session, the experimenter was blind, a situation that was 
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created by lowering or looking away from the laptop screen; thus, food reinforcers were 
delivered or not delivered based on the tone that sounded. For a small number of trials 
within a session, the experimenter was not blind, but instead monitored the delivery of 
trials on the laptop display screen to ensure that trials were presented free of experimenter 
error and computer malfunction.  
Except for some of the phases of shaping, sample stimuli were displayed centered 
in the top half of the screen and comparison stimuli were displayed in the bottom half of 
the screen side-by-side and separated by at least 100 pixels in three possible spatial 
positions: left, right, or center. A trial started with the sample stimulus displayed on the 
screen. A touch to the sample stimulus sounded the sample-touched tone and then the 
sample stimulus became unresponsive to touches, but it remained on the screen. 
Following a touch to the sample, the comparison stimuli appeared on the screen. Correct 
responses to the comparison stimuli were followed by the correct-response tone and the 
experimenter delivering food reinforcers. Incorrect responses were followed by the 
incorrect-response tone. Correct and incorrect responses were both followed by an 
intertrial interval (ITI). The ITI involved showing a blank (black) screen for some amount 
of time before the next trial was presented during which time responses were not 
registered by the touchscreen. Figure 3.1.1 shows the trial sequence.
8
 
Reinforcement was delivered on a continuous reinforcement (CRF) schedule. 
Response time was measured from the onset time of the comparison stimuli to a subject‘s 
touch. One hundred trials were presented within a session (except during Shaping and 
                                               
8
 In all figures, letters are shown within stimuli to aid readability. Additionally, except for 
Figure 3.1.1, figures depict problems following a touch to the sample (i.e., sample and 
comparison stimuli are displayed simultaneously). 
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Experiment 1A, Phase 2) unless a session was terminated because of husbandry 
procedures, subject unresponsiveness, equipment malfunction, or experimenter error. 
Subjects advanced to a different experiment part (A, B, C, etc.) or phase (1, 2, 3, etc.) 
when they meet a specified performance criteria. 
3.1.4.1 Shaping 
Shaping occurred between April 6, 2009 and May 22, 2009. One 2- to 150-trial 
session occurred one to four days per week for a total of 20 days. Only Junior 
participated in shaping as Madu was already experienced with touchscreen-controlled 
two- and three-choice MTS tasks. There were four phases of shaping and each phase 
utilized grey squares or rectangles as the stimuli. 
The first phase of shaping established touching of the touchscreen by presenting 
errorless trials. Before activating the touchscreen, the experimenter applied yogurt to the 
screen locations that corresponded to where the sample and two comparison stimuli 
would appear. Trials started with the sample stimulus and two comparison stimuli 
simultaneously displayed. Touching the sample stimulus sounded the sample-touched 
tone and touching either of the two comparison stimuli sounded the correct-response 
tone. For this phase only, reinforcement was delivered after both the sample- and the 
correct- response tone regardless of whether or not the subject was focused on consuming 
yogurt. The sample-touched and correct-response tones were followed by a 0.5-s ITI. The 
sample stimulus spanned most of the top half of the screen (1300 x 375 pixels). The two 
comparison stimuli were the same size (600 x 375 pixels), thus, collectively they spanned 
most of the bottom half of the screen. 
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The second phase of shaping established the touching of stimuli regardless of 
where they were displayed on the touchscreen using a fading procedure. Trials started by 
displaying a target stimulus. Touching the target stimulus sounded the correct-response 
tone, which was then followed by the delivery of reinforcement and a 2-s ITI. Initially, 
the target stimulus was a gray rectangle (1200 x 750 pixels) that spanned most of the 
screen and its spatial position randomly moved between four locations (upper right, upper 
left, lower right, and lower left) across trials. Over the course of shaping sessions, the size 
of the target stimulus was reduced to a medium sized square (500 x 500 pixels) and the 
possible spatial positions increased to nine screen locations (upper right, middle right, 
lower right, upper center, middle center, lower center, upper left, middle left, and lower 
left). 
The third phase of shaping involved chaining the appropriate response sequence 
(i.e., touch the sample, then touch a comparison stimulus) when the sample and one 
comparison stimulus was displayed. Trials proceeded as described in the General 
Procedure section except that only one comparison stimulus was utilized with its left or 
right spatial position randomly determined. A touch to the comparison stimulus sounded 
the correct-response tone, which was followed by the delivery of reinforcement and a 2-s 
ITI. The sample and comparison stimulus were squares of the same size (350 x 325 
pixels). 
The fourth phase of shaping involved chaining the appropriate response sequence 
when the sample and two comparison stimuli were displayed. Trials proceeded as 
described in the General Procedure except that one of the two comparison stimuli was 
responsive to touches while the other was unresponsive to touches. A touch to the 
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responsive comparison stimulus sounded the correct-response tone, which was followed 
by the delivery of reinforcement and a 2-s ITI. The sample and comparison stimulus were 
squares of the same size (350 x 325 pixels). 
3.1.4.2 Experiment 1A: Color Whole-Identity Responding 
Subjects participated in two- and three-choice matching-to-sample (MTS) tasks 
for one to two sessions per day: Junior for 42 days between August 3, 2009 and 
November 20, 2009 and Madu for 5 days between September 8 and 15, 2009 (Phase 1 
only). The purpose of this experiment was to establish color whole-identity responding 
with a small set of color stimuli that were instantiated in one shape. 
The sample and comparison stimuli were colored yellow (Y), red (R), and brown 
(B) and they were shaped as squares of the same size (350 x 325 pixels). A correct 
response was to touch the comparison stimulus that was the same color as the sample 
stimulus (i.e., touching the correct or matching comparison stimulus). An incorrect 
response was to touch a comparison stimulus that was a different color than the sample 
stimulus (i.e., touching an incorrect or a nonmatching comparison stimulus). Thus, color 
was the relevant dimension and shape was an irrelevant cue-constant dimension. Shape 
was not only cue-constant within trials, but it was also cue-constant between trials 
because it never varied. 
Trials were separated by a 3-s ITI. The number of times that each color served as 
the sample stimulus was balanced within sessions and the presentation order for the 
sample‘s color was randomized within sessions. The spatial position of the comparison 
stimuli was randomized across trials within a session. Unless otherwise noted, two-choice 
MTS tasks utilized two spatial positions for the comparison stimuli (e.g., the left and 
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right positions) and three-choice MTS tasks utilized three spatial positions for the 
comparison stimuli (left, right, and center positions). The performance criteria were 80% 
or more correct responses for three consecutive sessions with a minimum of five 
completed sessions. 
3.1.4.2.1 Three-choice MTS (Phase 1) 
Three comparison stimuli were used; thus, three problems were presented: B → 
B, not R and Y; R → R, not B and Y; and Y → Y, not B and R. Figure 3.1.1 shows an 
example problem and trial sequence. Subjects advanced to Experiment 1B when they 
meet the performance criteria; otherwise, they advanced to the Phase 2 after completing 
1,500 trials. 
3.1.4.2.2 Three-choice MTS with Correction Procedure (Phase 2) 
This purpose of this phase was to establish color whole-identity responding using 
a correction procedure. Trials were identical to Phase 1 except for the following details. 
A correction procedure was utilized such that trials to which a subject responded 
incorrectly were represented until they made a correct response. During correction trials, 
the left, right, and center spatial position of comparison stimuli was re-randomized. One 
session occurred per day during which the subject received from 71 to 222 noncorrection 
and correction trials per day. Figure 3.1.1 shows an example problem and trial sequence. 
The subject advanced to Phase 3 when he did not meet the performance criteria after 
completing approximately 1,300 trials. 
3.1.4.2.3 Two-choice Three-position MTS (Phase 3) 
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This purpose of this phase was to establish color whole-identity responding by 
changing the format of the task to two-choice three-position. Trials were identical to 
Phase 1 except for the following details. Only two comparison stimuli were utilized (i.e., 
the left, right, or center spatial position remained empty); thus, six problems were 
presented: B → B, not R or Y; R → R, not B or Y; and Y → Y, not B or R. Figure 3.1.1 
shows an example problem and trial sequence. The subject advanced to Phase 4 when he 
met the performance criteria. 
3.1.4.2.4 Two-choice MTS (Phase 4) 
The purpose of this phase was to ensure stable color-whole identity responding 
when only two spatial positions for the comparison stimuli were used. Trials were 
identical to Phase 1 except for the following details. The spatial position of stimuli was 
restricted to only the left or right position (i.e., the center spatial position was not used). 
Figure 3.1.1 shows an example problem and trial sequence. The subject advanced to 
Experiment 1B, Phase 2 when he met the performance criteria.
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 Phase (Correct Match) 
Event 
(Duration) 
Phase 1 and 2 
(Y → Y, not B and R) 
Phase 3 
(R → R not Y) 
Phase 4 
(B → B not R) 
Sample 
(Until response) 
   
Sample-Touched Tone 
(300 ms)    
Sample and Comparisons 
(Until Response) 
   
Figure 3.1.1. Trial sequence and example problems for color whole-identity responding in Experiment 1A.
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Correct-Response Tone (500 ms)  
or 
Incorrect-Response Tone (1,000 ms)  or   or   Or  
 Reinforcement 
 or 
Nonreinforcement  or   or   Or  
ITI Blank Screen 
(3,000 ms) 




3.1.4.3 Experiment 1B: Concurrent Color Whole-Identity and -Nonidentity Responding 
Subjects participated in two-choice modified MTS tasks for one to two sessions 
per day: Junior for 7 days between November 23, 2009 and December 7, 2009 (Phase 2 
only) and Madu for 10 days between November 3 and 17, 2009.
9
 The purpose of this part 
of the experiment was to establish concurrent whole-identity and -nonidentity responding 
to a small set of color stimuli that were instantiated in three shapes. 
The procedures of Experiment 1A were replicated to require whole-identity 
responding. Additionally, a black and white pattern was added to the set comparison 
stimuli colors. The patterned comparison stimulus served as the none-of-the-above 
comparison stimulus (NOTA) to allow for whole-nonidentity judgments. Thus, 
concurrent identity and nonidentity responding was required. The performance criteria 
was 80% or more correct responses for three consecutive sessions for both identity and 
nonidentity problems with a minimum of five sessions completed. The number of times 
the NOTA stimulus served as a comparison stimulus was balanced within sessions. 
There were nine whole-identity problems for which it was correct to select the 
comparison stimulus that matched the color of the sample stimulus. Of these, NOTA was 
absent for one comparison stimulus pair type (B → B, not R or Y; R → R, not B or Y; 
and Y → Y, not R or Y) and NOTA was the incorrect comparison for one comparison 
stimulus pair type (B → B, not NOTA; R → R, not NOTA; and Y → Y, not NOTA). 
                                               
9
 Before participating in this experiment, Madu completed two- and three-choice MTS 
tasks with a different NOTA stimulus: a black and white patterned X-shape. Madu failed 
to reach the performance criteria after 1,500 trials, but it was likely that she was matching 
based on shape; that is, avoiding the X-shaped NOTA comparison because it was shaped 
differently from the square shaped color comparisons. As such, the shape of the NOTA 
stimulus was changed to a square. 
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There were also six nonidentity problems for which the sample stimulus was 
presented with a nonmatching comparison and the NOTA comparison stimulus and it was 
correct to select the NOTA comparison stimulus. These problems were called the NOTA 
correct comparison stimulus pair type: B → NOTA, not R or Y; R → NOTA, not B or Y; 
and Y → NOTA, not B or R. 
3.1.4.3.1 Two-choice Three-position Modified MTS (Phase 1) 
The purpose of this phase was to introduce concurrent identity and nonidentity 
responding in a familiar format (i.e., three spatial positions for the comparison stimuli) 
before exposure to it in an unfamiliar format for Madu who had not yet experienced two-
choice MTS tasks. Two comparison stimuli were simultaneously presented in three 
spatial positions (i.e., the left, right, or center position remained empty). Figure 3.1.2 
shows an example identity problem in which NOTA is the incorrect comparison and an 
example nonidentity problem in which NOTA is the correct comparison. Refer to Figure 
3.1.1 for illustrations of color whole-identity problems in which NOTA is absent. The 









Figure 3.1.2. Example problems during concurrent color whole-identity and -nonidentity 
responding in Experiment 1B. (A): On the left, a color nonidentity problem in which 
NOTA is the correct comparison (Y → NOTA, not B) and on the right, a color identity 
problem in which NOTA is the incorrect comparison (R → R, not NOTA) for the two-
choice three-position MTS tasks (Phase 1). (B): On the left, a color nonidentity problem 
in which NOTA is the correct comparison (R → NOTA, not Y) and on the right, a color 
identity problem in which NOTA is the incorrect comparison (Y → Y, not NOTA) for 
the two-choice MTS tasks (Phase 2). 
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3.1.4.3.2 Two-choice Modified MTS (Phase 2) 
The purpose of this phase was to establish concurrent identity and nonidentity 
responding using a two-choice format. Trials were identical to Phase 1 except that the 
spatial position of comparison stimuli was restricted to only the left or right spatial 
position (i.e., the center position was not used). Figure 3.1.2 shows an example identity 
problem in which NOTA is the incorrect comparison and an example nonidentity 
problem in which NOTA is the correct comparison. Refer to Figure 3.1.1 for illustrations 
of color whole-identity problems in which NOTA is absent. Subjects finished Experiment 
1 when they met the performance criteria. 
3.1.4.4 Experiment 2A: Concurrent Color and Shape Part-Identity Responding 
Subjects participated in two-choice MTS tasks for one to two sessions per day: 
Junior for 20 days between June 12, 2010 and October 10, 2010 and Madu for 18 days 
between June 12, 2010 and October 9, 2010. The purpose of this part of the experiment 
was to establish concurrent color and shape part-identity responding to a small set of 
color and shapes. 
For color part-identity problems, color was the relevant dimension (i.e., correlated 
with differential reinforcement) and shape was the irrelevant cue-ambiguous dimension 
(i.e., shape differed among all stimuli within a trial); thus, the correct response was to 
touch the comparison stimulus that was the same color as the sample stimulus and an 
incorrect response was to touch the comparison stimulus that was a different color than 
the sample stimulus. For shape part-identity problems, shape was the relevant dimension 
and color was the irrelevant cue-ambiguous dimension; thus, the correct response was to 
touch the comparison stimulus that was the same shape as the sample stimulus and the 
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incorrect response was to touch the comparison stimulus that was a different shape than 
the sample stimulus.  
Sample and comparison stimuli were colored yellow, red, and brown. Sample and 
comparison stimuli were shaped as rectangles (Rect), pentagons (Pent), and circles (Circ) 
of approximately the same area (90,100 pixels, 89,917 pixels, and 89,529 pixels, 
respectively). There were six color part-identity problems: B → B, not R or Y; R → R, 
not B or Y; and Y → Y, not B or R. There were six shape part-identity problems: Circ → 
Circ, not Pent or Rect; Pent → Pent, not Circ or Rect; and Rect → Rect, not Circ or Rect. 
Figure 3.1.3 shows example color and shape part-identity problems. 
 
  
Figure 3.1.3. Example problems for color and shape part-identity responding in 
Experiment 2A. The left panel shows a color part-identity problem (B → B, not R). The 




Half of the trials in a session were color part-identity problems and the other half 
of trials were shape part-identity problems such that concurrent color and shape identity 
responding was required. The number of times that each color and shape served as the 
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sample stimulus was balanced within sessions and the presentation order for the sample‘s 
color and shape was randomized within sessions. Color and shape part-identity problems 
were randomly interspersed together within sessions. The spatial position of stimuli was 
restricted to only the left or right position (i.e., the center spatial position was not used) 
and randomized across sessions. Unless otherwise noted, two-choice MTS tasks utilized 
two spatial positions for the comparison stimuli (the left and right positions). Trials were 
separated by a 2-s ITI. If after completing 3,000 trials subject accuracy was not at least 
80% correct for each type of identity problem (i.e., for both color part-identity and shape 
part-identity problems) for three consecutive sessions, they advanced to Experiment 2B. 
3.1.4.5 Experiment 2B: Shape Part- and Whole-Identity Responding 
Subjects participated in two-choice MTS tasks for one to four sessions per day: 
Junior for 23 days between October 11, 2010 and November 5, 2010 and again for 6 days 
between November 5 and 10, 2010 and Madu for 3 days between October 12 and 14, 
2010 (Phase 1 only). The purpose of this part of the experiment was to establish in 
sequence shape part- and whole-identity responding after a failure to establish concurrent 
color and shape part-identity responding. 
3.1.4.5.1 Shape Part-Identity (Phase 1) 
The purpose of this phase was to establish shape part-identity matching. All trials 
within a session were shape part-identity problems like those in Experiment 2A. Subjects 
advanced to Experiment 2C when they met the performance criteria; otherwise, they 
advanced to Phase 2 after completing 1,500 trials. 
3.1.4.5.2 Shape Whole-Identity (Phase 2) 
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This purpose of this phase was to establish shape whole-identity matching. All 
trials within a session were shape whole-identity problems. That is, shape was the 
relevant dimension and color was the irrelevant cue-constant dimension (i.e., color was 
identical among all stimuli in a trial); thus, the correct response was to touch the 
comparison stimulus that was the same shape as the sample stimulus and the incorrect 
response was to touch the comparison stimulus that was a different shape than the sample 
stimulus.  
The number of times that each shape served as the sample stimulus was balanced 
within sessions and the trial presentation order for the sample‘s shape was randomized 
within sessions. There were six shape whole-identity problems: Circ → Circ, not Pent or 
Rect; Pent → Pent, not Circ or Rect; and Rect → Rect, not Circ or Rect. Figure 3.1.4 
shows an example shape whole-identity problem. Other than the aforementioned, the 
procedures of Experiment 2A were replicated. The subject advanced to Phase 3 when he 
met the performance criteria. 
 
  
Figure 3.1.4. Example problems for shape whole-identity responding in Experiment 2B 
and color whole-identity responding in Experiment 2D. The left panel shows a shape 
whole-identity problem (Pent → Pent, not Circ). The right panel shows a color whole-




3.1.4.5.3 Shape Part-Identity (Phase 3) 
This phase was an exact replication of Phase 1 with the purpose of establishing 
shape part-identity matching. The subject advanced to Experiment 2C when he met the 
performance criteria. 
3.1.4.6 Experiment 2C: Concurrent Color and Shape Part-Identity Responding 
This part of the experiment replicated the two-choice MTS tasks of Experiment 
2A for two to three sessions per day: Junior participated for 7 days between November 10 
and 17, 2010 and Madu for 5 days between October 15 and 20, 2010. The purpose was to 
establish concurrent color and shape part-identity responding. Subjects advanced to 
Experiment 2D when they meet the performance criteria. 
3.1.4.7 Experiment 2D: Color and Shape Whole-Identity Responding 
Subjects participated in two-choice MTS tasks for two to three sessions per day: 
Junior for 2 days on December 21 and 22, 2010 (Phase 1 only) and Madu for 4 days 
between December 31, 2010 and January 3, 2011. The purpose of this part of the 
experiment was to require color whole-identity responding with the full set of colors and 
shapes (c.f. only one shape was used in color whole-identity responding in Experiment 1) 
and to create equivalence between subjects in the type of identity task they completed, 
Madu was required to complete shape whole-identity tasks. 
3.1.4.7.1 Color Whole-Identity (Phase 1) 
All trials within a session were color whole-identity problems so color was the 
relevant dimension and shape was the irrelevant cue-constant dimension. A correct 
response was to touch the comparison stimulus that was the same color as the sample 
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stimulus and the incorrect response was to touch the comparison stimulus that was a 
different color than the sample stimulus. 
The number of times that each color served as the sample stimulus was balanced 
within sessions and the trial presentation order for the sample‘s color was randomized 
within sessions There were six color whole-identity problems: B → B, not R or Y; R → 
R, not B or Y; and Y → Y, not B or R. Figure 3.1.4 shows an example color whole-
identity problem. Otherwise, the procedures of Experiment 2A were implemented. If 
subjects completed Experiment 2B, Phase 2 at an earlier time, then they finished 
Experiment 2 when their accuracy was at least 80% correct for three consecutive 
sessions; otherwise, subjects advanced to Phase 2.  
3.1.4.7.2 Shape Whole-Identity (Phase 2) 
This experiment replicated Experiment 2B, Phase 2 by presenting only shape 
whole-identity problems to Madu. Figure 3.1.4 shows example color whole-identity and 
shape part-identity problems. The subject finished Experiment 2 when she met the 
performance criteria. 
3.1.4.8 Experiment 3: Concurrent Color and Shape Part- and Whole-Identity Responding 
and Transfer Test 
This experiment presented two-choice MTS tasks with the color and shape part- 
and whole-identity problems given in Experiment 2; thus, concurrent identity responding 
was required. Then, transfer of learning was assessed at the highest level by introducing 
new color and shape part- and whole-identity problems for which color and shape was 
novel. From one to nine sessions occurred per day with Junior participating for 12 days 
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between December 27, 2010 and January 10, 2011 and Madu participating for 7 days 
between January 4 to 11, 2011. 
Two-choice MTS tasks utilized two spatial positions for the comparison stimuli 
(the left and right positions) and the spatial position of comparison stimuli was 
randomized for every trial. Trials were separated by a 2-s ITI. When subject accuracy 
was at least 70% correct for each type of identity problem (i.e., for color part-identity, 
color whole-identity, shape-part-identity, and shape whole-identity problems) for three 
consecutive sessions and they completed a minimum of five sessions they advanced to 
the next phase. 
3.1.4.8.1 Baseline (Phase 1) 
Subjects were presented with color and shape part-identity problems like that 
described for Experiment 2A and 2C and color and shape whole-identity problems like 
that described for Experiment 2B and 2D. Color and shape part- and whole-identity trials 
were randomly interspersed together within a session. Because these trials present the 
familiar, trained color and shape part- and whole-identity problems they are called 
baseline trials. 
Within each session, one-fourth of baseline trials were color part-identity 
problems, one-fourth color whole-identity problems, one-fourth shape part-identity 
problems, and one-fourth shape whole-identity problems. For color part- and whole-
identity baseline trials, the number of times that each color served as the sample stimulus 
was balanced within sessions. For shape part- and whole-identity baseline trials, the 
number of times that each shape served as the sample stimulus was balanced within 
sessions. Figures 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 display example color and shape whole- and part-
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identity problems. When Junior and Madu met the performance criteria, they advanced to 
Phase 2 and Phase 3, respectively. 
3.1.4.8.2 Baseline and Nonreinforced (36%) Baseline (Phase 2) 
The purpose of this phase was to familiarize subjects to nonreinforced trials; thus, 
the familiar, trained color and shape part- and whole-identity problems were presented to 
subjects as two types of trials. Nonreinforced baseline trials were trials in which 
responses were differentially reinforced like in Phase 1 and nonreinforced baseline trials 
were trials that were not followed by the correct- or incorrect-response tone and food 
reinforcement regardless of the subject‘s response. Of the 100 trials in a session, 36% 
were nonreinforced baseline trials and the remaining 64% were reinforced baseline trials. 
Reinforced and nonreinforced baseline trials were pseudo randomly interspersed together 
within a session in a way that prevented more than three consecutive nonreinforced trials. 
When the subject reached the performance criteria, he received an additional 1,100 trials 
before advancing to Phase 3 to allow his accuracy with respect to each type of identity 
problem to stabilize. 
3.1.4.8.3 Baseline and Nonreinforced (24%) Baseline (Phase 3) 
The purpose of this phase was to reduce the percentage of nonreinforced baseline 
trials. This phase replicated Phase 2 except for the following. First, the size of the sample 
and comparison stimuli was reduced to prepare for the size of the novel stimuli to be used 
in the transfer test of Phase 4: rectangles (59,684 pixel area), pentagons (60,172 pixel 
area), and circles (59,773 pixel area). Second, the percentage of nonreinforced baseline 
trials was reduced to 24% of trials while the percentage of reinforced baseline trials 
constituted 76% of trials to reduce their prominence within a session. When Junior and 
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Madu reached the performance criteria, they received respectively one and five additional 
sessions before advancing to transfer testing in Phase 4 so that the total number of trials 
they completed was 1,000 trials.  
3.1.4.8.4 Transfer Test (Phase 4) 
To test for transfer of responding from the familiar problems t o novel problems, 
this phase replicated Phase 3 except for the following. The percentage of nonreinforced 
baseline trials was reduced to 12% of trials within a session while the percentage of 
reinforced baseline trials remained at 76%. The remaining 12% of trials within a session 
were nonreinforced probe trials. The three trial types were pseudo randomly mixed 
together in a way that prevented more than three consecutive nonreinforced trials. 
The nonreinforced probe trials presented color and shape part- and whole-identity 
problems for which the color and shape of stimuli was novel. The novel colors for the 
sample and comparison stimuli were pink (Pi), orange (O), and purple (Pu); thus, six 
color part- and whole-identity problems were created: O → O, not Pi or Pu; Pi → Pi, not 
O or Pu; and Pu → Pu, not O or Pi. The novel shapes for the sample and comparisons 
were rhombus‘ (Rhom), hexagons (Hex), and trapezoids (Trap); thus, six novel shape 
part- and whole-identity problems were created: Hex → Hex, not Rhom or Trap; Rhom 
→ Rhom, not Hex or Trap; Trap → Trap, not Hex or Rhom. The area of the rhombus‘, 
hexagons, and trapezoids was fixed to approximately the same size: 60,028 pixels, 60,840 
pixels, and 62,137 pixels, respectively. Figure 3.1.5 shows examples of the novel color 
and shape part- and whole-identity problems.  
To finish Experiment 3, subjects completed six sessions such that 72 
nonreinforced probe trials (18 novel color and 18 novel shape part- and whole-identity 
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problems), 72 nonreinforced baseline trials, and 456 reinforced baseline trials were 










Figure 3.1.5. Example novel color and shape part- and whole-identity problems for the 
transfer test (Phase 2) of Experiment 3. (A): In the left panel, a color part-identity 
problem (Pi → Pi, not Pu) and in the right panel, a color whole-identity problem (Pi → 
Pi, not O). (B) In the left panel, a shape part-identity problem (Trap → Trap, not Rhom) 





3.2.1 Data Analysis 
For three experiments subdivided into one to four parts (A, B, C, and D) and/or 
one to four phases the variables of interest were: (1) subjects (Junior and Madu), (2) 
problem type (identity and nonidentity), (3) comparison pair type (NOTA absent, as the 
incorrect comparison, and as the correct comparison), (4) identity problem type (color 
and shape part- and whole identity), and (5) trial type (nonreinforced baseline, reinforced 
baseline, and nonreinforced probe trials). 
One-tailed binomial tests were used to assess whether the proportion of correct 
responses for an individual differed from what chance would predict as a function of the 
aforementioned variables of interest. Chance was set to one-third for three-choice and 
one-half for two-choice MTS tasks for a number of trials and an alpha level of .05 was 
used for hypothesis testing of the binomial probability of obtaining k or more correct 
responses out of n trials. 
Chi-square tests of independence (two-tailed) and Fisher‘s exact tests (one-tailed) 
were applied to assess the relationship between the proportion of responses (correct vs. 
incorrect) and the variables of interest (α = .05). Cramer‘s statistic (V) was used to index 
the strength of the relationship for chi-square tests and the phi coefficient (ϕ) was used to 
index the strength of the relationship for Fisher‘s exact tests. One-tailed z tests were used 
as a follow-up procedure to statistically significant chi-square tests. To maintain the 
familywise error rate at .05 for each set of pairwise comparisons, a Bonferroni procedure 
was used to determine the alpha level for each pairwise comparison. Only instances when 
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the adjusted alpha level resulted in a nonsignificant pairwise comparison that would have 
otherwise been significant are reported indicated in the text. 
With respect to response times (reported in seconds), one-tailed correlated groups 
t tests were applied as a function of the aforementioned variables of interest (α = .05) 
with the strength of the relationship indexed by η
2
. Casewise deletion was performed 
when groups had unequal sample sizes. The selection of cases to be deleted was 
randomly determined so samples remained representative. Response times falling outside 
of two standard deviations from the mean were deemed outliers and removed from the 
data before t tests were conducted. 
The instances when a session did not contain 100 trials are reported in text, tables, 
or figures. Because multiple sessions were given on a single day, but accuracy (the 
percentage or proportion of correct responses) not tabulated until all daily sessions were 
completed, subjects sometimes received additional sessions after reaching the 
performance criteria; these instances are reported in the text. Regardless of the 
aforementioned, if the performance criterion was meet then the last 300 trials of a phase 
or experiment part were considered criterion learning. Additionally, the first 100 trials of 
a phase or experiment part were considered early learning. 
3.2.1.1 Experiment 1A: Color Whole-Identity Responding 
3.2.1.1.1 Three-choice MTS (Phase 1) 
Madu met the performance criteria (80% correct or more for three consecutive 
sessions with a minimum of five sessions completed) after completing 500 trials. Madu‘s 
accuracy was above chance for the last four sessions (83% correct, n = 400; binomial 
tests, ps < .001), but did not differ from chance for the first session (30% correct, n = 
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100; binomial test, p = .272). Figure 3.2.1 displays accuracy as a function of sessions. 
After completing Phase 1, Madu advanced to Experiment 1B. 
Junior did not meet the performance criteria after completing approximately 1,500 
trials. His accuracy was 36% correct across all fifteen sessions during which it was above 
chance for four sessions (49% correct, n = 400; binomial tests, ps < .045), below chance 
for two sessions (25% correct, n = 200; binomial tests, ps < .046), and not different from 
chance for nine sessions (33% correct, n = 897; binomial tests, ps > .068). Figure 3.2.1 




Figure 3.2.1. Subject accuracy as a function of sessions during three-choice color whole-
identity MTS tasks in Phase 1. The black horizontal line at 42% correct depicts the lowest 
percentage of correct responses that was statistically above chance (binomial test, p < .05, 
n = 100). 
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3.2.1.1.2 Three-choice MTS with Correction Procedure (Phase 2) 
Junior did not meet the performance criteria after completing 1,290 trials. The 
subject‘s accuracy was 35% correct for noncorrection trials (n = 428), responses to the 
initial presentation of a trial, and 31% correct for correction trials (n = 862), responses to 
representations of a trial following an incorrect response. His accuracy was statistically 
below chance for one session of noncorrection trials, but otherwise did not differ from 
chance. Binomial tests and accuracy for the nine sessions are listed in Table 3.2.1. After 
completing Phase 2, the subject advanced to Phase 3. 
 
Table 3.2.1 
Accuracy and Binomial Tests as a function of Sessions for Junior during Three-choice 
Color Whole-identity MTS tasks under the Correction Procedure in Phase 2 
Noncorrection Trials Correction Trials 
Session % Correct n p Session % Correct n p 
1 35.9 39 0.429 1 22.2
*
 108 0.008 
2 36.5 52 0.364 2 31.1 106 0.351 
3 38.9 54 0.236 3 36.8 87 0.287 
4 37.5 24 0.408 4 29.8 47 0.361 
5 33.9 56 0.517 5 31.3 115 0.365 
6 34.2 38 0.513 6 29.3 82 0.252 
7 33.3 27 0.586 7 32.7 52 0.528 
8 37.2 78 0.276 8 33.3 144 0.528 
9 26.7 60 0.166 9 36.4 121 0.274 
*Below chance accuracy, p < .05. 
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3.2.1.1.3 Two-choice Three-position MTS (Phase 3) 
Junior met the performance criteria after completing approximately 2,000 trials.
10
 
The subject‘s accuracy was above chance for the last eight consecutive sessions (79% 
correct, n = 770; binomial tests, ps < .035); otherwise, before reaching the performance 
criterion his accuracy was above chance for six sessions (74% correct, n = 592; binomial 
tests, ps < .001) and not different from chance for six sessions (51% correct, n = 600; 
binomial tests, ps > .133). The left panel of Figure 3.2.2 displays accuracy as a function 
of sessions. After completing Phase 3, the subject advanced to Phase 4. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.2. Accuracy as a function of sessions for Junior during two-choice color 
whole-identity MTS tasks in Phase 3 and Phase 4. The black horizontal line at 59% 
correct depicts the lowest percentage of correct responses that was statistically above 
chance (binomial test, p < .05, n = 100 and 98).
                                               
10




3.2.1.1.4 Two-choice MTS (Phase 4) 
Junior met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials. The subject‘s 
accuracy averaged 90% correct across all sessions and was above chance for all five 
sessions (binomial tests, ps < .001). The right panel of Figure 3.2.2 displays accuracy as a 
function of sessions. After completing Phase 4, the subject advanced to Experiment 1B, 
Phase 2. 
3.2.1.2 Experiment 1B: Concurrent Color Whole-Identity and -Nonidentity Responding 
3.2.1.2.1 Two-choice Three-position Modified MTS (Phase 1)  
Madu met the performance criteria (i.e., 80% correct or more for three 
consecutive sessions for both identity and nonidentity problems with a minimum of five 
sessions completed) after completing 500 trials. For identity problems, the subject‘s 
accuracy was above chance for all five sessions (98% correct, n = 250; binomial tests, ps 
< .001). For nonidentity problems, her accuracy was above chance for the last four 
consecutive sessions (92% correct, n = 200; binomial tests, ps < .001) and not different 
from chance for the first session (40% correct, n = 50; binomial test, p = .101). Figure 
3.2.3 displays her accuracy as a function of sessions and problem type. 
The proportion of correct responses during the first session was examined to 
evaluate early learning. There was a statistically significant and strong relation between 
responses and comparison pair type during the first 100 trials, χ
2
 (2, N = 100) = 42.86, p 
< .001, V = .67. Madu‘s accuracy was lower when NOTA was the correct comparison 
stimulus (40% correct, n = 50) than when NOTA was the incorrect comparison (100% 
correct, n = 24; z = 4.92, p < .001) and when NOTA was absent as a comparison (100% 
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correct, n = 26; z = 5.08, p < .001); also, accuracy did not differ between when NOTA 
was absent as a comparison and when NOTA was incorrect. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.3. Accuracy as a function of sessions and problem type for Madu during two-
choice three-position concurrent color whole-identity and -nonidentity modified MTS 
tasks in Phase 1. The black horizontal line at 64% correct depicts the lowest percentage 




3.2.1.2.2 Two-choice Modified MTS (Phase 2) 
Madu met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials. Her accuracy was 
statistically above chance for both identity (98% correct) and nonidentity problems (91% 
correct) during each of the five sessions. Table 3.2.2 displays the subject‘s accuracy and 






Accuracy and Binomial Tests for Two-choice Concurrent Color Whole-Identity and -
Nonidentity Responding in Phase 2 for Madu 
Identity Problems Nonidentity Problems 
Session % Correct N P Session % Correct n p 
1 98.3* 58 0.001 1 97.6* 42 0.001 
2 100.0* 52 0.001 2 81.3* 48 0.001 
3 98.7* 75 0.001 3 100.0* 25 0.001 
4 93.3* 75 0.001 4 80.0* 25 0.002 
5 98.7* 75 0.001 5 96.0* 25 0.001 




With his first experience with the two-choice modified MTS task, Junior met the 
performance criteria after completing 800 trials. For identity problems, his accuracy was 
above chance for the last five consecutive sessions (90% correct, n = 250; binomial tests, 
ps < .001); otherwise, his accuracy was not different from chance for two sessions (46% 
correct, n = 104; binomial tests, ps = .339) and above chance for one other session (94% 
correct, n = 50; binomial test, p < .001). For nonidentity problems, Junior‘s accuracy was 
above chance for the last three consecutive sessions (90% correct, n = 150 trials; 
binomial tests, ps < .001); otherwise, his accuracy was below chance for three sessions 
(10% correct, n = 150; binomial tests, ps < .001) and not different from chance for two 
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sessions (53% correct, n = 96; binomial tests, ps > .333). Figure 3.2.4 displays his 
accuracy as a function of sessions and problem type. 
 
Figure 3.2.4. Accuracy as a function of sessions and problem type for Junior during two-
choice concurrent color whole-identity and -nonidentity modified MTS tasks in Phase 2. 
The black horizontal line at 64% correct shows the lowest percentage of correct 




For Junior, the proportion of correct responses during the first session was 
examined to evaluate early learning.
11
 There was a statistically significant and strong 
relation between responses and comparison pair type during the first 100 trials, χ
2
 (2, N = 
100) = 89.35, p < .001, V = .95. Junior‘s accuracy was lower when NOTA was the correct 
comparison stimulus (0% correct, n = 50) than when NOTA was the incorrect 
comparison (100% correct, n = 24; z = 8.60, p < .001) and when NOTA was absent as a 
                                               
11
 Early learning was not evaluated with Madu as her first exposure to concurrent color 
whole-identity and -nonidentity responding was in the previous phase. 
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comparison (88% correct, n = 26; z = 7.96, p < .001); also, accuracy did not differ 
between when NOTA was absent as a comparison and when NOTA was the correct 
comparison (z = 1.72, p = .086). 
The proportion of correct responses during the final three sessions was examined 
to evaluate criterion learning for both Madu and Junior. There was a statistically 
significant and moderate relation between responses and comparison pair type during the 
last 300 trials for both Madu, χ
2
 (2, N = 300) = 9.79, p = .008, V = .18, and Junior, χ
2
 (2, 
N = 300) = 10.12, p = .006, V = .18. Madu‘s accuracy was higher when NOTA was 
absent as a comparison stimulus (99% correct, n = 150) than when NOTA was the correct 
comparison (92% correct, n = 75; z = 2.99, p < .001) and when NOTA was the incorrect 
comparison (92% correct, n = 75; z = -2.99, p < .001); also, accuracy did not differ 
between when NOTA was the incorrect and correct comparison stimulus. Junior‘s 
accuracy was higher when NOTA was absent as a comparison stimulus (95% correct, n = 
75; z = -2.88, p = .002) and when NOTA was the correct comparison (90% correct, n = 
150; z = -2.33, p = .010) than when NOTA was the incorrect comparison (79% correct, n 
= 75); also, accuracy did not differ between when NOTA was absent as a comparison and 
when NOTA was the correct comparison (z = 1.19, p = .118). 
Finally, responding speed during the final three sessions was examined for both 
Madu and Junior. Madu responded more slowly when NOTA was the correct comparison 
(M = 1.20 s, SE = .03, n = 69) than when NOTA was the incorrect comparison (M = .83 s, 
SE = .03, n = 69 after randomly deleting 5 cases; t[68] = -8.70, p < .001, η
2
 = .53) and 
when NOTA was absent as a comparison identity (M = .85 s, SE = .02, n = 69 after 
randomly deleting 73 cases; t[68] = -8.75, p < .001, η
2
 = .53), but there was no difference 
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in response speed between when NOTA was the incorrect comparison and when NOTA 
was absent as a comparison (t[68] = -.66, p = .513). Likewise, Junior responded more 
slowly when NOTA was the correct comparison (M = 1.98 s, SE = .08, n = 75 after 
randomly deleting 74 cases) than when NOTA was the incorrect comparison (M = 1.64 s, 
SE = .06, n = 75; t[74] = -3.45, p = .001, η
2
 = .14) and when NOTA was absent as a 
comparison (M = 1.64 s, SE = .06, n = 75; t[74] = -3.60, p = .001, η
2
 = .15), but there was 
no difference in response speed between when NOTA was the incorrect comparison and 
when NOTA was absent as a comparison (t[74] = -.02, p = .985). 
3.2.1.3 Experiment 2A: Concurrent Color and Shape Part-Identity Responding 
Both subjects failed to meet the performance criteria after completing 3,000 trials 
because their accuracy was not above 80% correct for three consecutive sessions for both 
color and shape part-identity problems.  
For color part-identity problems, Madu‘s responses were 91% correct across all 
sessions (n = 1,500) and her accuracy was above chance for each of the 30 sessions 
(binomial tests, ps < .016). Similarly, Junior‘s responses were 81% correct across all 
sessions (n = 1,500) and his accuracy was above chance for 28 sessions (binomial tests, 
ps < .032) and no different from chance for 2 sessions (binomial tests, ps > .059). 
On the other hand, for shape part-identity problems, Madu‘s responses were 67% 
correct across all sessions (n = 1,500 trials) with her accuracy above chance for 16 
sessions (74% correct, n = 800; binomial tests, ps < .032) and at chance for 14 sessions 
(59% correct, n = 700; binomial tests, ps > .059). Similarly, Junior‘s responses were 57% 
correct across all sessions (n = 1,500) with his accuracy above chance for eight sessions 
(74% correct, n = 400; binomial tests, ps < .032) and at chance for 22 sessions (52% 
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correct, n =1,100; binomial tests, ps > .059). Figure 3.2.5 displays subject accuracy as a 
function of sessions and identity problem type. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.5. Subject accuracy as a function of sessions and identity problem type during 
concurrent color and shape part-identity MTS tasks in Experiment 2A. The black 
horizontal line at 64% correct shows the lowest percentage of correct responses that was 




3.2.1.4. Experiment 2B: Shape Part- and Whole-Identity Responding 
3.2.1.4.1. Shape Part-Identity (Phase 1) 
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Madu met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials.
12
 Her accuracy 
was above chance for all five sessions (77% correct, n = 500; binomial tests, ps < .003). 
The left panel of Figure 3.2.6 displays accuracy as a function of each of the five sessions. 
After completing Phase 1, Madu advanced to Experiment 2C.  
On the other hand, Junior failed to meet the performance criteria after completing 
1,500 trials. His accuracy was above chance during one session (62% correct, n = 100; 
binomial, p = .010); otherwise, his accuracy was not different from chance (53% correct, 
n = 1,400; binomial tests, ps > .067). The left panel of Figure 3.2.6 displays accuracy as a 
function of each session. After completing Phase 1, Junior advanced to Phase 2. 
3.2.1.4.2. Shape Whole-Identity (Phase 2) 
Junior met the performance criteria after completing 2,000 trials. His accuracy 
was above chance for the last 14 consecutive sessions (71% correct, n = 1,400; binomial 
tests, ps < .044); otherwise, his accuracy was at chance for six sessions (56% correct, n = 
600; binomial tests, ps > .067). The second to left panel of Figure 3.2.6 displays accuracy 
as a function of sessions. After completing Phase 2, Junior advanced to Phase 3. 
3.2.1.4.3. Shape Part-Identity (Phase 3) 
Junior met the performance criteria after completing 1,200 trials. His accuracy 
was above chance for all 12 sessions (76% correct; binomial tests, ps < .001). The second 
to right panel of Figure 3.2.6 displays accuracy as a function of sessions. After 
completing Phase 3, Junior advanced to Experiment 2C. 
3.2.1.4.4. Early and Criterion Learning Between Experiment Phases 
                                               
12
 Ibid footnote 10, pg. 78. 
 
69 
Comparing the proportion of correct responses during the last 300 trials of shape 
part-identity responding in Phase 1 for Madu to the last 300 trials of shape part-identity 
learning in Phase 3 for Junior revealed that criterion learning accuracy did not differ 
between Madu and Junior (both 84% correct, ns = 300; Fisher‘s exact test, p = .50). 
Additionally, for Junior, the proportion of correct responses during criterion 
learning of shape whole-identity in Phase 2 (84% correct, n = 300) was statistically 
higher than the proportion of correct responses during early learning of shape part-





Figure 3.2.6. Subject accuracy as a function of sessions for shape part- and whole-identity MTS tasks in Experiment 2B and 
2D. The black horizontal line at 59% correct shows the lowest percentage of correct responses that was statistically above 
chance (binomial test, p < .05, n = 100). For Madu, note that color and shape part-identity responding in Experiment 2C and 
color whole-identity responding in Experiment 2D occurred before shape whole-identity responding.
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3.2.1.5. Experiment 2C: Concurrent Color and Shape Part-Identity Responding 
Madu met the performance criteria after completing 1,200 trials.
13
 For color part-
identity problems, her accuracy was above chance for all 13 sessions (97% correct, n = 
650; binomial tests, ps < .001). Likewise, for shape part-identity problems, her accuracy 
was above chance for all 13 thirteen sessions (75% correct, n = 650; binomial tests, ps < 
.032). Junior met the performance criteria after completing 1,500 trials. For color part-
identity problems, his accuracy was above chance for all fifteen sessions (86% correct, n 
= 650; binomial tests, ps < .001). Likewise, for shape part-identity problems, his accuracy 
was above chance for all 15 sessions (79% correct, n = 650; binomial tests, ps < .003). 
Figure 3.2.7 displays subject accuracy as a function of sessions and identity problem 
type. 
Performance during the last three sessions was examined to evaluate criterion 
learning. Madu was more accurate with color (98% correct, n = 150) than shape (79% 
correct, n = 150) part-identity problems, Fisher‘s exact test, p < .001, ϕ = .301). On the 
other hand, Junior‘ accuracy with color (83% correct, n = 150) and shape (88% correct, n 
= 150) part-identity problems was not different, Fisher‘s exact test, p = .161. Further, 
Madu‘s accuracy was significantly higher than Junior‘s for color part-identity problems 
(Fisher‘s exact test, p < .001, ϕ = .252) and Junior‘s was significantly higher than Madu‘s 
for shape part-identity problems (Fisher‘s exact test, p < .022, ϕ = .125). 
Finally, Madu responded faster to color (M = .80 s, SE = .01, n = 146 with 2 cases 
deleted) than shape (M = 1.12 s, SE = .03, n = 146) part-identity problems during 
criterion learning, t(145) = -11.76, p < .001, η
2
 = .49. On the other hand, Junior 
                                               
13
 Ibid footnote 10, pg. 78. 
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responded no differently to color (M = 1.36 s, SE = .044, n = 143) and shape (M = 1.31 s, 




Figure 3.2.7. Subject accuracy as a function of sessions and identity problem type during 
concurrent color and shape part-identity MTS tasks. The black horizontal line at 64% 
correct shows the lowest percentage of correct responses that was statistically above 




3.2.1.5.1. Early and Criterion Learning Between Experiment Parts 
In relation to shape part-identity problems, Madu‘s accuracy was not different 
during criterion learning in Experiment 2B, Phase 1 when only shape part-identity 
problems were presented (84% correct, n = 300) and early learning in Experiment 2C 
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when both shape and color part-identity problems were presented (76% correct, n = 150), 
Fisher‘s exact test, p =.132. Likewise, Junior‘s accuracy for shape part-identity problems 
was not different during criterion learning in Experiment 2B, Phase 3 when only shape 
part-identity problems were presented (84% correct, n = 300) and early learning in 
Experiment 2C when both shape and color part-identity problems were presented (88% 
correct, n = 150), Fisher‘s exact test, p = .314.  
Furthermore, the same pattern was evident for both subjects in relation to color 
part-identity problems. That is, neither Madu‘s nor Junior‘s criterion accuracy for color 
part-identity problems in Experiment 2A differed from their early learning in Experiment 
2C (Madu: 98% vs. 96% correct, respectively; Junior: 90% vs. 86% correct, 
respectively), Fisher‘s exact tests, ps > .293. 
3.2.1.6. Experiment 2D: Color and Shape Whole-Identity Responding 
3.2.1.6.1. Color Whole-Identity (Phase 1) 
Madu met the performance criteria (i.e., at least 80% correct for three consecutive 
sessions) after completing 300 trials. Her accuracy was above chance for all three 
sessions (all 100% correct, ns = 100; binomial tests, ps < .001). After completing Phase 
1, she advanced to Phase 2. Similarly, Junior met the performance criteria after 
completing 300 trials.
14
 His accuracy was above chance for all four sessions (in order by 
session: 95%, 92%, 92%, and 95% correct, ns = 95, 92, 92, and 95; binomial tests, ps < 
.001). After completing Phase 1, he advanced to Experiment 3. 
3.2.1.6.2. Shape Whole-Identity (Phase 2) 
                                               
14
 Ibid footnote 10, pg. 78. 
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Madu met the performance criteria after completing 1,000 trials. Her accuracy 
was above chance for all ten sessions (76% correct; n = 1,000; binomial tests, ps < .003). 
The right panel of Figure 3.2.6 displays Madu‘s accuracy as a function of sessions. 
3.2.1.7. Experiment 3: Concurrent Color and Shape Part- and Whole-Identity Responding 
and Test of Transfer 
3.2.1.7.1. Baseline (Phase 1) 
Madu met the performance criteria (i.e., at least 70% correct for color part-
identity, color whole-identity, shape part-identity, and shape whole-identity problems for 
three consecutive sessions with a minimum of five sessions completed) after completing 
1,000 trials.
15
 Her accuracy was above chance during all 12 sessions of color part- and 
whole-identity problems (98% and 99% correct, respectively, ns = 300; binomial tests, ps 
< .001). For shape part-identity problems, her accuracy was above chance for the final 
five consecutive sessions (78% correct, n = 125; binomial tests, ps < .022); otherwise, her 
accuracy was above chance for two other sessions (72% correct, n = 50; binomial tests, 
ps = .022) and at chance for five sessions (62% correct, n = 125; binomial tests, ps > 
.054). For shape whole-identity problems, her accuracy was above chance for the final 
seven consecutive sessions (79% correct, n = 175; binomial tests, ps < .007); otherwise, 
her accuracy was above chance for three sessions (83% correct, n = 75; binomial tests, ps 
< .022) and no different from chance for two sessions (64% correct, n = 50; binomial 
tests, ps > .054). The left panel of Figure 3.2.8 displays Madu‘s accuracy as a function of 
sessions and trial type. After completing Phase 1, she advanced to Phase 3.  
                                               
15
 Madu received two additional 100-trial sessions after she reached the criteria. 
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Junior met the performance criteria after completing 1,700 trials. His accuracy 
was above chance for all 17 sessions for color part- and whole-identity problems (93% 
and 95% correct, respectively, ns = 425; binomial tests, ps < .002). For shape part-
identity, his accuracy was above chance for the final four consecutive sessions (80% 
correct, n = 100; binomial tests, ps < .007); otherwise, his accuracy was above chance for 
four other sessions (75% correct, n = 100; binomial tests, ps < .007) and at chance for 
nine sessions (65% correct, n = 225; binomial tests, ps > .054). For shape whole-identity 
problems, his accuracy was above chance for the final three consecutive sessions (84% 
correct, n = 75; binomial tests, ps < .002); otherwise, his accuracy was above chance for 
seven sessions (81% correct, n = 175; binomial tests, ps < .022) and no different from 
chance for seven sessions (62% correct, n = 175; binomial tests, ps > .054). The left panel 
of Figure 3.2.9 displays Junior‘s accuracy as a function of sessions and trial type. After 
completing Phase 1, he advanced to Phase 2. 
The final three sessions of reinforced baseline trials were used to assess criterion 
learning. For Madu, the relationship between responses and identity problem type was 
statistically significant and moderately strong, χ
2
 (3, N = 300) = 28.62, p < .001, V = .31. 
The pattern was such that her accuracy did not differ between color part- and whole-
identity problems (96% vs. 99% correct, respectively; z = 1.01, p = .155, n = 75) or 
between shape part- and whole-identity problems (77% vs. 76% correct, respectively; z = 
.19, p = .423, n = 75), but her accuracy was higher for color part- and whole-identity 
problems than shape part- and whole-identity problems (zs > 3.36, ps < .001, ns = 75). 
For Junior, on the other hand, the relationship between responses and identity problem 
type was not statistically significant, χ
2
 (3, N = 300) = 6.53, p = .088, which indicates that 
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his accuracy did not differ statistically among color part-identity (89% correct), color 
whole-identity (92% correct), shape part-identity (79% correct), and shape whole-identity 
(84% correct) problems during the final three sessions (ns = 75).  
With respect to response latency during the last three sessions of reinforced 
baseline trials, statistically significant correlated groups t tests indicated that both subjects 
responded faster to color whole-identity problems (Madu: M = 1.16 s, SE = .07, n = 75; 
Junior: M = 1.26 s, SE = .07, n = 150) than shape part-identity problems (Madu: M = 1.33 
s, SE = .05, n = 75; Junior: M = 1.46 s, SE = .41, n = 150), but the effect was weak for 
both Madu, t(74) = 1.89, p = .031, η
2
 = .05, and Junior, t(149) = 2.70, p = .004, η
2
 = .05. 
No other paired comparison was statistically significant for Madu or Junior: ts(74) < 




Figure 3.2.8. Accuracy as a function of sessions and trial type for each identity problem type and phase of Experiment 3 for 
Madu. The black horizontal line at 72% correct shows the lowest percentage of correct responses that was statistically above 
chance for reinforced baseline trials in Phase 1 (binomial test, p < .05, n = 25); likewise, with the black and gold line for the 
average accuracy of reinforced and nonreinforced baseline trials in Phase 2 (binomial test, p < .05, n = 25) and with the blue 




Figure 3.2.9. Accuracy as a function of sessions and trial type for each identity problem type and phase of Experiment 3 for 
Junior. The black horizontal line at 72% correct shows the lowest percentage of correct responses that was statistically above 
chance for reinforced baseline trials in Phase 1 (binomial test, p < .05, n = 25); likewise, with the black and gold line for the 
average accuracy of reinforced and nonreinforced baseline trials in Phase 2 and 3 (binomial test, p < .05, n = 25) and with the 
blue line for nonreinforced probe trials in Phase 4 (binomial test, p < .05, n = 18).
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3.2.1.7.2. Baseline and Nonreinforced (36%) Baseline (Phase 2) 
Junior met the performance criteria after completing 600 trials. His accuracy was 
above chance for all six sessions of color part- and whole-identity problems (91% and 
95% correct, respectively, ns = 150; binomial tests, ps < .05). For shape part-identity 
problems, his accuracy was above chance for the last three consecutive sessions (79% 
correct, n = 75; binomial tests, ps < .002); otherwise, his accuracy was not different from 
chance for three sessions (56% correct, n = 75; binomial tests, ps > .115). For shape 
whole-identity problems, his accuracy was above chance for the last four consecutive 
sessions (83% correct, n = 100; binomial tests, ps < .002); otherwise, his accuracy was 
not different from chance for two sessions (62% correct, n = 50; binomial tests, ps > 
.054). 
During the 11 additional sessions that he received after reaching the performance 
criteria, Junior‘s responses were 97% and 98% correct (ns = 275) for color part- and 
whole-identity problems, respectively, and he was above chance for each of the 11 
sessions (binomial tests, ps < .001). The subject‘s responses were 74% and 79% correct 
(ns = 275) for shape part- and whole-identity problems during the 11 additional sessions 
that he received after reaching the criteria. His accuracy was above chance for eight of 
the 11 sessions for both shape part- and whole-identity problems (74% and 85% correct, 
respectively, ns = 200; binomial tests, ps < .002); otherwise his accuracy was not 
different for chance for three sessions for shape part- and whole-identity problems (67% 
and 64% correct, respectively, ns = 200; binomial tests, ps > .054). The second to left 
panel of Figure 3.2.9 displays Junior‘s accuracy as a function of sessions and trial type.  
3.2.7.1.3. Baseline and Nonreinforced (24%) Baseline (Phase 3) 
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Madu met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials. For color part- and 
whole-identity problems, her accuracy was above chance for all five sessions (90% and 
97% correct, respectively, ns = 125; binomial tests, ps < .001). For shape part- and 
whole-identity problems, Madu‘s accuracy was above chance for all five sessions (86% 
and 85% correct, respectively, ns = 125; binomial tests, ps < .002). During the five 
additional sessions that she received after reaching the performance criteria, Madu‘s 
accuracy above chance for all five sessions for color part-identity, color whole-identity, 
and shape whole-identity problems (85%, 97%, 79% correct, respectively, ns = 125; 
binomial tests, ps < .022). Her accuracy was above chance during four of the five 
sessions for shape part-identity problems (79% correct, n = 100; binomial tests, ps < 
.008); otherwise, her accuracy did not differ from chance for one session (64% correct, n 
= 25; binomial test, p = .115). The middle panel of Figure 3.2.8 displays Madu‘s 
accuracy as a function of sessions and trial type. After completing Phase 3, the subject 
advanced to Phase 4 transfer testing. 
Junior met the performance criteria after completing 900 trials. His accuracy was 
above chance for all ten sessions for color part- and whole-identity problems (94% and 
97% correct, respectively, ns = 250; binomial tests, ps < .001). For shape part-identity 
problems, his accuracy was above chance for the last seven consecutive sessions (83% 
correct, n = 175; binomial tests, ps < .008); otherwise, his accuracy was above chance for 
two other sessions (80% correct, n = 50; binomial tests, ps < .002) and not different from 
chance for one session (56% correct, n = 25 trials; binomial test, p > .345). For shape 
whole-identity problems, his accuracy was above chance for six sessions (83 % correct, n 
= 150; binomial tests, ps < .022); otherwise, his accuracy was at chance for four sessions 
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(66% correct, n = 100; binomial tests, ps > .054). The second to right panel of Figure 
3.2.9 displays Junior‘s accuracy as a function of sessions and trial type. After completing 
Phase 3, the subject advanced to Phase 4 transfer testing. 
Accuracy for nonreinforced baseline trials during the last three sessions was used 
to evaluate criterion learning. Madu‘s accuracy was above chance for nonreinforced 
baseline trials of color part-identity, color whole-identity, and shape whole-identity 
problems (71%, 94%, and 92% correct, ns = 21, 18, and 12, respectively; binomial tests, 
ps < .039), but not above chance for nonreinforced baseline trials of shape part-identity 
problems (67% correct, n = 21; binomial test, p = .095). Junior‘s accuracy was above 
chance for nonreinforced baseline trials of color part-identity, color-whole identity, and 
shape part-identity problems (95%, 100%, and 86% correct, respectively, ns = 21, 18, and 
21; binomial tests, ps < .001), but not above chance for nonreinforced baseline trials of 
shape whole-identity problems (75% correct, n = 12; binomial tests, ps = .073). 
Further, for nonreinforced baseline trials, the relationship between responses and 
identity problem type was statistically significant and moderately strong during criterion 
learning for both Madu, χ
2
 (3, N = 300) = 17.94, p < .001, V = .26, and Junior, χ
2
 (3, N = 
300) = 17.31, p < .001, V = .24. For Madu, the pattern was such that her accuracy was 
lower for shape part-identity problems (73% correct) than color part-identity (85% 
correct; z = 1.81, p = .035), shape whole-identity (91% correct; z = 2.76, p = .003), and 
color whole-identity (96% correct; z = 3.85, p < .001); additionally, her accuracy for 
color part-identity problems was lower than that for color whole-identity (z = 2.25, p = 
.012. No other pairwise comparison was significant (zs = 1.31 and 1.01, ps = .095 and 
.157). For Junior, the pattern was such that his accuracy for shape whole identity 
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problems (75% correct) was significantly lower than his accuracy for color whole-
identity (96% correct; z = 3.69, p < .001) and color part-identity (92% correct; z = -2.85, 
p = .002) and his accuracy for shape part-identity problems (84% correct) was 
significantly lower than that for color whole-identity (z = 2.45, p = .007). No other 
pairwise comparison was significant (zs = -1.41, 1.03, and 1.51, ps > .066).  
3.2.1.7.4. Transfer Test (Phase 4) 
The right panel of Figure 3.2.8 displays Madu‘s accuracy during the transfer of 
learning test. Performance was evaluated across all six transfer test sessions for 
reinforced baseline trials. Madu‘s accuracy was above chance for color part- and whole-
identity problems (87% and 97% correct, respectively, ns = 117 and 118; binomial tests, 
ps < .001) and for shape part- and whole-identity problems (83% and 88% correct, 
respectively, ns = 116 and 105; binomial tests, ps < .001). 
Performance was also evaluated across all six transfer test sessions for 
nonreinforced baseline trials. Madu‘s accuracy for nonreinforced baseline trials was 
above chance for color whole-identity problems (100% correct, n = 7; binomial test, p = 
.008) and shape part- and whole-identity problems (95% and 75% correct, respectively, 
ns = 20 and 28; binomial tests, ps < .007), but did not differ from chance for color part-
identity problems (71% correct, n = 17; binomial test, p = .072).  
Finally, performance was evaluated across all six transfer test sessions for 
nonreinforced probe trials and then compared to criterion learning in Phase 3. First, 
Madu‘s accuracy was above chance for novel color part-identity problems (78% correct, 
n = 18; binomial test, p = .016). Additionally, the relationship between responses to color 
part-identity problems and nonreinforced probe trials (78% correct), nonreinforced 
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baseline trials during criterion learning in Phase 3 (71% correct), and reinforced baseline 
trials during criterion learning in Phase 3 (91% correct) was not statistically significant, 
χ
2
 (2, N = 93) = 4.78, p = .092, which revealed that her accuracy with novel color part-
identity problems was not different from her accuracy with familiar color part-identity 
problems. 
Second, Madu‘s accuracy did not differ from chance for nonreinforced probe 
trials of the novel shape part-identity problems (56% correct, n = 18; binomial test, p = 
.407). Additionally, the relation between responses to shape part-identity problems and 
nonreinforced probe trials, nonreinforced baseline trials during criterion learning in Phase 
3 (67% correct), and reinforced baseline trials during criterion learning in Phase 3 (76% 
correct) was not statistically significant, χ
2
 (2, N = 93) = 2.80, p = .247, which revealed 
that response accuracy for novel shape part-identity problems was not different from 
criterion accuracy for familiar shape part-identity problems. 
Last, Madu‘s accuracy did not differ from chance for nonreinforced probe trials of 
the novel color whole-identity problems (67% correct, n = 18; binomial test, p = .119) 
and the novel shape whole-identity problems (56% correct, n = 18; binomial test, p = 
.407). In addition, the relation between responses to color whole-identity problems and 
responses to shape whole-identity problems and the nonreinforced probe trials, 
nonreinforced baseline trials during criterion learning in Phase 3, and reinforced baseline 
trials during criterion learning in Phase 3 was statistically significant: χ
2
s (2, Ns = 93) > 
13.24, ps < .001, Vs > .38. For color whole-identity problems, the pattern was such that 
Madu‘s accuracy was significantly lower for nonreinforced probe trials (67% correct) 
than nonreinforced baseline trials (94% correct, n = 18; z = 3.57, p < .001) and reinforced 
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baseline trials (96% correct, n = 57; z = 2.11, p = .018), and accuracy did not differ 
between nonreinforced and reinforced baseline trials (z = 3.86, p = .350), which revealed 
that response accuracy for novel color whole-identity problems was lower than criterion 
accuracy for familiar color whole-identity problems. For shape whole-identity problems, 
Madu‘s accuracy was significantly lower for nonreinforced probe trials (56% correct) 
than nonreinforced baseline trials (92% correct, n = 11; z = 2.11, p < .017) and reinforced 
baseline trials (90% correct; n = 57, z = 3.46, p < .001), and accuracy did not differ 
between nonreinforced and reinforced baseline trials (z = -1.30, p = .448), which reveals 
that response accuracy for novel shape whole-identity problems was lower than criterion 
response accuracy for familiar shape whole-identity problems. 
The right panel of Figure 3.2.9 displays Junior‘s accuracy during the transfer test. 
Performance was evaluated across all six transfer test sessions for nonreinforced baseline 
trials. Junior‘s accuracy was above chance for color part- and whole-identity problems 
(both 100% correct; ns = 17 and 7, respectively; binomial tests, ps < .008), but Junior‘s 
accuracy was not different from chance for shape part- and whole-identity problems 
(65% and 57% correct, ns = 20 and 28, respectively; binomial tests, ps > .135). 
Performance was also evaluated across all six transfer test sessions for reinforced 
baseline trials. Junior‘s accuracy was above chance for reinforced baseline trials of color 
part- and whole-identity problems (96% and 96% correct, ns = 117 and 118, respectively; 
binomial tests, ps < .001) and reinforced baseline trials of shape part- and whole-identity 




Finally, performance was evaluated across all six transfer test sessions for 
nonreinforced probe trials and then compared to criterion learning in Phase 3. For 
nonreinforced probe trials of the novel color part-identity, color whole-identity, and 
shape whole-identity problems, Junior‘s accuracy was above chance (89%, 89%, and 
72% correct, respectively, ns = 18; binomial tests, ps < .048). In addition, the relation 
between responses and nonreinforced probe trials, nonreinforced baseline trials during 
criterion learning in Phase 3, and reinforced baseline trials during criterion learning in 
Phase 3 was not statistically significant for color part-identity, color whole-identity, and 
shape whole-identity problems, χ
2
s (2, Ns = 93) < 2.19, ps > .335, which revealed that 
response accuracy for novel color part- and whole-identity and novel shape whole-
identity problems did not differ from criterion accuracy for familiar color part- and 
whole-identity and familiar shape whole-identity problems.. 
Last, Junior‘s accuracy was not different from chance for nonreinforced probe 
trials of the novel shape part-identity problems (50% correct; n = 18; binomial test, p 
=.50); however, the relationship between responses to shape part-identity problems and 
nonreinforced probe trials, nonreinforced baseline trials during criterion learning in Phase 
3, and reinforced baseline trials during criterion learning in Phase 3 was statistically 
significant, χ
2
(2, N = 93) = 9.65, p = .008, V = .32. The relationship was such that 
Junior‘s accuracy was significantly lower for nonreinforced probe trials of the novel 
shape part-identity problems (50% correct) than nonreinforced baseline trials during 
criterion learning in Phase 3 (86% correct; z = 2.41, p = .008) and reinforced baseline 
trials during criterion learning in Phase 3 (83% correct; z = 2.83, p = .002), and accuracy 
did not differ between nonreinforced and reinforced baseline trials during criterion 
 
86 
learning in Phase 3 (z = -.25, p = .400), which revealed that response accuracy for novel 
shape part-identity problems was lower than criterion accuracy for familiar shape part-
identity problems. 
3.3 Discussion 
There were clear differences in the propensity of subjects to learn to select the 
comparison stimulus that was identical in color to the sample stimulus when color was 
the only property that differed among stimuli (Experiment 1A). Junior required nearly 
4,800 trials before he reached the performance criteria, thus, demonstrating mastery of 
color whole-identity responding. On the other hand, Madu reached the performance 
criteria after 500 trials. These differences likely arise from the divergent experimental 
histories of subjects. 
During Experiment 1A, the relation between the sample and correct comparison 
stimulus (S+) or the relation between the sample and the incorrect comparison stimulus 
(S-) may have exerted control over the color whole-identity matching behavior of 
subjects. S+ control can be described by ‗if B is the sample then select B as the 
comparison‘, whereas, S- control can be described by ‗if B is the sample then do not 
select R or Y as a comparison‘. To test for S- control, the positive trained comparison can 
be replaced by a novel comparison (e.g., B - NOTA, not R) with S- control evidenced if 
subjects choose the novel untrained comparison. To test for S+ control, the negative 
trained comparison can be replaced by a novel comparison (e.g., B → B, not NOTA) 




Thus, the first 100-trial session of the modified two-choice MTS task with the 
NOTA comparison stimulus during Experiment 1B (Phase 1 for Madu and Phase 2 for 
Junior) reflects a test of the controlling relations during color whole-identity matching in 
Experiment 1A. Junior‘s behavior illustrated that color whole-identity matching was 
completely controlled by the S+; his responses were 100% correct during the first 100-
trial session of Phase 2 when the NOTA comparison replaced a trained comparison 
stimulus as the S- stimulus (i.e., NOTA as the incorrect comparison), but were 0% correct 
when the NOTA comparison replaced a trained comparison stimulus as the S+ 
comparison (i.e., NOTA as the correct comparison). Similarly, Madu‘s behavior 
illustrated that color whole-identity matching was S+ controlled; her responses were 
100% correct during the first 100-trials of Phase 1 when the NOTA comparison replaced 
a trained comparison stimulus as the S- stimulus, but were 40% correct when the NOTA 
comparison replaced a trained comparison stimulus as the S+ comparison. Indeed, S+ 
control of the identity matching was described in two chimpanzees called Pan and Panzee 
for auditory to visual cross-modal identity matching (Beran, 2010; Hashiya & Kojima, 
1997), a chimpanzee called Chloe for color to shape arbitrary identity matching 
(Tomonaga, 1993), and three chimpanzees called Lana, Sherman, and Panzee for 
photograph to lexigram identity matching (Beran & Washburn, 2002). 
With respect to concurrent color whole-identity and -nonidentity responding when 
color/pattern was still the only property that differed between stimuli during Experiment 
1B, the findings showed that Madu learned the task more readily than did Junior. 
Specifically, Madu required fewer trials to achieve above chance accuracy during a 
session (200 vs. 600 trials, respectively, for Madu in Phase 1 and Junior in Phase 2) and 
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fewer trials to demonstrate mastery of the task by reaching the performance criteria (500 
vs. 800 trials, respectively, for Madu in Phase 1 and Junior in Phase 2).  
Moreover, decrements in accuracy occurred when the NOTA stimulus was 
present as a comparison stimulus during the criterion-level performance of both subjects 
in Experiment 1B Phase 2. The criterion performance of Madu suggested that she was 
more likely to make errors when NOTA was present as a comparison, but she did so in a 
random manner as her accuracy was significantly lower but not different when NOTA 
was the correct and the incorrect comparison than when NOTA was absent as a 
comparison. Junior‘s criterion performance suggested that he preferred to select the 
NOTA comparison stimulus when it was present as a comparison as his accuracy was 
statistically higher but not different when the NOTA comparison was absent and when it 
was the correct comparison than when NOTA was the incorrect comparison. The 
aforementioned response patterns likely arose because the simple S+ control that was 
previously described for identity responding when all comparisons were color stimuli 
(i.e., if B then select B or if B then do not select R, respectively) could not continue to 
govern concurrent identity and nonidentity responding because now the S+ was 
nonidentical to the sample on some trials (i.e., when NOTA was the correct comparison) 
and on some trials it was identical to the sample (i.e., when NOTA was the incorrect 
stimulus). 
Finally, both subjects required more time to respond to color whole-nonidentity 
(i.e., when NOTA was the correct comparison) than color whole-identity (i.e., when 
NOTA was the correct comparison or absent as a comparison) during their criterion 
performance in Experiment 1B Phase 2. The found response speed difference is likely a 
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product of the unique type of responding that the modified MTS tasks required. In 
particular, nonidentity judgments during standard nonmatching-to-sample (NMTS) and 
oddity conditional discrimination tasks require that subjects select the comparison that is 
nonidentical to the sample in the presence of another comparison that is identical to the 
sample (i.e., select the nonidentical stimulus if nonidentity exists). The modified MTS 
task, on the other hand, required that subjects select a particular comparison stimulus that 
was nonidentical to the sample in the presence of another comparison that was 
nonidentical to the sample (i.e., select NOTA if nonidentity exists). For this reason, 
responding successfully to nonidentity with the modified MTS task might have required 
additional response time. 
Turning the discussion to part-identity responding, the accuracy of both subjects 
for color part-identity problems was above chance during the first session and remained 
so across all or the majority of sessions during concurrent color and shape part-identity 
responding in Experiment 2A. On the other hand, the accuracy of both subjects for shape-
part-identity problems was not different from chance during the first session and many 
sessions thereafter. It was not surprising that subjects failed to respond to shape part-
identity while successfully responding to color part-identity during the period of early 
learning following the tasks of Experiment 1. The tasks of Experiment 1 focused on 
learning to respond to color whole-identity when the shape of stimuli was an irrelevant 
dimension that remained cue-constant within and between trials (i.e., stimuli were shaped 
only as squares). The research on learned attention and dimensional relevance in category 
learning in humans and baboons illustrates that when the cue-to-outcome correspondence 
shifts at some point during the course of training such that the shifted correspondence has 
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the same relevant, diagnostic, or valid cues as the initial correspondence, then learning 
the shifted correspondence is relatively fast and easier. If the relevant cues for the shifted 
correspondence differ from those for the initial correspondence, then learning the shifted 
correspondence is relatively slow and harder (Fagot, Kruschke, Dépy, & Vauclair, 1998; 
Kruschke, 1996). Second, there is existing data to support the finding that chimpanzees, 
orangutans, and monkeys prefer color over shape as the relevant discriminative 
dimension in matching and oddity tasks (Davis, Leary, Stevens, & Thompson, 1967; 
Draper, 1965; Garcha & Ettlinger, 1979; King, 1973; Yagi, Shinoda, Shinohara, & 
Hirata, 1975). 
So the orangutans learned attention to color as the relevant dimension may have 
perseverated because attending to shape as the relevant dimension may be intrinsically 
more difficult than doing the same for color even though all stimuli began to vary in their 
shape and the cue-to-outcome correspondence broadened to include shape as the relevant 
dimension for half of the trials. The former explanation concerning learned attention to 
dimensional cues would be supported if the order of original learning was reversed such 
that shape whole-identity tasks were followed by concurrent shape and color part-identity 
tasks and subjects failed to judge identity for color part-identity problems while 
successfully judging identity for shape part-identity problems during concurrent color and 
shape part-identity tasks. This dissertation, however, leaves this issue as a matter for 
future investigations. 
Because the start of the concurrent color and shape part-identity MTS tasks in 
Experiment 2A occurred six or seven months after the conclusion of color whole-identity 
tasks in Experiment 1, one cannot conclude that the introduction of shape as a relevant 
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dimension and an irrelevant cue-ambiguous dimension in Experiment 2 (i.e., changing 
the task to require color and shape part-identity responding) was responsible for the drop 
from nearly perfect accuracy during criterion color whole-identity learning to 66% and 
74% correct for Madu and Junior, respectively, during early color part-identity learning. 
It is possible that the passage of time was solely responsible for the decline. In any case, 
the ambiguity as to the source of the decrement during early color part-identity learning 
for the concurrent color and shape part-identity MTS tasks prohibits concluding that 
subjects recognized that color was a constituent property of the stimulus even though 
their matching accuracy for color part-identity problems reached criterion levels. In other 
words, one cannot yet say that they learned that a part of an object can be identical to the 
part of another object while other parts of the object are nonidentical. 
Completing sessions that required only shape part-identity responding resulted in 
Madu mastering shape part-identity problems in Experiment 2. Specifically, her accuracy 
was above what chance would predict during the very first session of shape part-identity 
problems in Phase 1 when color was always an irrelevant cue-ambiguous dimension that 
was not associated with reinforcement. On the other hand, Junior required more than just 
sessions devoted solely to shape part-identity matching to master shape part-identity 
problems. Indeed, it was only after learning to respond to shape whole-identity that 
Junior mastered shape part-identity problems. Specifically, Junior continued to respond 
no differently from chance after completing 1,500 trials of shape part-identity matching 
in Phase 1. His accuracy rose to above chance levels only after he completed 700 trials of 
shape whole-identity problems and he went on to demonstrate mastery of shape whole-
identity matching by reaching the performance criteria in Phase 2. Following criterion 
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learning for shape whole-identity in Phase 2, his accuracy was above chance during the 
very first session in which only shape part-identity problems were represented in Phase 3. 
By the end of shape part-identity learning in Phase 3, his accuracy was no different from 
Madu‘s criterion shape part-identity performance. That Junior required shape whole-
identity response learning before mastering shape part-identity responding supports the 
traditional human developmental view that conceptual abilities shift from identity 
judgments that are based on the global or holistic aspect of objects in early infancy to the 
ability to judge identity relations that are articulated along the different constituent 
properties or attributes of objects in late infancy and early childhood (Burns, 1992; 
Kemler, 1983; Smith, 1984; Smith, 1993; Smith & Heise, 1992). 
Although both subjects went on to master shape part-identity problems when they 
were given in isolation, one still cannot conclude that the subjects were responding to 
part-identity. The critical test to discern whether subjects recognized identity relations 
that are articulated along the constituent properties of objects must involve concurrent 
color and shape part-identity responding. When both color and shape part-identity 
responding is required and there is no discriminative stimulus to signal what property is 
associated with reinforcement, one can infer that subjects recognize that an identity 
relation exists between one, but not another constituent property when they respond 
accurately to both types of part-identity problems even though it may be more difficult to 
recognize the part-identity relation between one property. 
What happened when subjects were represented with sessions that required 
concurrent color and shape part-identity matching only one or five days after they 
reached criterion-level performance with shape part-identity problems in Experiment 2C? 
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Junior and Madu both judged color and shape part-identity above what chance would 
predict during the very first session and during all subsequent sessions. In addition, there 
was not a decline in shape part-identity response accuracy from when they judged shape 
part-identity in isolation (i.e., when color was always irrelevant cue-ambiguous) to when 
they were required to do so concurrently with color part-identity. These results indicate 
that both subjects responded to color and shape as the constituent properties of stimuli. 
After mastering sequential color and shape whole-identity MTS tasks and 
concurrent color and shape part-identity MTS tasks in Experiment 2, both subjects went 
on to master concurrent color and shape part- and whole-identity MTS tasks during Phase 
1 baseline of Experiment 3. The early learning performance of both subjects, however, 
showed that shape part- and whole-identity accuracy declined while color part- and 
whole-identity accuracy was unaffected. Both subjects eventually re-established above 
chance accuracy with shape part- and whole-identity problems, but they were only able to 
meet a reduced performance criterion of 70% correct for three consecutive days after 
1,000 or more trials during concurrent matching with the four identity problem types. 
The introduction of nonreinforced baseline trials in Phase 2 disrupted Junior‘s 
shape part- and whole-identity responding during the concurrent color and shape part- 
and whole-identity MTS task. Decreasing the proportion of nonreinforced baseline trials 
from 36% to 24% of trials in Phase 3 for Junior seemed to aid in the re-establishment of 
the shape part- and whole-identity responding, but it is possible that simply receiving 
more trials in Phase 3 stabilized his matching ability. 
In any case, the criterion-level performance of Madu during concurrent color and 
shape part- and whole-identity MTS tasks showed that responding to shape identity was 
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more difficult than responding to color identity. The same pattern was evident in Junior‘s 
responding, but it was expressed to a lesser extent. Specifically, Madu‘s criterion-level 
reinforced baseline trial accuracy was statistically lower for shape part- and whole-
identity problems than color part- and whole-identity problems in Phase 1 and her 
criterion-level nonreinforced baseline trial accuracy was statistically lower for shape part-
identity problems than color part-identity problems in Phase 3. For Junior, criterion-level 
nonreinforced baseline trial accuracy was statistically lower for shape whole-identity 
problems than color whole-identity in Phase 3.  
An earlier study with four orangutans and one gorilla reported that the average 
accuracy of subjects across 300 to 360 trials with color and shape part-identity problems 
did not statistically differ during a concurrent color and shape part- and whole-identity 
MTS task (Vonk, 2003), however, inspection of subject accuracy during the last 60 trials 
showed that their accuracy was about 10% to 15% higher for color part-identity problems 
than shape part-identity problems for the gorilla and 3 of the 4 orangutans.
16
 With respect 
to criterion-level performance, the pattern found in the present dissertation seems to 
match the pattern found in a previous study with orangutans; that is it is more difficult to 
respond to shape part-identity than color part-identity. On a related note, there is also 
existing data to support the finding that color is preferred over shape as the relevant, 
discriminative dimension in matching and oddity tasks in monkeys (Davis et al., 1967; 
                                               
16
 Whole-identity problems in Vonk (2003) contained an incorrect comparison that 
differed from the sample and correct comparison in both its color and shape (e.g., red 
square → red square, not yellow triangle). Whole-identity problems in the current study, 
however, contained an incorrect comparison that differed from the sample and correct 
comparison (a) in color, but not in shape or (b) in shape, but not color. For this reason, 
the results of Vonk on whole-identity responding are not discussed. 
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Draper, 1965; Garcha & Ettlinger, 1979; Yagi et al., 1975) and chimpanzees and 
orangutans (Garcha & Ettlinger, 1979; King, 1973).  
Additionally, the criterion-level performance of Madu during concurrent color 
and shape part- and whole-identity MTS tasks showed that responding to part-identity 
was more difficult than responding to whole-identity. Specifically, Madu‘s criterion-level 
nonreinforced baseline trial accuracy was statistically lower for shape part-identity 
problems than shape whole-identity and for color part-identity problems than color 
whole-identity in Phase 3. The data from Madu conform to a previous study in monkeys, 
which revealed that selection of the odd stimulus was more difficult when the irrelevant 
dimension was cue-ambiguous (i.e., part-identity) than when the irrelevant dimension 
was cue-constant (i.e., whole-object nonidentity) (Thomas & Frost, 1983). Of final note, 
the interactive effect of the relevant dimension (color vs. shape) and identity type (part 
vs. whole) was illustrated in the finding that Madu‘s criterion-level nonreinforced 
baseline trial accuracy was not different from chance for shape part-identity problems in 
Phase 3, whereas, her accuracy was above chance for all other identity types. 
Nonhuman primates, thus, can learn that one thing is identical or nonidentical to 
another thing and that the identity relation can also be applied on a finer level between 
the constituent properties of those objects. Did this type of responding transfer to a 
conceptual understanding of part- and whole-identity at the highest level when both 
relevant and irrelevant dimensions were made novel? Madu‘s accuracy illustrated full 
transfer of color part-identity learning as her accuracy was not only above chance, but no 
different from criterion nonreinforced and reinforced baseline matching for color part-
identity problems. She did not exhibit conceptual behavior about shape part- and whole-
 
96 
identity and color whole-identity as her accuracy was not different from chance for the 
aforementioned problem types during the transfer test. On the other hand, Junior‘s 
matching accuracy illustrated full transfer of color part- and whole-identity and shape 
whole-identity learning as his accuracy was not only above chance, but also no different 
from criterion nonreinforced and reinforced baseline matching for color part- and whole- 
identity and shape whole-identity problems. He did not exhibit conceptual behavior about 
shape part-identity as his accuracy was not different from chance for the aforementioned 
problem type during the transfer test. 
Why did Junior form whole-identity concepts about color and shape, whereas, 
Madu did not and why did neither subject form a part-identity concept about shape? 
Three factors may have contributed to these patterns of concept formation failures. First, 
the extent to which responses generalize to novel exemplars is a direct function of the 
number of different training stimuli (Katz, Wright, & Bodily, 2007; Lea, 1984; Oden, 
Thompson, & Premack, 1988; Thompson, 1995; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Wasserman, 
Kiedinger, & Bhatt, 1988; Wright & Katz, 2006; Zentall et al., 2008). Though concept 
formation during acquisition may more readily happen when a large number of training 
exemplars are used, it is also possible that the use of a large number of training exemplars 
increases the likelihood that any given novel transfer test stimulus will resemble one or 
more of the familiar training stimuli. The latter scenario may be especially true of color, 
which is a mixture of light wavelengths, such that providing additional color exemplars 
may serve as a confounding influence on assessments of concept formation. In any case, 
the number of color and shape exemplars used during the learning of concurrent part- and 
whole-identity responding in the present experiments may not have been sufficient to 
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promote more than item-specific learning in Madu for color and shape whole-identity and 
in both Madu and Junior for shape part-identity.  
Second, in the previous chapter I used the idea of levels of concept formation to 
evaluate the existing literature about color and shape part- and whole-identity concept 
formation in monkeys, apes, and human infants. The highest level of concept formation 
reflected an understanding of identity relations for all instances of a dimension regardless 
of how they were distinctly instantiated in terms of another dimension. In the present 
study, concept formation was assessed at the highest level by introducing problems in 
which the instances of both the relevant and irrelevant dimension were novel. If the 
proposed levels of concept formation are akin to the levels of relational knowledge 
proposed by Smith (1984) then concept formation should be hardest at the highest level. 
Concepts may have formed at the lowest and intermediate levels for color and shape 
whole-identity for Madu and for shape part-identity for both Madu and Junior, but the 
present experiment did not assess concept formation at this level. Finally, both subjects 
failing to behave conceptually to shape part-identity may reflect what was generally 
found in terms of their criterion responding during the concurrent color and shape part- 
and whole-identity MTS tasks; specifically, that it is not only harder to respond to shape 
versus color identity and part- versus whole-identity, but that it is also more difficult to 
form concepts along the same lines. 
The literature is rife with examples of apes, monkeys, and human infants learning 
to respond to color and shape whole-identity, but to a lesser extent illustrates how 
nonlinguistic apes, monkeys, and human infants learn to respond to part-identity about 
color and shape. Moreover, sometimes chimpanzees, orangutans, monkeys, and human 
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infants form part- and whole-identity and -nonidentity concepts from their learning 
(Barros, Galvão, & McIlvane, 2002; Bhatt et al., 2004; Fujita, 1983b; Hayne, Rovee-
Collier, & Perris, 1987; Jackson & Pegram, 1970; King, 1973; McMurray & Aslin, 2004; 
Meyer & Harlow, 1949; Robinson, 1955; Tomonaga, 1995; Truppa et al., 2010; 
Weinstein, 1945; Young & Harlow, 1943). 
Not only did the subjects of the present study learn to respond to identity at the 
holistic level for certain colors, they also learned to respond to nonidentity at the holistic 
level for those colors too; moreover, they were able to do the aforementioned 
concurrently. This experiment, thus, documented the ability of nonlanguage-trained apes 
to make concurrent identity and nonidentity judgments using a modified MTS format that 
was akin to the concurrent identity and nonidentity judgments that are required to be 
made during S/D discrimination tasks. The subjects of the present study also learned to 
respond concurrently to identity at the holistic and at the dimension-differentiated level 
and their learning transferred at the highest level to the formation of concepts about color 
part-identity in both orangutans and to the formation of color and shape whole-identity in 
one orangutan. This experiment, thus, documented the ability of nonlanguage-trained 






Animals encounter challenges in their daily lives to which the use of quantitative 
information would be advantageous. For example, animals may decide whether to visit 
various food patches based on the amount of food present or to engage in aggressive 
interactions by determining the number of potential opponents (Gallistel, 1989; Hauser, 
1997; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Wynn, 1998a). This area of animal cognition is often 
called numerical competence or cognition, which is perhaps a misnomer because this line 
of research is devoted also to understanding how nonverbal organisms process and use 
information about all types of quantitative attributes (Boysen, 1997; for reviews, see 
Boysen & Capaldi, 1993; Boysen & Hallberg, 2000; Brannon & Roitman, 2003; Davis & 
Memmott, 1982; Davis & Pérusse, 1988; Dehaene, 1997; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, 
& Cohen, 1998; Gallistel, 1989; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; and Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
4.1. What is Number? 
A quantitative attribute is an attribute of which the instances are related to one 
another both additively and ordinally. Following well-established usage derived from the 
Aristotelian division of mathematics, specific instances of a quantitative attribute may be 
divided in two ways: first, continuous quantity or magnitude and second, discrete 
quantity or multitude (Bell, 1937; Detlefsen, 2005; Michell, 1997).  
Under the name of continuous quantity comes what is undifferentiated or unified, 
in other words, what is continuous. For example, the specific length between point A and 
B is a magnitude of the quantity length. As one goes from A to B, the line continues 
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without break, as it is not made up of discrete units. Other examples of magnitudes are 
time, area, and volume. Magnitudes of a quantity are not collections of things, they are 
not denumerable, but they are measurable because they can stand in relations to one 
another that can be expressed as real numbers. For example, a + b = c is the relation 
between magnitudes, say specific lengths, that denotes that magnitude c is composed of 
the discrete parts of magnitudes a and b and these relations can be expressed as real 
numbers with each number representing many possible relational compositions, like 4 = 
3 + 7 or 4 = 25 - 21 (Dooley & Gill, 1977a; Michell, 1997) (Bell, 1937; Detlefsen, 2005; 
Michell, 1997).  
Under the name of discrete quantity are discrete units that are indivisible in the 
sense that if they are divided the result will not be a unit. For example, half of a person is 
not a person and half of a table is not a table. Discrete quantity is best represented by 
number or more specifically, by all positive rational integers (e.g., ten humans and five 
pencils, but not negative ten humans or negative five pencils). Number should not, 
however, be confused with numerals, which are the symbols used to represent number for 
counting, measuring, labeling, and ordering sets of things (Bell, 1937; Detlefsen, 2005; 
Michell, 1997). 
What more can be said about number? Number is an abstraction, a discrimination 
based on a single property of stimuli independent of other properties, derived from our 
perception of the physical world and conceptualizing quantities (Conant, 1896; Dehaene, 
1992; Dooley & Gill, 1977a; Hamilton, 1982; Michell, 1997; Strauss & Curtis, 1984; 
Thomas, 1988; Tomasello & Call, 1997). Piaget (1941/1965) wrote that ―the 
permutations of the elements in a given set do not change its value. A number is only 
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intelligible if it remains identical with itself, whatever the distribution of the units of 
which it is composed‖ (p. 3). Resting on Piaget‘s framework, in this dissertation, number 
is defined as the only property of a set that remains invariant when perceptual 
characteristics of the set‘s elements change. How this definition applies to the cardinal 
and ordinal aspects of number will be apparent in the next sections.  
Of final note, the use of the term number more often than not invokes thoughts of 
numerals and counting in the way that humans use number, but the quantitative skills of 
nonverbal organisms need not involve symbols or formal enumerative processes 
(Dehaene, 1992; Stevens, 1951; Tomasello & Call, 1997). Experimental paradigms in 
which an organism‘s responses are controlled primarily by countable or discriminable 
(viz. by the experimenter) items are usually termed numerosity or numerical 
discrimination, judgment, and comparison tasks (Davis & Pérusse, 1988; Stevens, 1951), 
whereas, the term quantity is used as a general term to describe amounts such that both 
continuous and discrete quantity may be involved in an organism‘s responses. 
4.2. Types of Number 
Tomasello and Call (1997) divide the quantitative skills and abilities that 
nonhuman animals share with human infants before they develop adult-like abilities into 
two general types: those that require ordination and those that require cardination. 
Researchers argue whether human infants acquire ordinality before or after they acquire 
cardinality, whether both develop simultaneously, and whether ordination always 
involves cardination and vice versa (Brainerd, 1979). The studies that attempt to 
understand the developmental sequence, though, typically focus on how linguistic 
children respond to quantities (Henry, 1976; Kingma & Koops, 1981; Piaget, 1941/1965; 
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Siegel, 1974) so preverbal abilities remain underexplored. A brief discussion of ordinal 
number is presented first to provide a framework for thinking about how apes, monkeys, 
and nonverbal human infants understand the cardinal aspect of number. 
4.2.1. Conceptual Understanding about Ordinal Number 
The ordinal aspect of number concerns the position of an element in a series with 
respect to some quantitative property and it identifies certain places in a sequence, 
answering questions about ‗which one‘ it is in the set. For example, one would say that 
the horse that ran the fastest held 1st place, the horse that ran the next fastest held 2nd 
place, and the horse that ran the next fastest held 3rd place, but one could also use names 
like excellent, good, and poor to rank order elements in a set. The central tendency of an 
ordinal attribute can be represented by its median and mode, but the mean cannot be 
defined because an ordinal attribute is not quantitative if the differences between its 
degrees are not additively structured. For example, the arithmetic mean of the ordinal 
numbers first and second does not reflect the average finish times of the first and second 
place horses (Fuson, 1988; Hamilton, 1982; Michell, 1997; Stevens, 1951; Tomasello & 
Call, 1997; Whitehead & Russell, 1927). 
Defining number as the only property of a set that remains invariant when other 
characteristics of the set‘s elements change is consistent with the ordinal aspect of 
number. It means that in a set with three elements, there will be a 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
position regardless of if the perceptual properties of the set‘s elements change. For 
example, in a set with three objects ordered with respect to length, there is a smallest, 
middle-sized, and largest object regardless of whether the color, shape, and spatial 
arrangement of the objects change (Brannon & Terrace, 1998; Fuson, 1988; Hamilton, 
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1982; Michell, 1997; Piaget, 1941/1965; Stevens, 1951; Tomasello & Call, 1997; 
Whitehead & Russell, 1927). There are many orderings in a set (but a set has only one 
size) and finding the object with a particular ordinal position involves matching ordinal 
numbers one-by-one to objects within the set. Thus, ordinal number concerns the relation 
of stimuli in a set to other stimuli in the set and that means it can be characterized in 
terms of relational learning and concept formation (Brainerd, 1979; Brannon & Terrace, 
1998; Fuson, 1988; Hamilton, 1982; Michell, 1997; Piaget, 1941/1965; Stevens, 1951; 
Tomasello & Call, 1997; Whitehead & Russell, 1927). 
One way that researchers evaluate how organisms understand the ordinal aspect 
of number is to analyze generative, emergent performances that are derived from 
relational learning of stimulus sequences and serial organization (De Lillo, 1996; Green, 
Stromer, & Mackay, 1993; for review, see Thompson & Oden, 2000; and Tomasello & 
Call, 1997; Vasconcelos, 2008). Methodologically and conceptually, this is the analysis 
of stimulus classes based on order derived from relational learning and it is analogous to 
the analysis of stimulus equivalence as proposed by Sidman (1990, 1997). That is, first, 
the contingencies that establish production of stimulus sequences and serial behavior can 
lead to the production of sequences that are not trained explicitly (i.e., stimulus classes 
based on common ordinal positions). Second, an order relation exists if the relations 
among stimuli in sequences are characterized by the four properties of an order relation: 
irreflexivity, asymmetry (also called antisymmetry), transitivity, and connectedness 
(Green, Stromer, & Mackay, 1993; Hamilton, 1982; Levy, 1979; Stevens, 1951). 
4.2.2. Conceptual Understanding about Cardinal Number 
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Cardinality answers questions about ‗how many‘ elements are in the set, in other 
words, cardination concerns assessments of a set‘s size. For example, ‗threeness‘ 
characterizes things like the number of sides of a triangle and the number of leaves of a 
shamrock so the cardinal number three is the class of all trios. The term numerosity may 
also be applied to indicate the size of a set, for example, the set‘s cardinality or 
numerosity is three. A set has only one size (but there are many orderings in a set) and 
that size applies to the whole set, not to an individual member of the set.  
The cardinal aspect of number rests solely on the principle of setting things in 
one-to-one relations or correspondence. Finding one-to-one correspondences between 
two classes is a way of matching them member for member, with members paired until 
one or both groups are exhausted. The major use for doing such is to establish, without 
actually counting, that some class is of the same or a different size or is more or less in 
size as another set of known size (Bell, 1937; Brannon & Terrace, 1998; Dantzig, 1939; 
Dehaene, 1992; Fuson, 1988; Hamilton, 1982; Michell, 1997; Stevens, 1951; Tomasello 
& Call, 1997).  
Defining number as the only property of a set that remains invariant when other 
perceptual characteristics of the set‘s elements change is consistent with the definition of 
cardinality. What this means is that the size of a set is three regardless of whether the set 
is composed of three objects, three people, or three sounds and regardless of whether the 
shape, color, spatial arrangement of the elements within the set change (Stevens, 1951; 
Whitehead & Russell, 1927). Because number is itself an abstraction, it is my contention 
that an organism‘s cardinal number understanding should be evaluated within the 
framework of concept learning just like ordinal number is typically evaluated within the 
 
105 
framework of stimulus equivalence classes, which are a special type of associative 
concept. Indeed, Thomas (1988) thought that it may be redundant to consider number as 
its own separate conceptual process. So when I write that an organism understands 
cardinal number, it is meant that the understanding is at a conceptual level, otherwise, 
terminology like judging and responding to cardinality or cardinal number is used.  
How should one assess if an organism understands the cardinal aspect of number 
at a conceptual level? The first way involves the successful transfer of discriminative 
ability established with a training set of numerosities to the same numerosities 
instantiated in sets that have perceptual properties different (i.e., novel) from those of the 
training set. In other words, responding in a way that shows that one perceives that the 
cardinal aspect of number is the only property of a set that remains invariant even when 
the nonquantitative perceptual characteristics (color, shape, spatial orientation, spatial 
position, and heterogeneity of elements) of the set change. Similarly, Gallistel (1989, 
1993) and Gallistel and Gelman (1992) defined understanding the invariance of the 
cardinal aspect of number in the face of novel perceptual changes as when animals 
possessed a number category. Of final note, Douglass (1925) recognized that there is no 
limit to a concept‘s extension or perfection; instead, there are varying degrees to the 
attainment of a perfect concept because a concept is never complete and its limits 
boundless; so the number of dimensions that novel transfer stimuli should vary from the 
training stimuli is debatable. 
Returning to the original question about how one assesses cardinal number 
understanding at a conceptual level, the second manner involves the generalization or 
transfer of discriminative ability established during training with a set of numerosity 
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stimuli to sets that are composed of novel numerosities. In other words, to infer concept 
learning about cardinal number, an organism that learns to discriminate the numerosity of 
one set of stimuli should respond appropriately and without further training when novel 
numerosities are introduced. The common thread that runs between the first and the 
second manner of assessing conceptual cardinal number understanding is the ability to 
generalize the results of learning. The ability to generalize the results of learning is to 
what a concept about cardinal number, like all concepts, ultimately reduces (Strauss & 
Curtis, 1984; Thomas, 1988). 
The term numerosity is applied in this dissertation only to refer to the number of 
items, objects, or elements within a set of stimuli when the experimental procedures have 
provided controls to isolate number from continuous quantity and prevent pattern-based 
responding. Thus, the next topic for discussion concerns how the aforementioned controls 
may be accomplished. First, one cannot demonstrate that an organism is responding to 
cardinal number without constructing sets of items that differ systematically in no way 
other than number, a task that is difficult because continuous quantity covaries with 
number. For example, as one adds items to an array, the total area that the items cover in 
the array increases (i.e., positive correlation) and the average distance between items 
decreases (i.e., negative or inverse correlation) such that number is confounded with 
these continuous quantities if controls are not employed. Randomizing the presentation of 
confounding quantitative properties across trials is one way to control this problem, but 
other methods are used within the empirical literature to ensure that number is the only 
property that controlling responding (Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
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To isolate number from other quantitative properties, at a minimum (a) element 
area, perimeter length, or contour length and (b) inter-element distance or array density 
must be controlled in some way during visual discrimination tasks. Element area is a 
measure of the extent of an item‘s exposed surface. Element area and array brightness are 
linearly related so by controlling area one also controls brightness. Element perimeter 
length is a measure of the distance around the sides of a closed polygon. Perimeter length 
is linearly related to element area for all polygons (i.e., plane figures that are composed of 
line segments and are bounded by a closed circuit) so by controlling area one also 
controls perimeter length. Contour length is the circumference or perimeter of a circle 
(i.e., a polygon of infinite sides), but controlling for contour length does not control for 
area because the two measures are not linearly related. Finally, it is cumulative element 
area, perimeter length, and contour length of all the elements within a set that is usually 
indexed. 
Inter-element distance is a measure of the spread of items within an array. Inter-
element distance may be calculated in a variety of ways, for example, as the average 
distance of each item in the array to the center of the array or as the average distance 
between each item in the array and every other item in the array. Array density is a 
measure of the number of items per unit area of the array. The length, width, or both 
length and width of arrays are changed to manipulate density. I note here that some 
research papers use the term inter-element distance interchangeably with density, but this 
may lead to confusion because although the two terms are related they are not the same 
measure. Density is usually positively correlated with the number of items in arrays 
because the area of the arrays involved in comparisons typically remains unchanged and 
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equivalent; thus, the confounding influence of inter-element distance usually needs to be 
controlled. Furthermore, imagine discriminating between two sets of 1 to 5 various sized 
buttons that are placed on two white saucers (the arrays) that are separated by 2 inches. 
Does the area of the saucers on which buttons are placed or the spread of buttons on the 
saucers exert a greater confounding influence on the discrimination of cardinal number? I 
argue that inter-element distance exerts a much greater confounding influence than does 
array density. 
Additionally, one cannot demonstrate that an organism is responding to cardinal 
number without varying the spatial location of the elements in the array that instantiate a 
set‘s numerosity a sufficient number of times to preclude pattern-based responding.
17
 
Even so, an argument can be made that the number of novel (viz. from the experimenter‘s 
perspective) element spatial positions for an array of fixed size is limited such that by, 
say the first 1,000 to 2,000 trials, the spatial arrangement of elements is not truly novel. 
Irrelevant dimension cue constancy and cue ambiguity are measures of between-stimulus 
heterogeneity or variability and the prevention of pattern-based responding requires that 
the spatial location of elements be an irrelevant cue-ambiguous dimension, meaning it 
must be a dimension that is not correlated with reinforcement and differs in some 
noninformative way among all stimuli being compared (Bernstein, 1961; Noble & 
Thomas, 1985; Steirn & Thomas, 1990; Thomas & Frost, 1983). Other irrelevant 
dimensions like color, shape, and spatial orientation of elements may be cue-constant in 
                                               
17
 The term array refers to the container or location that bounds or groups a set of stimuli 
(e.g., the lower half of a computer screen or wells on a Wisconsin General Test 
Apparatus), whereas, the term set refers to the collection or group of stimuli that are used 
or presented together. 
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that a specific instance of the dimension is shared by all numerosity stimuli being 
compared, cue-ambiguous, or they may reflect some combination of cue constancy and 
ambiguity.  
To illustrate the aforementioned, I use as an example two-choice MTS tasks in 
which it is a given that numerosity is the relevant dimension (i.e., the dimension 
correlated with reinforcement) and element spatial position is an irrelevant cue-
ambiguous dimension: (a) if two red circles, two red circles, and three red circles serve 
respectively as the sample, correct, and incorrect stimulus then both color and shape are 
irrelevant cue-constant dimensions; (b) if two red circles, two red squares, and three red 
triangles serve respectively as the sample, correct, and incorrect stimulus then shape is a 
irrelevant cue-ambiguous dimension and color an irrelevant cue-constant dimension; and 
(c) if two red circles, two blue squares, and three yellow pentagons serve respectively as 
the sample, correct, and incorrect stimulus then both color and shape are irrelevant cue-
ambiguous dimensions. 
The next sections detail the empirical literature that employs operant techniques 
to discover whether apes and monkeys form identity and nonidentity concepts about the 
cardinal aspect of number.
18
 The cardinal number of two sets is said to be identical when 
all things in the sets can be paired off one-to-one such that after the pairing there are no 
unpaired things in either set (Bell, 1937; Brannon & Terrace, 1998; Dehaene, 1992; 
Hamilton, 1982; Michell, 1997; Stevens, 1951; Tomasello & Call, 1997). What is not 
discussed are studies that involve differential reinforcement values being imposed on 
                                               
18
 There were no empirical studies assessing numerical identity in infants using operant 
or associative learning procedures. 
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arbitrary stimuli because differences in conditioned reinforcement can account for 
subjects behaving in a conceptual manner. For example, reinforcing subjects with four 
pieces of food for selecting the Arabic numeral four would reinforce that choice response 
more strongly, induce more salivation and satiation, and elicit stronger affective 
responses than would reinforcing subjects with two pieces of food for selecting the 
Arabic numeral two such that different reactions may become associated with the 
different number symbols and serve as the basis of relational responding (see Brannon & 
Terrace, 1998; Gillan, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981; and Olthof, Iden, & Roberts, 1997). 
Moreover, continuous quantity (e.g., volume) covaries with the number of food 
reinforcers given to subjects unless controls prevent it from doing so, thus, the underlying 
trained basis of responding to symbols may be number, quantity, or both number and 
quantity (see Beran, Evans, & Harris, 2008; Olthof & Roberts, 2000). 
Like the earlier chapters discussing identity concept formation about color and 
shape: (a) only empirical studies using operant methods in which identity responding as 
well as subsequent concept formation could be assessed are discussed, (b) studies that 
involved two or more relevant dimensions (i.e., numerosity and at least one other 
dimension), cross-modal and extradimensional concept formation, and symbolic language 
systems (i.e., lexicons and lexigrams) were excluded, (c) assessment of transfer was 
limited to early-trial transfer performance (25 or fewer trials of a single problem when 
differential reinforcement was employed), and (d) baseline and transfer test performance 
was considered equivalent when their accuracy differed by less than 5% or 6% and 
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transfer test performance at what chance would predict if accuracy differed from chance 
by less than 15% to 16% when statistical evaluations were absent.
19, 20 
4.2.2.1. Identity in Apes 
Evidence in favor of an identity concept about cardinal number was demonstrated 
in an enculturated chimpanzee called Sheba (Boysen & Berntson, 1989). Using one-, 
two-, and three-choice MTS procedures, the subject was trained to match homogenous 
and heterogeneous sample sets of 1 to 3 food items to homogenous comparison sets of 1 
to 3 metal discs, Arabic numerals I, II, or III, or combinations of metal discs in one or 
two comparisons sets and Arabic numerals in one or two comparison sets.
21
 Even though 
element area was positively correlated with the number of food items in homogeneous 
comparison sets and inter-item distance was negatively correlated with the number of 
metal discs in homogenous sets, food items were presented in a variety of spatial 
locations within sample sets and some sample sets were heterogeneous so subjects were 
prevented from matching samples to comparisons based on inter-item distance or element 
area. The subject‘s matching ability fully transferred to the matching of sample sets of 
familiar Arabic numerals to heterogeneous comparison sets that were composed of 1 to 3 
novel items presented in three-choice MTS tasks. From these results, one can infer that 
the subject formed an identity concept about cardinal number. 
                                               
19
 Data that showed that a concept did not form across more than 25 differentially 
reinforced trials of a single problem were considered for inclusion. 
20
 When statistical evaluations were absent, chance probabilities for correct responses 
were estimated to be .50 for two-choice simple and conditional discriminations, .33 for 
three-choice simple and conditional discriminations, and so forth unless otherwise 
indicated in the text. 
21
 Roman numerals instead of Arabic numerals are used to make it clear that matching 
involved symbols, not numerosity. 
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Detailed in two reports, the behavior of a language-trained chimpanzee called Ai 
provides support for the formation of an identity concept about cardinal number even 
though additional training with a larger set of exemplars was necessary for concept 
formation (Matsuzawa, 1985; Matsuzawa, Asano, Kubota, & Murofushi, 1986). The 
training procedure used a many-to-one conditional discrimination procedure that required 
the matching of sample sets of Arabic numerals to sets of objects. The objects used in 
sets were presented in different spatial locations and orientations; thus, inter-element 
distance varied randomly and did not covary with the number of objects in sets. Training 
proceeded in a stepwise manner by adding Arabic numerals and objects such that 
responding was first established with Arabic numerals I and II and sets of 1 and 2 objects 
and finally with Arabic numerals from I to V and from 1 to 5 objects. Although the area 
of objects was positively correlated with the number of objects in sets, using the many-to-
one MTS procedure with different objects prevented samples and comparisons from 
being successfully matched based on area (e.g., 1 pencil → I; 1 brick → I).  
Transfer was assessed after the learning criterion was reached after every step by 
introducing nondifferentially reinforced probe trials of a novel object instantiated in a 
novel color. Initial probe trial accuracy with novel exemplars was at chance levels when 
Arabic numerals I to III and 1 and 3 objects were matched, which indicates that learning 
did not transfer to sets instantiated with novel perceptual features. As training progressed 
stepwise, matching ability partially transferred. Specifically, Ai obtained above chance 
probe trial accuracy when matching novel exemplars when the sets were composed of I to 
IV and I to V Arabic numerals and 1 to 4 and 1 to 5 objects (Boysen & Berntson, 1989). 
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These data show the formation of an identity concept about cardinal number even though 
additional training with a larger set of exemplars was necessary for concept formation. 
The responses of a language-trained adult chimpanzee named Sarah showed the 
formation of an identity concept about cardinal number, but the responses of four 
nonlanguage-trained juvenile chimpanzees did not show concept formation (Woodruff & 
Premack, 1981). First, Sarah and the four juvenile chimpanzees were trained to match to 
a criterion using a two-choice MTS task that employed 1 to 4 wooden discs, food items, 
or metal containers of liquid of various sizes as the sample and comparison stimuli. The 
sample and comparisons for a problem were taken from the same class (i.e., 4 wooden 
discs → 4 wooden discs, not 2 wooden discs) so all irrelevant dimensions were cue-
constant.
22
 The sets of food items and wooden discs were positioned in random spatial 
arrangements so inter-item distance was roughly controlled for in these two types of sets. 
However, elements were homogenously sized within sets so the element area and contour 
length of the sample and correct comparison were identical; thus, number was 
confounded with continuous quantity during training. 
To test for concept formation, subjects were required to match sample sets of 1 to 
4 liquid containers to comparison sets of 1 to 4 wooden discs or food items (e.g., 2 liquid 
containers → 2 wooden discs, not 1 wooden disc) under differential reinforcement. 
Because matching now involved sets in which the sample and comparisons were taken 
from different classes, the transfer test may be said to employ task-novel stimuli. 
Moreover, because matching occurred between sets from different classes, there was no 
                                               
22
 It is likely that subjects were not attending to the amount of liquid in the containers, but 
attending to the containers as whole objects. 
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systematic relation between the sample and comparison stimuli‘s element area, inter-item 
distances, or contour length, other than number. Sarah‘s matching ability during training 
was above what chance would predict at 100%, 86%, and 89% correct for wooden discs, 
food items, and liquid containers during training. The four juveniles responded correctly 
in a significant proportion of all trials as well (except for one juvenile with food items), 
but they were less accurate than Sarah was during training. During the transfer test, 
Sarah‘s matching performance was statistically above chance immediately and evinced 
full concept formation however, the accuracy of the four juveniles was not above chance 
(Woodruff & Premack, 1981). 
The behavior of a chimpanzee called Dennis did not indicate the formation of an 
identity concept about cardinal number, but represented learning to match specific 
comparisons to specific sample stimuli (Ferster, 1964; Ferster & Hammer, 1966). Using 
an arbitrary two-choice MTS procedure, the subject was trained to match to a criterion 
sample visual arrays of elements in a specific shape and color to light patterns as the 
comparison stimuli. The training set of sample stimuli contained 1 to 3 or 4 white 
triangles that were arranged in three fixed spatial arrangements (e.g., in a horizontal row, 
in a vertical row, and as a triangle). The two comparison sets consisted of three circular 
lights arranged in a row and located on a panel to the right and left of the sample, with 
specific patterns created by turning lights on and off. Expressed as binary numbers, 0 for 
light off and 1 for light on, the comparison stimuli were the six or seven specific light 
patterns that corresponded to binary numbers 1 to 7 (e.g., 1 white triangle → 001, not 
010). Transfer was first tested by changing the shape (e.g., triangles to squares) and color 
of the sample stimuli‘s elements. Changing the shape of elements in the sample array 
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resulted in accuracy decreasing to nearly 60% correct, which indicates that the subject 
learned to match specific comparisons to specific samples. After a novel color was 
introduced and performance re-stabilized, the sample stimulus‘ elements were arranged 
in new spatial arrangements (i.e., the rows of elements were changed to irregularly placed 
elements) to test for transfer a second time. This change disrupted performance such that 
accuracy again fell to near chance levels (60% correct). The results indicate again that the 
subject‘s behavior was controlled by specific learned associations between samples and 
comparisons, not the cardinal aspect of number (Ferster, 1964; Ferster & Hammer, 1966). 
An experiment with a language-trained chimpanzee called Ai suggests that she 
learned to respond to cardinal number, but did not develop a conceptual understanding 
about cardinal number (Murofushi, 1997). The subject was trained to match to a criterion 
homogenous sets of 1 to 7 red blocks and 1 to 7 red pencils to Arabic numerals I to VII. 
Even though area was positively correlated with the number of items within sets during 
training, transfer tests used sets of heterogeneous objects so element area was not 
confounded with the number of items in sets. Specifically, differentially reinforced probe 
trials of heterogeneous sets of 1 to 7 red and green blocks and pencils (e.g., 3 green 
blocks and 1 green pencil as a 4-item set) were inserted in training trials to test for 
transfer. Ai‘s accuracy dropped by 35% to 40% (across the first 200 trials) when the sets 
were first made heterogeneous for familiar colored and shaped objects, which shows that 
her responding was not conceptually based. In particular, if an organism is able to match 
a collection of, say, five pencils to the Arabic numeral five, but is not able to match a 
collection of three pencils and two bricks to the same numeral until a large number of 
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differentially reinforced trials have been given then one can only conclude that 
associative learning is at play, not a conceptual understanding. 
In summary, evidence supporting identity concept formation about cardinal 
number was found in the behavior of one encultured and two language-trained 
chimpanzees (Boysen & Berntson, 1989; Matsuzawa, 1985; Matsuzawa et al., 1986; 
Woodruff & Premack, 1981). On the other hand, one of the aforementioned language-
trained chimpanzees and five nonlanguage-trained chimpanzees failed to show an identity 
concept about cardinal number (Ferster, 1964; Ferster & Hammer, 1966; Murofushi, 
1997; Woodruff & Premack, 1981). Together, the findings indicates that apes fail and 
succeed at forming identity concepts about cardinal number equally often, an 
interpretation that is contrary to that described by most researchers because most 
researchers base their conclusions about the numerical abilities of apes on studies that do 
not isolate number from other quantitative properties. The found failures may indicate 
that apes do not need a conceptually based understanding of a set‘s size to function 
adaptively in domains like foraging and social interactions (Brannon & Roitman, 2003; 
Davis & Pérusse, 1988) and that they prefer to make their choices based on quantitative 
properties other than number or in conjunction with number (Beran, Evans, & Harris, 
2008) even though such choices may not lead to the most optimal payoff. 
An important consideration to keep in mind, though, is whether the expressed 
inabilities and abilities reflect the general cognitive capacity of apes or are they artifacts 
of experimental design (Wright, 1992). Specifically, within the taxonomic Superfamily 
Hominidae, chimpanzees are the only nonhuman species in which the cardinal 
understanding of number has been investigated. Also, there was variation in the 
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expression of abilities and inabilities within the same subject; specifically, the behavior 
of the language-trained chimpanzee called Ai showed an understanding of the cardinal 
aspect of number (Matsuzawa, 1985; Matsuzawa et al., 1986), but in a later study her 
behavior did not (Murofushi, 1997).  
Save one experiment with one language-trained and four nonlanguage-trained 
chimpanzees (Woodruff & Premack, 1981), all of the experiments involved matching 
arbitrary and nonarbitrary symbols (i.e., Arabic numerals and light patterns) to 
numerosities instead of matching numerosities to numerosities. Symbols are used to 
encompass attributes of their real world referents and this is assumed advantageous in 
studying conceptual behavior in humans, but it is not yet known precisely how their use 
influences concept formation in apes. When they are employed with ape subjects, 
symbols are assumed to capture only the requisite numerical attributes and not capture 
non-numerical and perceptual features that may trigger an interfering response bias 
(Boysen, 1997). The two chimpanzees for which Arabic numerals were used to assess 
cardinal number understanding also received training that involved matching between 
Arabic numerals and quantities, which makes the aforementioned assumption dubious. 
Currently, empirical demonstrations of conceptual behavior about cardinal 
number are restricted to chimpanzees, concern identity rather than nonidentity, and 
mostly involve the use of symbols. Furthermore, no study has yet investigated whether 
apes possess a conceptual understanding of cardinal number as indexed by transfer to 
novel numerosities. For these reasons, it is important that prospective studies provide new 
lines of evidence about numerical identity concept formation across the sister ape species. 
4.2.2.2. Identity in Monkeys 
 
118 
Three number-experienced rhesus monkeys (Feinstein, Mikulski, and Schroeder) 
and one number-naïve monkey (Boxer) formed an identity concept about cardinal 
number even though all subjects failed to do so when element shape was unconfounded 
with number and the number-naïve subject required additional training trials with a larger 
set of numerosities to do so when element area was unconfounded with number (Cantlon 
& Brannon, 2007). Delayed two-choice MTS tasks were given with the elements in sets 
randomly positioned within arrays so inter-element distance did not covary with the 
number of elements in sets. Elements that composed a stimulus were homogeneous for 
element shape, color, and size within a stimulus. In the first experiment, the number of 
elements within stimuli ranged from 1 to 4 elements.  
To test for transfer of learning and number-based responding, after reaching the 
criterion with training trials in which the number and shape of elements were confounded 
such that either one could be used to match successfully, all-reinforced probe trials in 
which number was unconfounded with element shape were inserted within training trials. 
All four subjects failed to identity match above chance on probe trials in which number 
was unconfounded with shape. In a second test for transfer of learning and number-based 
responding, after reaching the criterion with training trials in which the number and area 
of elements was confounded, all-reinforced probe trials in which number was 
unconfounded with element area were inserted within training trials. The three number-
experienced monkeys identity matched statistically above what chance would predict on 
probe trials in which number was unconfounded with area, but the number-naïve monkey 
did not.  
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In a second experiment, the number of elements within stimuli was supplemented 
to include 6 and 8 such that 18 additional problems were created and the training and 
testing procedure of the first experiment with one number-experienced monkey and the 
number-naïve monkey. Like before, both subjects failed to identity match above what 
chance would predict when element number and shape were unconfounded. Unlike the 
first experiment, though, both the number-experienced and number-naïve monkey 
identity matched statistically above what chance would predict when number and area 
were unconfounded. Although it is unclear why a concept of numerical identity failed to 
form when number was unconfounded with shape, it was not surprising that the number-
experienced monkeys did not require additional training with an extended set of problems 
to use number as a basis for matching as they had extensive experimental histories with 
numerical matching and sequential responding when neither array density nor element 
color, shape, size, and surface area could be used to consistently solve the tasks (see 
Cantlon & Brannon, 2006; Jordan & Brannon, 2006).  
Two rhesus monkeys (Mikulski and Schroeder) formed an identity concept about 
cardinal number as indexed by the maintenance of discriminative responding when a 
novel numerosity was introduced for matching within sets of familiar numerosities 
(Merritt, Rugani, & Brannon, 2009). Subjects were trained to match using a two-choice 
MTS procedure with a set of numerosities (1 to 4, 6, 8, and 12). Elements (circles) were 
presented within a yellow rectangle of fixed size (i.e., the array). The elements that 
instantiated a numerosity stimulus were homogeneously sized and colored within a 
stimulus. Sets could be cue-ambiguous or cue-constant for irrelevant dimensions of color 
and shape. In any case, element color, size, and spatial location varied randomly between 
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and within trials; thus, matching could not be accomplished using element area, contour 
length, or inter-element distance. Both Mikulski and Schroder matched above what 
chance would predict during training (75% and 63% correct in order by subject).  
To assess transfer of learning, an empty set (0 elements) was introduced into the 
set of numerosity stimuli. This created 14 semi-novel problems, seven with novel empty 
set samples (0→ 0, not 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8) and seven with familiar samples (1 → 1, not 0; 2 
→ 2, not 0; 3 → 3, not 0; 4 → 4, not 0; 6 → 6, not 0; 8 → 8, not 0; and 12 → 12, not 0), 
that were presented within training trials as all-reinforced probe trials. If subjects 
preferred to select numerosities that were reinforced during training, then they would 
achieve 100% correct with semi-novel problems with a familiar sample and 0% correct 
with semi-novel problems with a novel sample such that their overall transfer accuracy 
would be 50% correct. If a concept about cardinal number formed, then subjects should 
continue to identity match with both types of semi-novel problems so their overall 
transfer accuracy should full or partial transfer. Both Mikulski and Schroder‘s overall 
transfer accuracy with the semi-novel problems was above what chance would predict 
and illustrated full and partial transfer (79% and 72% correct in order by subject). 
To rule out identity matching based on the array‘s size and color (e.g., yellow 
rectangle with no elements → yellow rectangle with no elements, not yellow rectangles 
with 1 to 4, 6, 8, or 12 elements), additional all-reinforced probe trials of semi-novel 
problems that had a novel empty set sample were given to subjects. For these trials: (a) 
the sample stimulus remained unchanged, (i.e., instantiated by the yellow array) and the 
correct comparison‘s array was unchanged from or made larger or smaller than its 
original size or (b) the correct comparison stimulus remained unchanged (i.e., instantiated 
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by the yellow background array) and the sample‘s array was changed from yellow to one 
of six colors. Accuracy did not change statistically with any of these changes for any 
subject; thus, subjects spontaneously recognized identity with a novel numerosity, zero, 
which illustrates the formation of a concept of cardinal number. 
In summary, an identity concept about cardinal number formed in four rhesus 
monkeys as indexed by transfer of learning to familiar numerosities instantiated with 
novel perceptual properties in four monkeys (Cantlon & Brannon, 2007) and as indexed 
by transfer of learning to novel numerosities instantiated with familiar perceptual 
properties in two monkeys (Merritt, Rugani, & Brannon, 2009). Like with apes, no 
research study has investigated judgments of numerical nonidentity and subsequent 
concept formation. In any case, from the available evidence, one can conclude that 
monkeys form numerical identity concepts without the use of symbols or symbolic 
language systems. 
4.2.2.3. Discussion 
A variety of definitions of a number concept have been applied to study the 
behavior of nonverbal organisms (for review, Davis & Pérusse, 1988). One definition 
involves the idea of mental representation, the hypothetical internal constructs postulated 
to be responsible for the observable actions of organisms (Mandler, 1985; Thagard, 1996) 
such that a concept of number is described as the capacity to integrate symbols from a 
learned representational numerical system into new emergent relationships (Boysen & 
Hallberg, 2000). 
Other definitions define concept of number in terms of both ordinal and cardinal 
understanding. First, Dooley and Gill (1977a, 1977b) wrote that the development of a 
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numerical concept of discrete quantity is the recognition of number in a cardinal sense 
and the recognition of the ordinal interrelationships among individual numbers. Similarly, 
Piaget believed that concept of number was a synthesis of understanding the cardinal and 
ordinal aspects of number that formed at the final stage of the development of numerical 
skills. Specifically, children understand that number may be correctly applied to a 
collection of entities and these entities can be conceived of as equivalent and therefore 
grouped into classes and children understand that number may be applied to characterize 
the relative position of entities in an ordered series and these entities can also be 
conceived of as equivalent and therefore grouped into classes (Piaget, 1941/1965; see 
also, Tomasello & Call, 1997; Zimiles, 1963). 
Still others define concept of number in terms of arithmetic and mathematics. 
Gallistel (1989, 1993) and Gallistel and Gelman (1992) wrote that a concept of number is 
demonstrated when one shows that nonhuman animals perform operations that are 
isomorphic to some or all of the arithmetic operations that define the number system (i.e., 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division) and the mathematical relations of 
equality and inequality (e.g., >, <, =, and ≠) with the representatives of numerosity. Yet 
another definition focuses on cross-modality. Dehaene (1997) wrote that the ability to 
generalize across different modalities of perception or action is an important component 
of what we call the number concept. For example, recognizing that events such as 
pressing a lever twice, hearing two sounds, or eating two seeds are instances of the 
number two, demonstrates a concept of number. Some emphasize both mathematics and 
cross-modality even though there is considerable latitude in how stringent a criterion one 
applies. Finally, Davis and Pérusse, (1988) define the number concept in terms of 
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counting, a mathematical action or activity, and the capacity of transfer across sensory 
modalities and methodology (e.g., transfer of perceived number into performed number 
or transfer of number discrimination from simultaneous to sequential methods). 
Douglass (1925) recognized that there is no limit to a concept‘s extension or 
perfection because a concept is never complete and its limits boundless; instead, there are 
varying degrees to the attainment of a perfect concept. Thus, the discussed definitions of 
number concepts are all possible components of a fully developed number concept 
(Strauss & Curtis, 1984). The perfect number concept likely involves generalization 
based on both the cardinal and ordinal aspects of number and the ability to perform 
arithmetic and mathematic operations on cardinal and ordinal number. With that said, 
what processes are proposed to account for the ability of nonverbal organisms to put sets 
of objects or events in one-to-one correspondence with other sets to judge cardinal 
number identity, which then forms the basis of forming concepts of identity about 
cardinal number? 
The object-file model is a prominent model proposed to account for numerical 
processing in humans (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992). This model proposes that 
the visual system opens object files, temporary placeholders or tokens, for each relevant 
object when individuals scan an array of objects. At first, the tokens carry no information 
about the perceptual characteristics (spatial, temporal, and physical) of objects; instead, 
these details are filled in later by attentional processes. The system attempts to place 
currently perceived tokens (e.g., during testing with novel and familiar sets) in one-to-one 
correspondence with tokens from preceding scenes (e.g., arrays presenting during 
habituation) with mismatches resulting in preferential visual fixation. The object file 
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model has been recently reformulated in terms of a working memory system called 
parallel individuation.  
Parallel individuation can hold individuals (or objects) that are represented by 
unique mental symbols in parallel and support identity-nonidentity and more-less 
comparisons between the working memory set of individuals and a visible set of set to 
determine one-to-one correspondence. Infants are limited to working memory modules of 
at least two sets of three or fewer individuals because of hard capacity limits, whereas, 
working memory modules may create sets of four or fewer individuals for adults (Le 
Corre & Carey, 2007). Based on empirical evidence on the limits of parallel visual 
individualization of objects, there is assumed to be a strict limit on the number of objects 
that can be simultaneously tracked, no more four (Carey, 2001; Hauser, 1997; Simon, 
1997). The object file model predicts that nonverbal organisms should fail with 
numerosity comparisons involving sets with more than four items. Developmentally, 
object-file models and parallel individuation support discontinuity in the mode of 
numerical processing as infants must gain additional systems to support processing with 
larger sets. Finally, the object-file model is limited to comparisons in the visual system 
and has no built-in mechanism to account for ordinal relations (Brannon, 2002; Brannon 
& Roitman, 2003).  
The accumulator model is the other prominent model proposed to account for 
counting and timing in animals (Church & Meck, 1984; Gibbon, 1977; Meck & Church, 
1983). An animal is said to be counting if the number of events, independently of their 
duration, serves as a discriminative stimulus and said to be timing if the duration of an 
event, independent of the number of events, serves as a discriminative stimulus. In this 
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model, a pacemaker puts out energy pulse of relatively fixed duration and a switch passes 
these pulses into an accumulator. The pacemaker-switch-accumulator system functions as 
a counter if the switch is operated in the event mode in which it closes for a relatively 
fixed interval of time to gate pulses into the accumulator at a relatively constant rate. 
Thus, countable quantity is encoded as magnitudes because the accumulator fills up in 
equal increments for each entity to be counted; for example, ten entities fills the 
accumulator up five times as much as two entities does.  
The value in the accumulator may be passed onto working memory such that the 
current accumulator value is compared to a remembered accumulator value (from a time 
of reinforcement of a previous response) stored in reference memory. In the final step, the 
decision process occurs, that is, a response rule determines the response based on the 
comparison that was made (e.g., push the left button or push the right button). Based on 
experience, the animal learns the accumulator value associated with reinforcement 
because this information is stored in reference memory. The existence of numerous 
separate accumulators allows identity-nonidentity comparisons to be made by detecting 
one-to-one correspondence through simultaneous decrements in two accumulators by one 
increment until one or both are empty. If both accumulators empty at the same time, then 
they encode the same number of elements. If not, then the two accumulators encode a 
different number of elements, with lesser numerosity encoded by the first to become 
empty (Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Wynn, 1998a, 1998b). 
 In the pacemaker-switch-accumulator system, the source of variance that receives 
the most attention involves the drift in the time between pulses that are generated by the 
pacemaker. The time between pulses is assumed to be fixed within any trial, but vary 
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normally around a mean between trials. The pacemaker-switch-accumulator counting 
system, is a scalar (variance in the accumulator increases proportionally to the mean 
number of counts) counting system (Church & Meck, 1984; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon & 
Meck, 1984; Meck & Church, 1983). The second source of variance that has received 
attention involves the comparator. Responses are theorized to be based on whether the 
current value in the accumulator is closer to the value in reference memory for a 
reinforced response. The measure of closeness is the ratio between the current 
accumulator value and the reference memory value, which corresponds to an acceptance 
region around the remembered positive value. Together, the ratio comparator combined 
with scalar counting in the accumulator model should result in accuracy conforming to 
Weber's law for the discriminability of numerosity comparisons (Gallistel & Gelman, 
1992; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Gibbon, 1977).  
Weber‘s law is a psychophysical rule that is usually characterized as constant 
discriminability with a constant ratio of increment in stimulation to a standard stimulus 
(Church & Meck, 1984; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon & Meck, 1984; Meck & Church, 1983). If 
numerosities are encoded and processed as magnitudes then the more nearly equal two 
numerosities are, the harder it should be to determine which is larger or which is smaller 
and the larger two numerosities are at a given difference between them, the harder it 
should be to determine which is the larger or the smaller. These patterns have been 
named the numerical size (or magnitude), distance (or difference), and ratio (or disparity) 
effect. The numerical size effect is the finding that discrimination ability declines (and 
response latency increases) as the numerical magnitude (i.e., arithmetic sum) of 
compared numerosities increases for any given numerical distance. The numerical 
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distance effect is the finding that discrimination ability declines (and response latency 
increases) as the numerical difference (i.e., the arithmetic difference) of compared 
numerosities declines. The numerical ratio effect combines the numerical distance and 
size effects as it is the finding that discrimination ability declines (and response latency 
increases) when the numerical ratio (i.e., the smaller numerosity divided by the larger 
numerosity) between compared numerosities approach a value of one (Dehaene & 
Changeux, 1993; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998). 
What do the data from the empirical studies about concept formation reveal about 
the processes that underlie conceptual judgments about cardinal number? The findings in 
apes and monkeys show that cardinality is not encoded exactly even at the conceptual 
level, but instead it is encoded as magnitudes with scalar variability as proposed in the 
accumulator model (Gallistel & Gelman, 2000). In apes, only a single study reports 
accuracy and response latency in terms of the numerosity of sets (Matsuzawa, 1985; 
Matsuzawa et al., 1986). This report indicated that the training and transfer performance 
of one language-trained chimpanzee called Ai showed the numerical distance and 
numerical size effects. Most of her errors involved selecting the neighboring Arabic 
numeral comparison (94% and 96% of errors during training and transfer testing) and of 
these errors, nearly half involved the largest two Arabic numerals and object sets (48% 
and 47% during training and transfer testing). Also, her response latency increased as the 
number of objects in the sample set increased during training, but this trend was more 
apparent during the initial training sessions than the final training sessions. Object-file 
models would predict a failure to identity match (and thus form an identity concept) for 
comparisons that involved more than three or four items; instead, Ai successfully learned 
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to match from Arabic numerals I to V to sets of 1 to 5 objects. Together, these 
aforementioned patterns are consonant with the predictions of the accumulator model.  
In monkeys, the findings indicate that they are more accurate and sometimes 
faster in making correct choices as the numerical distance between comparisons increase 
and as the ratio between comparisons move away from a numerical value of one. The 
probability of making a correct match increased as the ratio between comparisons 
decreased in the four rhesus monkeys during transfer testing with familiar numerosities 
that were instantiated with novel perceptual properties (Cantlon & Brannon, 2007). Also, 
matching accuracy declined and latency increased as the numerical distance between 
comparisons decreased during transfer testing with familiar and semi-novel sample and 
comparisons in one of the aforementioned monkeys (Merritt, Rugani, & Brannon, 2009). 
Again, object-file models would predict a failure to identity match (and thus form an 
identity concept) for comparisons that involved more than three or four items; instead, 
successful matching and concept formation was not limited to sets composed of four or 
less elements in all monkeys. Together, these finding are consistent with the hypothesis 
that numerical comparison errors are rooted in the noisiness of numerical processing as 
proposed by the accumulator model. 
To end the discussion, I note that to date no study has systematically explored the 
sole effect of irrelevant dimension cue ambiguity and constancy, which are measures of 
between-stimulus heterogeneity or variability, on numerical identity judgments and 
concept formation in apes or monkeys. By sole effect, it is meant that within-stimulus 
heterogeneity or variability is fixed at the lowest level such that the instances of each 
irrelevant dimension other than element spatial position are uniform or homogenous 
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within a stimulus instead (e.g., the sample is instantiated as four red circles and not as 
two red circles, one green square, and one yellow circle). Because cardinal number 
represents how many discrete things exist in a set regardless of the manner in which those 
discrete things are instantiated, it is a constituent property of a collection of objects. It 
seems reasonable then to assume that it would be harder to respond to numerical identity 
when irrelevant dimensions are cue-ambiguous than when they are cue-constant because 
earlier experiments found the same pattern with respect to judgments of part-identity 
about non-numerical dimensions (Bernstein, 1961; Noble & Thomas, 1985; Steirn & 
Thomas, 1990; Strong, Drash, & Hedges, 1968; Thomas & Frost, 1983). Further, it 
remains unanswered whether apes can learn to judge numerical identity when all 
irrelevant dimensions are cue-ambiguous and within-stimulus heterogeneity is fixed at its 
lowest point, which is presumably when it would be most difficult to do so, before they 
learn to respond to numerical identity when irrelevant dimensions are cue-constant, 
which is presumably when it would be easiest to do so. Additional data is necessary to 
provide insights about the effect of between-stimulus variability on numerical identity 




EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CARDINAL NUMBER IDENTITY-
NONIDENTITY RESPONDING AND CONCEPT FORMATION 
The objective of Experiment 4 was to establish concurrent identity and 
nonidentity responding to cardinal number when both irrelevant dimensions (element 
color and shape) were cue-ambiguous, which was presumably when accurate conditional 
responding would be the most difficult. The hypothesis was that subjects would learn to 
respond to numerical identity when element color and element shape were both cue-
ambiguous irrelevant dimensions.  
The objective of Experiment 5 was to establish identity responding to cardinal 
number when both irrelevant dimensions were cue-ambiguous before doing the same 
when at least one and then both irrelevant dimensions were cue-constant. The hypothesis 
was that subjects would learn to respond to numerical identity, at the very least, when 
element color and element shape were both cue-constant irrelevant dimensions; further, I 
predicted that subject responses would be affected by the numerical distance and 
numerical size of comparisons.  
Finally, the objective of Experiment 6 was to assess transfer of the established 
conditional discrimination to novel transfer problems in which novel and familiar 
numerosities were instantiated with familiar element colors and shapes or with novel 
element colors and shapes and the irrelevant dimensions of element color and shape were 
cue-constant, one cue-ambiguous and the other cue-constant, or both cue ambiguous. The 




5.1.1 Subjects, Housing, Apparatus, and Materials 
The subjects, housing, apparatus, and materials were as described for Experiments 
1, 2, and 3 in Chapter 3. 
5.1.2 Visual and Auditory Stimuli 
Visual and auditory stimuli were the three shapes (rectangle, pentagon, and 
circle), three colors (brown, red, and yellow), one pattern (black and white), and three 
sounds (sample-touched, correct-response, and incorrect-response tones) described in 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 in Chapter 3. In addition, the following three novel shapes and 
three novel colors were employed: crosses, cylinders, and triangles; and blue (RGB: 0, 
255, 255), green (RGB: 0, 255, 0), and white (RGB: 255, 255, 255). 
5.1.3 General Procedure 
The procedure was as described for Experiments 1, 2, and 3 in Chapter 3. 
Additionally, the experimenter delivered reinforcement according to both a continuous 
and partial reinforcement schedule. Subjects advanced to a different experiment part (A, 
B, and C) or phase (1, 2, 3, etc.) when they meet a specified performance criteria. 
5.1.3.1 Experiment 4: Concurrent Numerical Identity-Nonidentity Responding with 
Irrelevant Dimensions Cue-Ambiguous 
Subjects participated in two-choice matching-to-sample (MTS) tasks for one to 
two sessions per day: Junior for 45 days between March 2, 2010 and June 13, 2010 and 
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Madu for 47 days between March 2, 2010 and June 5, 2010.
23
 The purpose of this 
experiment was to establish concurrent numerical identity and nonidentity responding, 
when presumably it was hardest to do so, with both irrelevant dimensions cue-
ambiguous. 
A numerosity stimulus was composed of a number of elements placed within a 
500 x 350 pixel, grey rectangle that served as the array. The number of elements within 
the array defined the stimulus‘ numerosity. The numerosity of stimuli was 2, 4, or 6 
elements. The numerosity of stimuli was always the relevant dimension (i.e., correlated 
with reinforcement). Element area (size) was the cumulative area of all elements in the 
array and it varied according to five sizes: 10,000, 12,000, 14,000, 16,000, or 18,000 
pixels. Element area was homogenous or uniform within a stimulus, but differed between 
stimuli. Inter-element distance was the average of all pairwise distances as measured 
from the closest edge between element pairs and it varied according to five distance 
levels: 25, 35, 45, 55, and 65 pixels. Elements were pseudorandomly placed at different 
spatial locations in the array with the restriction that they be at least 10 pixels apart. The 
sample, correct, and incorrect comparison stimulus always had different, randomly 
determined element areas, inter-element distances, and element spatial locations. Thus, 
the sample‘s element area and inter-element distance was sometimes greater and 
sometimes less than one or both comparison stimuli, which prevented numerosity from 
covarying with inter-element distance and element area.
24
 
                                               
23
 Before participating, subjects completed Experiment 1, which is detailed in Chapter 3. 
24
 Junior and Madu received respectively 60 and 75 trials in which the correct and 
incorrect comparison stimulus had the same element area because of experimenter error. 
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The elements that instantiated a stimulus‘ numerosity were colored yellow (Y), 
red (R), and brown (B) and they were shaped as rectangles, circles, or pentagons. 
Element shape and color were uniform within a stimulus; in other words, within-stimulus 
variability was always homogeneous. The shape and color of the elements that 
instantiated a stimulus were irrelevant dimensions that were cue-ambiguous such that the 
color and shape of elements within a numerosity stimulus differed from each other. In 
addition to the numerosity stimuli, a black and white patterned rectangle (500 x 350 
pixels) was added to the set of comparison stimuli to serve as the none-of-the-above 
comparison stimulus (NOTA).  
There were nine numerical identity problems for which a correct response was to 
select the comparison stimulus that had the same number of elements as the sample 
stimulus and an incorrect response was to select the comparison stimulus with a different 
number of elements than the sample or to select the NOTA comparison stimulus: 2 → 2, 
not 4, 6, or NOTA; 4 → 4, not 2, 6, or NOTA; and 6 → 6, not 2, 4, or NOTA. In 
particular, the sample stimulus was presented with one numerosity comparison stimulus 
that had the same number of elements as the sample and (a) another numerosity 
comparison stimulus that had a different number of elements as the sample (the NOTA 
absent comparison pair type) or (b) the NOTA comparison stimulus (the NOTA incorrect 
                                                                                                                                            
Still, the sample stimulus could not be matched to the comparison based on shared area 
so these trials were not removed from the analyses except where otherwise noted. 
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comparison pair type). Figure 5.1.1 shows an example identity problem in which NOTA 
is the incorrect comparison and NOTA is absent in the comparison.
25
 
There were six numerical nonidentity problems for which a correct response was 
to select the NOTA comparison stimulus and an incorrect response was to select the 
comparison stimulus with a different number of elements than the sample: 2 → NOTA, 
not 4 or 6; 4 → NOTA, not 2 or 6; and 6 → NOTA, not 2 or 4. In particular, the sample 
stimulus was presented with one numerosity stimulus that had a different number of 
elements as the sample and with the NOTA comparison stimulus (the NOTA correct 
comparison stimulus pair type). Figure 5.1.1 shows an example nonidentity problem in 
which NOTA is the correct comparison. 
The number of times that each numerosity, color, and shape served as the sample 
stimulus was balanced within sessions and the presentation order for the sample‘s 
numerosity, color, and shape was randomized within sessions. The number of times the 
NOTA stimulus served as a comparison stimulus was also balanced across sessions. The 
spatial location of elements in the array was trial-unique for each numerosity stimulus for 
three-fourths of all sessions given; in other words, some sessions utilized earlier sets. 
Only two spatial positions for the comparison stimuli (the left and right positions) were 
utilized and the spatial position of the correct and incorrect stimulus was randomized 
across trials. Trials were separated by a 2-s ITI. The performance criteria for mastery of 
tasks was to achieve above chance accuracy (i.e., 59% correct, n = 100, p < .05) for three 
consecutive sessions with a minimum of five sessions completed. 
                                               
25
 In all figures, letters are shown within elements only to aid readability. Additionally, 
all figures depict problems following a touch to the sample (i.e., sample and comparison 
stimuli are displayed simultaneously). 
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Reinforcement was delivered on a continuous schedule after every correct 
response (CRF) unless otherwise noted that it was delivered on a variable ratio 
intermittent reinforcement schedule after an average of three correct responses (VR-3). 
The two schedules were used because previous research has shown that reinforcement 
schedules affect the accuracy of conditional discrimination during early learning in 
monkeys (Ferster, 1960; Fujita, 1985). 
5.1.3.1.1 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous (Phase 1) 
The purpose of this phase was to establish concurrent numerical identity and 
nonidentity responding under CRF. The color and shape of the sample stimulus‘ 
elements, the correct comparison stimulus‘ elements, and the correct comparison 
stimulus‘ elements differed from each other. Subjects advanced to Phase 2 when they did 
not meet the performance criteria after completing 4,000 trials. 
5.1.3.1.2 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous under VR-3 (Phase 2) 
This purpose of this phase was to establish concurrent numerical identity and 
nonidentity responding under VR-3. Trials were identical to Phase 1 except that 
reinforcement was delivered under VR-3. Subjects advanced to Experiment 5 when they 









Figure 5.1.1. Example problems during concurrent numerical identity and nonidentity 
responding with both irrelevant dimensions cue-ambiguous in Experiment 4. (A): 
Nonidentity problem with NOTA as the correct comparison (4 brown circles [12,000 
pixel element area, 25 pixel inter-element distance] → NOTA, not 6 yellow pentagons 
[16,000 pixel element area, 55 pixel inter-element distance]). (B): Identity problem with 
NOTA as the incorrect comparison (6 red pentagons [12,000 pixel element area, 35 pixel 
inter-element distance] → 6 yellow rectangles [16,000 pixel element area, 55 pixel inter-
element distance], not NOTA). (C): Identity problem with NOTA absent (2 brown 
rectangles [12,000 pixel element area, 65 pixel inter-element distance] → 2 red pentagons 
[16,000 pixel element area, 35 pixel inter-element distance], not 4 yellow circles [18,000 
pixel element area, 25 pixel inter-element distance]). 
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5.1.3.2 Experiment 5A: Numerical Identity Responding with Irrelevant Dimensions Cue-
Ambiguous 
Subjects participated in two-choice MTS tasks for one to three sessions per day: 
Junior for 16 and 19 days respectively between May 14, 2010 and June 5, 2010 and 
November 18, 2010 and December 5, 2010 and Madu for 16 days and 18 days 




The purpose of this part of the experiment was to establish numerical identity 
responding, when presumably it was hardest to do so, with both irrelevant dimensions 
cue-ambiguous after failures to establish concurrent identity and nonidentity responding. 
The procedures of Experiment 4 were replicated except the NOTA stimulus (i.e., the 
black and white patterned rectangle) was not used; thus, there were six identity problems: 
2 → 2, not 4 or 6; 4 → 4, not 2 or 6; and 6 → 6, not 2 or 4. 
5.1.3.2.1 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous under VR-3 (Phase 1) 
Reinforcement was delivered on a VR-3 schedule. Subjects advanced to Phase 2 
when they did not meet the performance criteria after completing 2,500 trials. 
5.1.3.2.2 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous (Phase 2) 
Trials were identical to Phase 1 except that CRF was used. Subjects advanced to 
Phase 3 when they did not meet the performance criteria after completing 2,000 trials. 
5.1.3.2.3 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous for Sample Numerosity of 4 (Phase 3) 
                                               
26
 In the interim between the two periods, subjects completed Experiment 2A, 2B, and 
2C, which are detailed in Chapter 3. 
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The purpose of this phase was to establish numerical identity responding by 
reducing the number of problems to two. Trials were identical to Phase 2 except that only 
problems with a sample numerosity of four were employed. Subjects advanced to Phase 4 
when they did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 trials. 
5.1.3.2.4 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous for Sample Numerosity of 2 (Phase 4) 
The purpose of this phase was to establish numerical identity responding by 
reducing the number of problems to two. Trials were identical to Phase 2 except that only 
problems with a sample numerosity of two were employed. Subjects advanced to Phase 5 
when they did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 trials. 
5.1.3.2.5 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous for Sample Numerosity of 6 (Phase 5) 
The purpose of this phase was to establish numerical identity responding by 
reducing the number of problems to two. Trials were identical to Phase 2 except that only 
problems with a sample numerosity of six were employed. Subjects advanced to 
Experiment 5B when they did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 
trials. 
5.1.3.3 Experiment 5B: Numerical Identity Responding with Irrelevant Dimensions Cue-
Ambiguous and Cue-Constant 
Subjects participated in two-choice MTS tasks for one to two sessions per day: 
Junior for 7 days between December 6 and 13, 2010 and Madu for 6 days between 
November 11 and 17, 2010.  
This purpose of this part of the experiment was to establish numerical identity 
responding, at presumably the intermediate level of difficulty, when one irrelevant 
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dimension was cue-constant and the other cue-ambiguous. The procedures of Experiment 
4 were replicated except that one irrelevant dimension was cue-ambiguous and the other 
was cue-constant and the NOTA comparison stimulus was not used; thus, there were six 
identity problems (2 → 2, not 4 or 6; 4 → 4, not 2 or 6; and 6 → 6, not 2 or 4). 
5.1.3.3.1 Shape Cue-Ambiguous and Color Cue-Constant (Phase 1) 
The color of a numerosity stimulus‘ elements was the same among the sample, 
correct comparison, and incorrect comparison stimuli while the shape of a numerosity 
stimulus‘ elements differed among the sample, correct comparison, and incorrect 
comparison stimuli. The left panel of Figure 5.1.2 shows an example problem. Subjects 
advanced to Phase 2 when they did not meet the performance criteria after completing 
500 trials. 
5.1.3.3.2 Color Cue-Ambiguous and Shape Cue-Constant (Phase 2) 
The color of a numerosity stimulus‘ elements differed among the sample, correct 
comparison, and incorrect comparison stimuli while the shape of a numerosity stimulus‘ 
elements was the same among the sample, correct comparison, and incorrect comparison 
stimuli. The right panel of Figure 5.1.2 shows an example problem. Subjects advanced to 






Figure 5.1.2. Example problems with irrelevant cue-ambiguous and cue-constant 
dimensions for Experiment 5B. The left panel illustrated color cue-constant and shape 
cue-ambiguous irrelevant dimensions (6 brown rectangles [12,000 pixel element area, 35 
pixel inter-element distance] → 6 brown pentagons [10,000 pixel element area, 25 pixel 
inter-element distance], not 2 brown circles [16,000 pixel element area, 65 pixel inter-
element distance]). The right panel illustrates shape cue-constant and color cue-
ambiguous irrelevant dimensions (4 yellow pentagons [12,000 pixel element area, 35 
pixel inter-element distance] → 4 red pentagons [10,000 pixel element area, 45 pixel 





5.1.3.4 Experiment 5C: Numerical Identity Responding with Irrelevant Dimensions Cue-
Constant 
Subjects participated in two-choice MTS tasks for one to four sessions per day: 
Junior for 5 days between December 14 and 21, 2010 (only Phase 1) and Madu for 23 
days between November 17, 2010 and December 15, 2010. This purpose of this part of 
the experiment was to establish numerical identity responding, when it presumably was 
easiest to do so, with both irrelevant dimensions cue-constant. The procedures of 
Experiment 4 were replicated except that color and shape were both cue-constant and the 
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NOTA stimulus was not used; thus, there were six identity problems (2 → 2, not 4 or 6; 4 




Figure 5.1.3. An example problem with both irrelevant dimensions cue-constant for 
Experiment 5C. Color cue-constant and shape cue-ambiguous is illustrated (2 brown 
circles [10,000 pixel element area, 25 pixel inter-element distance] → 2 brown circles 
[14,000 pixel element area, 55 pixel inter-element distance], not 4 brown circles [18,000 




5.1.3.4.1 Color and Shape Cue-Constant (Phase 1) 
The color and shape of a numerosity stimulus‘ elements was the same among the 
sample, correct comparison, and incorrect comparison stimuli. Except for one 14-trial 
session, sessions contained 100 trials. After completing 914 trials, Junior failed to 
respond for 30 minutes for three consecutive days so he was terminated from Experiment 




5.1.3.4.2 Color and Shape Cue-Constant for Sample Numerosity of 4 (Phase 2) 
The purpose of this phase was to establish numerical identity responding by 
reducing the number of problems to two. Trials were identical to Phase 1 except that only 
problems with a sample stimulus numerosity of four were employed. The subject 
advanced to Phase 3 when she met the performance criteria. 
5.1.3.4.3 Color and Shape Cue-Constant for Sample Numerosity of 2 (Phase 3) 
The purpose of this phase was to establish numerical identity responding by 
reducing the number of problems to two. Trials were identical to Phase 1 except that only 
problems with a sample stimulus numerosity of two were employed. The subject 
advanced to Phase 4 when she met the performance criteria. 
5.1.3.4.4 Color and Shape Cue-Constant for Sample Numerosity of 6 (Phase 4) 
The purpose of this phase was to establish numerical identity responding by 
reducing the number of problems to two. Trials were identical to Phase 1 except that only 
problems with a sample stimulus numerosity of were employed. The subject advanced to 
Phase 5 when she met the performance criteria. 
5.1.3.4.5 Color and Shape Cue-Constant (Phase 5) 
This phase was a replication of Phase 1 to allow the subject a second attempt to 
reach the performance criteria with all six numerical identity problems. When the subject 
met the performance criteria, she was given 15 additional sessions to allow her 
performance to stabilize before she finished Experiment 5. 
5.1.3.5 Experiment 6: Numerical Identity Responding and Test of Transfer 
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Madu participated in two-choice MTS tasks for two to eight sessions per day for 9 
days between December 18 and 29, 2010. The purpose of this experiment was to assess 
transfer of numerical identity responding from a small set of familiar numerosities 
instantiated with familiar element colors and shapes when both irrelevant dimensions 
were cue-constant (i.e., the stimuli from Experiment 5C) to novel and familiar 
numerosities instantiated with novel and familiar element colors and shapes when both 
irrelevant dimensions were cue-constant, both cue-ambiguous, or one cue-ambiguous and 
one cue-constant. 
5.1.3.5.1 Reinforced and Nonreinforced (36%) Baseline (Phase 1) 
The purpose of this phase was to familiarize subjects to nonreinforced trials; thus, 
the familiar, trained numerical identity problems of Experiment 5C when both irrelevant 
dimensions were cue-constant were presented to subjects as two types of trials. Trials of 
the familiar, trained numerosities from Experiment 5C are called baseline trials. 
Nonreinforced baseline trials were trials in which responses were differentially reinforced 
like in all Phases of Experiment 5C and nonreinforced baseline trials were trials that were 
not followed by the correct- or incorrect-response tone and food reinforcement regardless 
of the subject‘s response. Of the 100 trials in a session, 36% were nonreinforced baseline 
trials and the remaining 64% were reinforced baseline trials. Reinforced and 
nonreinforced baseline trials were pseudorandomly mixed together within a session in a 
way that prevented more than three consecutive nonreinforced trials. After meeting the 
performance criteria, the subject received 15 additional sessions to ensure stable 
performance before advancing to the transfer test of Phase 2. 
5.1.3.5.2 Transfer Test (Phase 2) 
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This phase replicated Phase 1 except for the following. The percentage of 
nonreinforced baseline trials was reduced to 18% of trials within a session while the 
percentage of reinforced baseline trials remained at 64%. The remaining 18% of trials 
within a session were nonreinforced probe trials. The three trial types (i.e., reinforced 
baseline, nonreinforced baseline, and nonreinforced probe trials) were pseudorandomly 
mixed together in a way that prevented more than three consecutive nonreinforced trials. 
Nonreinforced probe trials presented problems in which (a) the numerosity of 
stimuli was novel (novel number-familiar color and shape), (b) the color and shape of 
elements was novel (familiar number-novel color and shape), and (c) the number, color, 
and shape of elements was novel (novel number-novel color and shape). For the three 
types of novel transfer problems, irrelevant dimensions could be both cue-ambiguous, 
one cue-ambiguous and the other cue-constant, or both cue-constant. The novel 
numerosities were 3, 5, and 7; thus, six novel numerical identity problems were created 
(3 → 3, not 5 or 7; 5 → 5, not 3 or 7; and 7 → 7, not 3 or 5) for each irrelevant dimension 
type. The novel element shapes were crosses, cylinders, and triangles and the novel 
element colors were white (W), blue (Bl), and green (G). Figure 5.1.4 shows example 
problems as a function of the three novel problem types at each of the three irrelevant 
dimension types. 
In completing Phase 2 and finishing Experiment 6, the subject completed 22 
sessions such that 1,408 reinforced baseline, 396 nonreinforced baseline, and 396 
nonreinforced probe trials (108 novel number-familiar color and shape, 132 familiar 
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Figure 5.1.4. Example numerical identity transfer problems as a function of novel problem type and irrelevant dimension type 
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5.2.1 Data Analysis 
For three experiments subdivided into one to three parts (A, B, and C) and/or two 
to five phases the variables of interest were: (1) subjects (Junior and Madu), (2) problem 
type (nonidentity and identity), (3) comparison pair type (NOTA absent, as the incorrect 
comparison, and as the correct comparison), (4) irrelevant dimension type (shape and 
color both cue-ambiguous, one cue-ambiguous and one cue-constant, and both cue-
constant), (5) schedule of reinforcement (CRF and VR-3), and (6) trial type 
(nonreinforced baseline, reinforced baseline, and nonreinforced probe trials).  
The data were analyzed as described in Chapter 3 for Experiments 1, 2, and 3 for 
the binomial, chi-square, and Fisher‘s exact tests that were applied to assess the relation 
between responses (correct vs. incorrect) and the aforementioned variables. Like in the 
previous experiments, the instances when a session did not contain 100 trials and when 
subjects received additional sessions after reaching the performance criteria are reported 
in text, tables, or figures. Regardless, the last 300 trials of a phase or experiment were 
considered criterion learning and the first 100 trials considered early learning. 
Linear regression analyses were conducted to predict the percentage of correct 
responses (accuracy) and response time (reported in seconds from the onset time of the 
comparison stimuli to a subject‘s touch) from various predictor variables. Response times 
falling outside of two standard deviations from the mean were deemed outliers and 
removed from the data before linear regression analyses were conducted. Each predictor 
variable was entered into the analysis using a forward selection method that sequentially 
entered variables into the model, starting with the one with the largest positive or 
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negative correlation with the dependent variable, but only if they satisfied the criterion 
for entry (F-entry, p < .05). Two-tailed t tests determined whether the unstandardized 
regression coefficients (B) were statistically different from zero. A criterion α level of .05 
was used for linear regression analyses.  
The predictor variables concerned the numerical relations among the sample 
stimulus (S), the correct comparison stimulus (C), and the incorrect comparison stimulus 
(I). The numerical distance between the correct and incorrect comparison was the 
absolute value of the algebraic difference between their numerosities (abs C-I). The 
numerical total of the correct and incorrect comparison was the algebraic sum of their 
numerosities (C+I). The element area disparity ratio (abs [S-C]/[S-I]) and inter-element 
distance disparity ratio (abs [S-C]/[S-I]) indicated the degree of divergence between the 
sample and correct comparison‘s element area or inter-element distance as a function of 
the divergence between the sample and incorrect comparison‘s element area or inter-
element distance. Specifically, large disparity ratios indicated that the sample and correct 
comparison were more different than were the sample and incorrect comparison with 
respect to element area or inter-element distance. Smaller disparity ratios indicated that 
the sample and incorrect comparison were more different than were the sample and 
correct comparison with respect to element area or inter-element distance. F-tests 
assessed model fit in relation to the variables as predictors of the percentage of correct 







5.2.1.1 Experiment 4: Concurrent Numerical Identity-Nonidentity Responding with 
Irrelevant Dimensions Cue-Ambiguous 
5.2.1.1.1 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous (Phase 1) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria (i.e., above chance [59% correct] 
accuracy for three consecutive sessions with at least five sessions completed) after 
completing 4,000 trials (52% correct across all trials). Her accuracy was not different 
from chance for 35 sessions (51% correct, n = 3,500; binomial tests, ps > .067), below 
chance for one session (38% correct, n = 100; binomial test, p = .010), and above chance 
for only four sessions (62% correct, n = 400; binomial tests, ps < .028). Similarly, Junior 
did not meet the performance criteria after completing 4,000 trials (52% correct across all 
trials). His accuracy was not different from chance for 36 sessions (50% correct, n = 
3,600; binomial tests, ps > .067) and above chance for only four sessions (62% correct, n 
= 400; binomial tests, ps < .028). The left panel of Figure 5.2.1 displays subject accuracy 
collapsed across comparison pair type as a function of sessions (as the solid black line). 
Chi-square tests revealed a statistically significant and strong relationship 
between responses and comparison pair type for both Madu and Junior: respectively, χ
2
s 
(2, Ns = 4,000) = 500.37 and 311.89, ps < .001, Vs = .35. For Madu, the pattern was such 
that her accuracy was significantly higher when the NOTA comparison stimulus was the 
incorrect comparison (73% correct, n = 1,080) than when NOTA was absent (54% 
correct, n = 1,840; z = -10.28, p < .001) or when NOTA was the correct comparison (26% 
correct, n = 1,080; z = 22.16, p < .001); further, her accuracy was significantly higher 
when the NOTA comparison stimulus was absent than when it was the correct 
comparison (z = 14.99, p < .001). The opposite pattern characterized Junior‘s responses. 
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That is, his accuracy was significantly higher when the NOTA comparison stimulus was 
the correct comparison (71% correct, n = 1,080) than when NOTA was absent (51% 
correct, n = 1,840; z = -10.50, p < .001) or was the incorrect comparison (33% correct, n 
= 1,080; z = -17.66, p < .001); further, his accuracy was significantly higher when the 
NOTA comparison stimulus was absent than when NOTA was the incorrect comparison 
(z = 9.52, p < .001). The left panel of Figure 5.2.1 displays subject accuracy for each 
comparison pair type as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.1.2 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous under VR-3 (Phase 2) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria after completing 1,000 trials as her 
accuracy was at chance for all ten sessions (50% correct, n = 1,000; binomial tests, ps > 
.097). Likewise, Junior did not meet the performance criteria after completing 1,000 trials 
(50% correct) as his accuracy did not differ from chance for all ten sessions (binomial 
tests, ps > .097). The right panel of Figure 5.2.1 displays subject accuracy collapsed 
across comparison pair type as a function of sessions (as the black solid line). 
Chi-square tests revealed a statistically significant and moderately strong 
relationship between responses and the comparison pair type for both Madu and Junior: 
respectively, χ
2
s (2, Ns = 1,000) = 20.85 and 25.76, ps < .001, Vs = .14 and .16. The 
pattern was reversed from that found under the CRF schedule in Phase 1 for both Madu 
and Junior. Specifically, Madu‘s accuracy was significantly higher when the NOTA 
comparison stimulus was the correct comparison (60% correct, n = 270) than when it was 
absent (50% correct, n = 460; z = -2.78, p = .003) or the incorrect comparison (40% 
correct, n = 270; z = -4.56, p < .001); further, her accuracy was significantly higher when 
the NOTA comparison stimulus was absent than when it was the incorrect comparison 
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stimulus (z = 2.41, p = .008). Second, Junior‘s accuracy was significantly higher when 
the NOTA comparison stimulus was the incorrect comparison (58% correct, n = 270; z = 
4.58, p < .001) or when it was absent (53% correct, n = 460; z = 4.03, p < .001) than 
when the NOTA comparison stimulus was the correct comparison (37% correct, n = 
270); however, there was no difference in accuracy between when the NOTA comparison 
stimulus was incorrect and when the NOTA comparison stimulus it was absent (z = -1.40, 
p = .082). The right panel of Figure 5.2.1 displays subject accuracy for each comparison 




Figure 5.2.1. Subject accuracy as a function of comparison pair type and sessions when both irrelevant dimensions were cue-
ambiguous for each phase of Experiment 4. The black horizontal line at 59% correct depicts the lowest percentage of correct 
responses that was statistically above chance for all comparison pair types (binomial test, p < .05, n = 100). Note that each 




5.2.1.2 Experiment 5A: Numerical Identity Responding with Irrelevant Dimensions Cue-
Ambiguous 
5.2.1.2.1 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous under VR-3 (Phase 1) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria after completing 2,500 trials (51% 
correct). Her accuracy was not different from chance for 23 sessions (51% correct, n = 
2,300; binomial tests, ps > .067), below chance for one session (38% correct, n = 100; 
binomial test, p = .010), and above chance for only one session (65% correct, n = 100; 
binomial test, p = .002). Similarly, Junior did not meet the performance criteria after 
completing 2,500 trials (50% correct). His accuracy was not different from chance for 21 
sessions (49% correct, n = 2,100; binomial tests, ps > .097), below chance for two 
sessions (41% correct, n = 200; binomial tests, ps < .044), and above chance for only two 
sessions (61% correct, n = 200; binomial tests, ps < .028). The left panel of Figure 5.2.2 
displays subject accuracy as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.2.2 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous (Phase 2) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria after completing 2,000 trials (49% 
correct). Her accuracy was not different from chance for 18 sessions (48% correct, n = 
1,800; binomial tests, ps > .067), below chance for one session (39% correct, n = 100; 
binomial test, p = .018), and above chance for only one session (61% correct, n = 100; 
binomial test, p = .018). Similarly, Junior did not meet the performance criteria after 
completing 2,000 trials (48% correct). His accuracy was not different from chance for 15 
sessions (49% correct, n = 1500; binomial tests, ps > .184), below chance for four 
sessions (37% correct, n = 400; binomial tests, ps < .044), and above chance for only one 
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session (68% correct, n = 100; binomial test, p < .001). The second left panel of Figure 
5.2.2 displays subject accuracy as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.2.3 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous for Sample Numerosity of 4 (Phase 3) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (51% 
correct). Her accuracy was not different from chance for all five sessions (binomial tests, 
ps > .136). Likewise, Junior did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 
trials (51% correct). His accuracy was not different from chance for four sessions (53% 
correct, n = 400; binomial tests, ps > .067) and was below chance for one session (41% 
correct, n = 100; binomial test, p = .044). The center panel of Figure 5.2.2 displays 
subject accuracy as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.2.4 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous for Sample Numerosity of 2 (Phase 4) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (54% 
correct). Her accuracy was not different from chance for all five sessions (binomial tests, 
ps > .097). Similarly, Junior did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 
trials (48% correct). His accuracy also did not differ from chance for all five sessions 
(binomial tests, ps > .184). The second panel from the right of Figure 5.2.2 displays 
subject accuracy as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.2.5 Color and Shape Cue-Ambiguous for Sample Numerosity of 6 (Phase 5) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (46% 
correct). Her accuracy was not different from chance for four sessions (48% correct, n = 
400; binomial tests, ps > .242) and below chance for one session (40% correct, n = 100; 
binomial test, p = .028). Similarly, Junior did not meet the performance criteria after 
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completing 500 trials (54% correct). His accuracy was not different from chance for four 
sessions (51% correct, n = 400; binomial tests, ps > .136) and was above chance for only 
one session (64% correct, n = 100; binomial test, p = .003). The right panel of Figure 




Figure 5.2.2. Subject accuracy as a function of sessions when both irrelevant dimensions were cue-ambiguous for each phase 
of Experiment 5A. The black horizontal line at 59% correct shows the lowest percentage of correct responses that was 
statistically above chance (binomial test, p < .05, n = 100).
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5.2.1.3 Experiment 5B: Numerical Identity Responding with Irrelevant Dimensions Cue-
Ambiguous and Cue-Constant  
5.2.1.3.1 Shape Cue-Ambiguous and Color Cue-Constant (Phase 1) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (54% 
correct). Her accuracy was not different from chance for four sessions (53% correct, n = 
400; binomial tests, ps > .184) and above chance for only one session (59% correct, n = 
100; binomial test, p = .044). Similarly, Junior did not meet the performance criteria after 
completing 500 trials (39% correct). His accuracy was not different from chance for three 
sessions (45% correct, n = 300; binomial tests, ps > .097) and below chance for two 
sessions (30% correct, n = 200; binomial tests, ps < .001). The left panel of Figure 5.2.3 
displays subject accuracy as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.3.2 Color Cue-Ambiguous and Shape Cue-Constant (Phase 2) 
Madu did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (55% 
correct). Her accuracy was not different from chance for all five sessions (binomial tests, 
ps > .067). Likewise, Junior did not meet the performance criteria after completing 500 
trials (43% correct). His accuracy did not differ from chance for all five sessions 
(binomial tests, ps > .309). The right panel of Figure 5.2.3 displays subject accuracy as a 





Figure 5.2.3. Subject accuracy as a function of sessions for numerical identity responding 
when one irrelevant dimension was cue-constant and the other cue-ambiguous for the 
phases of Experiment 5B. The black horizontal line at 59% correct depicts the lowest 
percentage of correct responses that was statistically above chance (binomial test, p < .05, 




5.2.1.4 Experiment 5C: Numerical Identity Responding with Irrelevant Dimensions Cue-
Constant 
5.2.1.4.1 Color and Shape Cue-Constant (Phase 1) 
Junior did not meet the performance criteria after completing 914 trials (50% 
correct).
27
 His accuracy was not different from chance for eight sessions (50% correct, n 
= 714; binomial tests, ps > .184), below chance for one session chance (40% correct, n = 
100; binomial test, p = .028), and above chance for only one session (60% correct, n = 
                                               
27
 During the last session, Junior completed only 14 trials. 
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100; binomial test, p = .028). Junior‘s participation in Phase 1 concluded his involvement 
with all subsequent numerical identity tasks. On the other hand, Madu meet the 
performance criteria (i.e., 59% correct or higher for three consecutive sessions for a 
minimum of five sessions) after completing 900 trials.
28
 She was 60% correct across all 
ten sessions and her accuracy was above chance for the last four consecutive sessions 
(62% correct, n = 400; binomial tests, ps < .028), above chance for one other session 
(60% correct, n = 100; binomial test, p = .028), and not different from chance for five 
sessions (56% correct, n = 100; binomial tests, ps > .067). The left panel of Figure 5.2.4 
displays subject accuracy as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.4.2 Color and Shape Cue-Constant for Sample Numerosity of 4 (Phase 2) 
Madu met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (61% correct). Her 
accuracy was above chance for the last three consecutive sessions (65% correct, n = 300; 
binomial tests, ps < .010) and at chance for two sessions (55% correct, n = 200; binomial 
tests, ps >.097). The second panel from the left of Figure 5.2.4 displays Madu‘s accuracy 
as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.4.3 Color and Shape Cue-Constant for Sample Numerosity of 6 (Phase 3) 
Madu met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (79% correct). Her 
accuracy was above chance for all five sessions (binomial tests, ps < .001). The second 
center panel of Figure 5.2.4 displays Madu‘s accuracy as a function of sessions. 
5.2.1.4.4 Color and Shape Cue-Constant for Sample Numerosity of 2 (Phase 4) 
                                               
28
 Madu received an additional 100-trial session after meeting the performance criteria. 
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Madu met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (80% correct) as 
her accuracy was above chance for all five sessions (binomial tests, ps < .001). The 
second panel from the right of Figure 5.2.4 displays Madu‘s accuracy as a function of 
sessions. 
5.2.1.4.5 Color and Shape Cue-Constant (Phase 5) 
Madu met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials (69% correct) and 
her accuracy was above chance for all five sessions (binomial tests, ps < .010). Further, 
the subject was 73% correct across the 1,500 additional trials that she completed after 
reaching the performance criteria, with her accuracy above chance for each of the 15 
sessions (binomial tests, ps < .002). The right panel of Figure 5.2.4 displays Madu‘s 




Figure 5.2.4. Subject accuracy as a function of sessions during numerical identity responding when both irrelevant dimensions 
were cue-constant for the phases of Experiment 5C. The black horizontal line at 59% correct depicts the lowest percentage of 
correct responses that was statistically above chance (binomial test, p < .05, n = 100).
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5.2.1.4.6 Early and Criterion Learning Among Experiment Phases 
To examine Madu‘s performance between consecutive phases in relation to early 
and criterion learning, the proportion of correct responses during the final three sessions 
of Phases 1, 2, 3, and 4 were compared to the first session of the phase that followed it 
(i.e., respectively Phases 2, 3, 4, and 5). A chi-square test revealed a statistically 
significant, moderately strong relationship between responses and sessions, χ
2
 (7, N = 
1,600) = 67.65, p < .001, V = .21. The pattern was such that there was no difference 
between criterion learning in Phase 1 and early learning in Phase 2 (63% vs. 57% correct, 
n = 300 and 100; z = 1.07, p = .143), but accuracy was significantly lower during 
criterion learning in Phase 2 than early learning in Phase 3 (65% vs. 86% correct, n = 300 
and 100; z = -4.03, p < .001), significantly higher during criterion learning in Phase 3 
than early learning in Phase 4 (77% vs. 66% correct, n = 300 and 100; z = 2.11, p = .018), 
and significantly higher during criterion learning in Phase 4 than early learning in Phase 5 
(84% vs. 66% correct, n = 300 and 100; z = 3.86, p < .001). 
Additionally, the final three sessions of Phases 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were used to 
assess Madu‘s criterion level performance in relation to the six numerical identity 
problems. A chi-square test indicated that there was a statistically significant, moderately 
strong relationship between responses and the numerical identity problems, χ
2
 (5, N = 
1,500) = 117.45, p < .001, V = .28. Accuracy was highest for (zs > 2.72, ps < .003), but 
not different between (z = 0.96, p = .168) the following two problems: 6 → 6, not 2 and 2 
→ 2, not 6. Accuracy was lowest for 4 → 4, not 6 (zs > 3.61, ps < .001): Finally, there 
were no differences between 4 → 4, not 2 and 2→ 2, not 4 (z = -0.62, ps = .269) and 
between 4 → 4, not 2 and 6 → 6, not 4 (z = 2.12, ps = .017 adjusted). Figure 5.2.5 
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displays accuracy for Madu as a function of the six numerical identity problems during 
criterion learning for Experiment 5C. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.5. Accuracy as a function of the numerical identity problems for Madu during 





Linear regression analyses were conducted to assess linear trends in Madu‘s 
accuracy and response times during criterion learning for the phases of Experiment 5C. 
The data from Experiment 5C during the final three sessions of Phases 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
were included in the analyses. The nine trials that Madu received during criterion 
learning in which element area was the same for the correct and incorrect comparison 
stimulus were removed from these analyses. The percentage of correct responses and 
average response time were calculated for every possible combination of numerosities, 
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element areas, and inter-element distances among the sample, incorrect, and correct 
comparison stimuli (N = 226). 
Both numerical distance and numerical total of the comparison stimuli were 
significantly related to the percentage of correct responses in the final regression model, 
F(2, 223) = 33.91, p < .001. The element area and inter-element distance disparity ratios 
did not meet the F-entry criterion; thus, they were not entered into the regression model. 
The final regression model explained a moderate amount of variance (R
2
 = .23). T tests 
indicated that the slope was significantly different from zero for the numerical distance 
between comparisons (B = 9.36, SE = 1.35; t = 6.94, p < .001) and the numerical total of 
comparisons (B = -3.84, SE = .80; t = -4.80, p < .001). The relationships were such that 
accuracy was higher when the numerical difference between comparisons was largest 
(difference of 4: 84% correct, SE = 2.00) rather than smallest (difference of 2: 66% 
correct, SE = 1.77) and accuracy increased as the numerical total of comparisons 
decreased from a numerosity of 10 (58% correct, SE = 2.55), to a numerosity of 8 (84% 
correct, SE = 2.00), to a numerosity of 6 (73% correct, SE = 2.17). 
For the second regression conducted, the numerical distance and element area 
disparity ratio between comparisons was significantly related to response time in the final 
regression model, F(2, 225) = 9.35, p < .001. The numerical total and inter-element 
distance disparity ratio did not meet the F-entry criterion; thus, they were not entered into 
the regression model. The final regression model explained only a small amount of 
variance (R
2
 = .08). T tests indicated that the slope was significantly different from zero 
for numerical distance (B = -.05, SE = .02; t = -3.42, p = .001) such that response times 
were longer when the numerical difference between comparisons was smallest 
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(difference of 2: 1.27 s, SE = .02) rather than largest (difference of 4: 1.16 s, SE = .02) 
and that the slope was significantly different from zero for the element area disparity ratio 
(B = .03, SE = .02; t = 2.16, p = .032) such that response times increased as the element 
area disparity ratio increased. 
5.2.1.5 Experiment 6: Numerical Identity Responding and Transfer Test 
5.2.1.5.1 Reinforced and Nonreinforced (36%) Baseline (Phase 1) 
Madu met the performance criteria after completing 500 trials. Her accuracy was 
above chance for all five sessions (71% correct; binomial tests, ps < .001). For the 1,500 
additional trials she completed after she reached the criterion, the subject‘s accuracy also 
was above chance for each session (74% correct; binomial tests, ps < .001). With respect 
to all 20 sessions, she was 73% correct for reinforced (n = 1,520) and 74% correct for 
nonreinforced baseline trials (n = 480). In particular, her accuracy was above chance with 
the 64 reinforced baseline trials in each of the 20 sessions (binomial tests, ps < .017) and 
above chance with the 36 nonreinforced baseline trials in 18 of the 20 sessions (binomial 
tests, ps < .033). The left panel of Figure 5.2.6 displays Madu‘s accuracy as a function of 




Figure 5.2.6. Accuracy for Madu as a function of sessions and trial type when irrelevant 
dimensions were cue-constant during the phases of Experiment 6. The black and gold 
horizontal line at 59% correct depicts the lowest percentage of correct response that was 
statistically above chance for the average accuracy of reinforced and nonreinforced 
baseline trials in Phase 1 (binomial test, p < .05, n = 100); likewise with the blue line at 




There was a statistically significant, moderately strong relationship between 
responses and the numerical identity problems during the last 300 trials of reinforced and 
nonreinforced baseline trials, χ
2
 (5, N = 300) = 144.26, p < .001, V = .27. Accuracy was 
highest for 6 → 6, not 2 (zs > 3.34, ps < .001), but not different from 2 → 2, not 6 (z = 
2.12, p = .017 adjusted). Accuracy was lowest for 4 → 4, not 6 (zs > 2.65, ps < .004), but 
not different from 6 → 6, not 4 (z = 2.01, p = .022 adjusted) or 2 → 2, not 4 (z = 1.78, p = 
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.038 adjusted). No other pairwise comparison was significant. Figure 5.2.7 displays 
accuracy for Madu as a function of the six numerical identity problems. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.7. Accuracy as a function of the six numerical identity problems for Madu 
during criterion learning when both irrelevant dimensions were cue-constant for Phase 1 




Two regressions were conducted to assess linear trends for numerical identity 
matching accuracy and response time across all twenty sessions. The percentage of 
correct responses and average response times were calculated for every possible 
combination of numerosities, element areas, and inter-element distances among the 
sample, incorrect, and correct comparison stimuli (N = 199).
29
 
                                               
29
 Criterion performance (i.e., the last 300 trials) was not used to prevent instances where 
a single trial represented the percentage of correct responses or average response time. 
 
168 
Both the numerical distance and the numerical total between comparisons were 
significantly related to the percentage of correct responses in the final regression model, 
F(2, 196) = 47.09, p < .001. The element area disparity ratio and inter-element distance 
disparity ratio did not meet the F-entry criterion; thus, they were not entered into the 
regression model. The final regression model explained a moderate amount of variance 
(R
2
 = .33). T tests indicated that the slope was significantly different from zero for the 
numerical distance between comparisons (B = 10.94, SE = 1.29; t = 8.46, p < .001) and 
for the numerical total of comparisons (B = -3.51, SE = .74; t = -4.71, p < .001). The 
relationships were such that accuracy was higher when the numerical difference between 
comparison sets was largest (difference of 4: 88% correct, SE = 1.20) rather than smallest 
(difference of 2: 66% correct, SE = 1.81) and accuracy increased as the numerical total of 
comparisons decreased from a numerosity of 10 (59% correct, SE = 2.49) to a numerosity 
of 8 (88% correct, SE = 1.20) to a numerosity of 6 (74% correct, SE = 2.37). 
For the second regression, only the element area disparity ratio was significantly 
related to response time in the final regression model, F(1, 197) = 4.16, p = .043. The 
numerical distance, numerical total, and inter-element distance disparity ratio did not 
meet the F-entry criterion. The final regression model explained only a small amount of 
variance (R
2
 = .02). T tests indicated that the slope was significantly different from zero 
(B = .02, SE = .01; t = 2.04, p = .043) such that response times increased as the element 
area disparity ratio increased. 
5.2.1.5.2 Transfer Test (Phase 2) 
The right panel of Figure 5.2.6 displays Madu‘s accuracy during the transfer of 
learning test. Performance was evaluated across all 22 transfer test sessions for reinforced 
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baseline trials, nonreinforced baseline trials, and nonreinforced probe trials. These 
analyzes revealed that Madu responses exceeded chance with reinforced baseline trials 
(75% correct, n = 1,408; binomial test, ps < .001) and nonreinforced baseline trials (70% 
correct, n = 396; binomial test, p < .001), but were not different from chance for 
nonreinforced probe trials (54% correct, n = 396; binomial test, p = .073). 
Finally, analyzing nonreinforced probe trial accuracy across all 22 transfer 
sessions as a function of novel problem type and irrelevant dimension type revealed that 
Madu responded above chance with novel number-familiar cue-constant color and shape 
problems (67% correct, n = 33; binomial test, p = .040) and novel number-novel cue-
constant color and shape problems (65% correct, n = 57; binomial test, p = .017). Further, 
accuracy for novel number-familiar cue-constant color and shape problems and novel 
number-novel cue-constant color and shape problems (66% correct, n = 90) did not differ 
from the subject‘s criterion level accuracy with reinforced (72% correct, n = 192) and 
nonreinforced baseline trials (76% correct, n = 108) during the last 300 trials of Phase 1, 
χ
2
 (2, N = 390) = 2.68, p = .263. The subject‘s accuracy did not differ from chance for 
any other novel problem-irrelevant dimension type combination (binomial tests, ps > 
.095). Figure 5.2.8 displays the subject‘s accuracy during the transfer of learning test for 










Neither subject responded correctly to concurrent numerical identity and 
nonidentity problems after completing 4,000 trials in Experiment 4 when the irrelevant 
dimensions of color and shape were cue-ambiguous. Instead, they both exhibited 
avoidance and preference response patterns for the NOTA comparison stimulus and 
responded randomly when NOTA was not present as a comparison. Under CRF, Madu 
avoided selecting the NOTA comparison when it was present in the comparison stimulus 
pair regardless of whether it was correct to do so. The result was that her accuracy was 
high and above chance when the NOTA comparison was the incorrect stimulus and low 
and below what chance would predict when the NOTA comparison was the correct 
stimulus. On the other hand, under CRF, Junior preferred to select the NOTA comparison 
stimulus when it was present in the comparison stimulus pair regardless of whether it was 
correct to do so. The result was that his accuracy was high and above chance when the 
NOTA comparison was the correct stimulus and low and below chance when the NOTA 
was the incorrect stimulus. Interestingly, when the reinforcement schedule switched from 
CRF to VR-3, both subjects swapped response patterns; that is, Madu began to prefer to 
choose the NOTA comparison and Junior began to avoid the NOTA comparison. Finally, 
aside from preference and avoidance for the NOTA, both subjects responded randomly 
when only numerosity stimuli were present as comparisons before and after the 
reinforcement schedule changed from CRF to VR-3. 
Explaining the aforementioned pattern of preference and avoidance is difficult. If 
whole-nonidentity learning about color transferred from the earlier experiment detailed in 
Chapter 3, then subjects should have preferred to select the NOTA comparison whenever 
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it was present because the irrelevant dimensions were cue-ambiguous for identity and 
nonidentity problems so the color (and the shape) of a comparisons‘ elements never 
matched the sample. This is what Junior did at first under the CRF schedule and what 
Madu switched to do when the reinforcement schedule changed to VR-3 so transfer of 
learning about the NOTA comparison stimulus in terms of color whole-identity matching 
cannot account for the response patterns demonstrated in the present experiment by 
subjects.  
The change in reinforcement schedule seemed to prompt the switch in subject 
response pattern, which demonstrates that the orangutans were sensitive to the relative 
rate of reinforcement. Two different reinforcement schedules were utilized during the 
concurrent numerical identity and nonidentity tasks in Experiment 4 and during the first 
part of Experiment 5 because the previous work of other authors suggested that the 
schedule of reinforcement during conditional discrimination tasks affects acquisition. 
One report demonstrated that three monkeys learned conditional position discrimination 
problems that involved pairs of colors rapidly under CRF, but their performance was 
marked by repeated drops to chance accuracy levels; whereas, their performance under a 
VR schedule illustrated slow, but consistent increases in accuracy (Fujita, 1985). On the 
other hand, the conditional discrimination accuracy of pigeons was near chance under a 
CRF schedule, but became higher under an intermittent reinforcement schedule during 
acquisition (Ferster, 1960).  
After receiving 6,000 more trials during Experiment 5A, subjects did not respond 
above what chance would predict when the irrelevant dimensions remained cue-
ambiguous even though the NOTA stimulus was removed from the set of comparisons to 
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restrict the task to numerical identity responding, the problems reduced from all six 
problems to sets of two problems with the same sample numerosity presented in 
sequential trial blocks, and the reinforcement schedule changed from VR-3 to CRF. 
Because reliable discrimination did not emerge under either reinforcement schedule, the 
present experiment does not provide information about the effectiveness of continuous 
and partial reinforcement schedules in establishing conditional discrimination in 
nonhuman primates. 
In any case, after receiving 1,000 more trials under CRF during Experiment 5B, 
subjects still did not respond reliably above what chance would predict when one 
irrelevant dimension was made cue-constant while the other remained cue-ambiguous. 
Finally, when both irrelevant dimensions were made cue-constant and CRF still 
employed during Experiment 5C, Junior ceased to respond after completing about 900 
trials with his accuracy remaining around 50% correct during the first phase. Conversely, 
after completing 900 trials during the first phase of Experiment 5C, Madu reached the 
performance criteria by obtaining above chance accuracy (59% correct or better) for more 
than three consecutive sessions. Her accuracy continued to improve across the next 1,500 
trials when the set of numerical identity problems was again reduced from all six 
problems to sets of two problems that had the same sample numerosity that were 
presented in sequential trial blocks during the second, third, and fourth phases. During the 
final phase of Experiment 5C, Madu judged numerical identity with all six problems 
above what chance would predict. She reached an accuracy of 69% correct after 
completing 500 trials and her accuracy stabilizing at around 73% correct after completing 
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an additional 1,500 trials. In total, thus, Madu completed 15,500 trials while learning to 
respond to numerical identity for six problems. 
Numerical identity responding only occurred when irrelevant dimensions were 
cue-constant, in other words, when the color and shape of the elements that instantiated a 
numerosity were identical between all stimuli being compared. That Madu did not learn 
to match numerical identity or nonidentity when the irrelevant dimensions were not cue-
constant suggests that numerical identity responding must first be established with 
between-stimulus variability at its lowest level before it can be established at higher 
levels. Confirmation of the aforementioned may be provided in the future if Madu 
demonstrates an ability to respond to numerical identity for the same six problems or 
subsets of the six problems when at least one irrelevant dimension is cue-ambiguous. The 
establishment of numerical identity responding with between-stimulus variability at its 
highest level before it is established at the lowest level has not yet been demonstrated in 
nonhuman primates (in Chapter 4, c.f., Cantlon & Brannon, 2007; Merritt, Rugani, & 
Brannon, 2009; Woodruff & Premack, 1981). 
During criterion learning when both color and shape were cue-constant during the 
five phases of Experiment 5C, Madu was least accurate when judging numerical identity 
for the 4 → 4, not 6 problem, which is defined by the largest numerical size and the 
smallest numerical distance. Indeed, both the numerical distance and the numerical size 
of comparisons were significant predictors of accuracy such that accuracy was highest 
when the difference in the number of element between comparisons was large and when 
the total number of the elements for comparisons was small. Additionally, both numerical 
distance and the element area disparity ratio predicted the subject‘s latency to respond, 
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although they were only weakly predicative. The effects were such that Madu took longer 
to respond when the numerical distance between stimuli was small rather than large and 
when the element area disparity ratio was larger rather than smaller. Large element area 
disparity ratios indicate that the sample and correct comparison‘s element areas were 
more different than were the sample and incorrect comparison‘s element areas. Madu 
went on to obtain above chance accuracy when 36% of the familiar, trained numerical 
identity problems were not followed by reinforcement during the first phase of 
Experiment 6. Again, the subject‘s numerical identity matching ability was inferior for 4 
→ 4, not 6, numerical distance and the numerical size were significant predictors of 
accuracy, and the element area disparity ratio was a significant but weak predictor of 
response latency. It is important to note that the element area disparity ratio and inter-
element distance disparity ratio were never significant predictors of criterion accuracy 
during the five phases of Experiment 5C or when 36% of the familiar, trained numerical 
identity problems were not followed by reinforcement during the first phase of 
Experiment 6. These continuous quantities were experimentally controlled to prevent 
them from influencing accuracy even though it seems that one exerted an effect on 
response latency. 
The aforementioned numerical magnitude and distance effects coupled with 
Madu‘s ability to respond to numerical identity with problems that included 4 and 6 
elements, is consonant with the idea that cardinality is not encoded exactly as object-files 
or otherwise, but instead is encoded as magnitudes with scalar variability as proposed in 
the accumulator model (Gallistel & Gelman, 2000). Similarly, the accuracy of one 
language-trained chimpanzee called Ai showed the same kind of numerical distance and 
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numerical size effects (Matsuzawa, 1985; Matsuzawa et al., 1986) and the accuracy and 
response latency of four monkeys showed the same kind of numerical distance effects 
(Merritt, Rugani, & Brannon, 2009) during their training on numerical identity tasks.  
The final topic for discussion is concept formation. During the final phase of 
Experiment 6, numerical identity responding partially transferred to 2 of the 12 transfer 
test novel problem-irrelevant dimension types despite the small number of training 
numerosities, colors, and shapes employed. The present study utilized six numerical 
identity problems that employed three different numerosities, three different colors, and 
three different shapes during training to establish the conditional discrimination; thus, the 
universe of numerosities, colors, and shapes was not narrowed substantially. This means 
that the transfer of learning that occurred is not likely because the novel transfer stimuli 
physically resembled one or more of the training stimuli.  
Concept formation occurred for 2 of the 3 transfer test problems that were defined 
by cue-constant irrelevant dimensions; that is, for novel number-familiar colors and 
shapes and for novel number-novel colors and shapes, but not for familiar number-novel 
colors and shapes. Acquisition of the conditional discrimination occurred only when the 
irrelevant dimensions of problems were both cue-constant; thus, it is likely that the 
generality of concept formation was restricted to the same domain such that concepts did 
not form for problems that had one or more cue-ambiguous irrelevant dimensions. 
Restricted-domain relational learning is defined as being able to perform a task 
relationally within limits that are circumscribed by the training stimuli and increasing the 
training set of stimuli is the mechanism that expands the domain (Wright & Katz, 2009; 
Wright & Lickteig, 2010). 
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In the introduction to the dissertation, I asserted that comparative examinations 
between all sister ape species and nonverbal human infants are necessary to discover 
information about the origins, mechanisms, and development of primate cognition. 
Operant procedures have not yet been utilized with nonverbal human infants to discover 
how they learn about and conceptualize numerical identity; furthermore, the research 
reports that employ habituation/dishabituation and novelty procedures to investigate 
numerical cognition do not document the language production and comprehension 
abilities of their infant participants. Nonhuman primates and nonverbal human infants 
may share the same set of basic numerical competencies, in particular, the ability to 
relationally learn and form domain-specific concepts about numerical identity.  
That Madu continued to match based on numerical identity for the majority of 
novel numerical identity problems that fell within the domain of her earlier learning 
illustrates an ability to form a conceptual understanding of cardinal number identity for 
the first time in a nonlanguage-trained ape without the use of symbols and between sets 
of numerosities as indexed by successful transfer of learning to novel numerosities 
instantiated in familiar and novel element colors and shape. As such, this experiment 
provides evidence that converges with what was previously demonstrated in an 
enculturated chimpanzee with symbols and in language-trained chimpanzees with and 
without the use of symbols (Boysen & Berntson, 1989; Matsuzawa, 1985; Matsuzawa et 
al., 1986; Woodruff & Premack, 1981) and in monkeys (Cantlon & Brannon, 2007; 





It has been said that detecting identity and nonidentity is central to human 
cognition (Wasserman & Young, 2010), but few researchers attempt to account for 
exactly how organisms learn relational concepts about identity and nonidentity from their 
experiences. It is a hard proposition because any specific example of a relation is always 
instantiated with some specific set of arguments (e.g., a specific object is above another 
specific object) so it is never possible to observe an example of a pure disembodied 
relation (Mandler, 2000). A handful of researchers have originated psychological and 
neural network models to answer questions about relational learning and concept 
formation. 
One of the recent models to account for how relational concepts form from 
specific examples was proposed by Doumas, Hummel, and Sandhofer (2008). According 
to their discovery of relations by analogy (DORA) model, during comparison the 
properties that objects share become more active than the properties unique to one object 
or the other. New tokens for the shared roles or objects are connected to the most active 
features to reflect the feature overlap explicitly. For example, when a child thinks about 
an elephant and a truck simultaneously, it activates their constituent features (elephants 
are big, gray, and have trunks, whereas, trucks are big, metallic, and have wheels). The 
feature that is shared by the elephant and truck (i.e., big) receives twice as much input 
and become twice as more active than unshared features and then, a new unit learns the 
connection to the most active feature and links it together. Applied iteratively, DORA 
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results in progressively more refinements and eventually in multi-place relational 
structures. 
This model highlights the importance of part-identity in the discovery of relations. 
Indeed, our world is full of objects that differ from one another across multiple stimulus 
dimensions (Evans & Smith, 1988; Lea & Wills, 2008; Smith, 1989). Developmentally, 
relational learning begins with the discovery of global identity in early childhood, but 
later the ability extends to include discovering identity between shared common attributes 
(Burns, 1992; Kemler, 1983; Smith, 1984; Smith, 1993; Smith & Heise, 1992). Even so, 
it does not follow that humans and nonhuman animals will automatically use all the 
dimensional information available to them to categorize or conceptualize things (Lea & 
Wills, 2008). The series of experiments within this dissertation showed that both 
orangutans learned to judge color whole-identity and nonidentity. They went on to learn 
to judge color and shape whole- and part-identity, but the extent to which they did so 
differed in terms of the type of identity (part vs. whole) and the relevant dimension (color 
vs. shape), and they were even able to conceptualize some identity relations. 
Our world is also full of collections of objects that differ from one another in their 
cardinality. Again, it does not follow that humans and nonhuman animals automatically 
will use cardinal number to categorize or conceptualize collections of things. The series 
of experiments within this dissertation showed that one orangutan failed to judge 
numerical identity at first when between-stimulus variability was at the highest and 
intermediate level (i.e., four brown circles is the same as four blue triangles), but 
succeeded in doing so when between-stimulus variability was at its lowest (e.g., four 
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brown circles is the same as four brown circles). Additionally, this subject was able to 
conceptualize numerical identity, but only in a domain-specific way. 
Finding that conditional discrimination failed to transfer to some novel stimuli, 
but successfully transferred to other novel stimuli for the two orangutans, supplies some 
support for restricted-domain relational learning. Restricted-domain relational learning is 
the idea that relational learning can operate within a restricted portion of the stimulus 
domain that is defined by the characteristics of the training stimuli (Wright & Katz, 2009; 
Wright & Lickteig, 2010). It is a different way of thinking about concept learning that 
somewhat paradoxically concludes relational learning in the absence of transfer of 
learning to novel stimuli. What this means is that concept formation may not be an all-or-
none phenomena, but be best characterized as a domain that can expand.  
Number is typically treated as its own separate conceptual process, but perhaps it 
is better thought of as a constituent property of a collection of things just like color and 
shape can be constituent properties of objects. Indeed, differentiating numerical 
information from other kinds of information and differentiating the relations between 
numerical information from the relations between other kinds of information are 
components involved in the posited developmental progression of numerical knowledge 
in human infants. Specifically, numerical information is theorized to exist first in 
unordered subitized states for which there is no understanding that N-ness concerns 
information about the same kind of thing. In other words, oneness and twoness are 
initially unrelated to each other such that oneness is different from twoness just as 
oneness is different from blueness. The next capability added to the system involves 
infants realizing that N-ness concerns information about the same kind of thing. In other 
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words, infants learn that numerical information is an independent characteristic of stimuli 
such that the relation among different N-nesses are relations of the same type that are 
unlike other kinds of relations (e.g., the relation between blueness and blueness is not the 
same as the relation between oneness and oneness). This provides the basis for 
generalizing the concept of equality of number from one small numerosity to another 
(Cooper, 1984; Wynn, 1992a) (but see also, Brainerd, 1979; Simon, 1997; Strauss & 
Curtis, 1984). 
Are primates predisposed to learn about and conceptualize numerical identity in a 
way that is different from the way that they learn about and conceptualize other things 
(Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; Geary, 2000; Wynn, 1992b, 1998a, 1998b)? This paper 
does not claim to provide an answer to this question, but the patterns in how the 
orangutans responded to and conceptualized identity support the notion that recognizing 
identity is more difficult when the stimuli being compared are more divergent, regardless 
of whether the stimuli are numerical or not. So it is harder to judge part-identity and it is 
harder to judge numerical identity when irrelevant dimensions are cue-ambiguous 
because the compared sets are defined by a high level of between-stimulus variability. 
This dissertation found that two orangutans were able to relationally learn about and 
conceptualize identity and sometimes nonidentity in terms of color, shape, and cardinal 
number with some constraints. To generate a complete picture about the mechanisms, 
origins, and development of cognition, it is essential to continue to investigate these types 
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